WASHINGTON – As we approach the one-year anniversary of the assassination attempt of President Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Secret Service remembers Corey Comperatore, who was tragically killed, as well as David Dutch and James Copenhaver, who were injured that day alongside President Donald J. Trump. The July 13 attack was nothing short of a tragedy, one felt not only by those in Butler that day, but around the world. It also represents an operational failure that the Secret Service will carry as a reminder of the critical importance of its zero-fail mission and the need for continuous improvement.
As is well documented in both internal and external reports, breakdowns in communication, technological issues, and human failure, among other contributing factors, led to the events of July 13. Today, with the support of the United States Congress and President Trump, the agency is laser-focused on ensuring that those we are sworn to protect, the public, and the dedicated men and women of the Secret Service are never let down again.
“One year ago, I was by President Trump’s side when a lone gunman attempted to assassinate him in Butler, Pennsylvania,” said Secret Service Director Sean Curran. “My heart will always be with all those impacted on that day, especially Corey Comperatore, who lost his life while protecting those around him. Since President Trump appointed me as director of the United States Secret Service, I have kept my experience on July 13 top of mind, and the agency has taken many steps to ensure such an event can never be repeated in the future. Nothing is more important to the Secret Service than the safety and security of our protectees. As director, I am committed to ensuring our agency is fully equipped, resourced, and aligned to carry out our important mission each and every day.”
Under Director Curran’s leadership, the Secret Service is focused on executing his strategic plan, which aims to meet today’s challenges by aligning the organization under five pillars – Operations, Human Capital, Resources and Physical Assets, Training and Technology.
Over this last year, the Secret Service also took a serious look at our operations, reviewed the recommendations made by external oversight bodies and subsequently implemented numerous operational, policy and organizational reforms.
Of the 46 recommendations currently made by Congressional oversight bodies, the Secret Service implemented 21, 16 are in progress, and nine are addressed to non- Secret Service stakeholders. Among the reforms implemented are changes to the Secret Service’s protective operations policies to ensure clear lines of accountability and improved information sharing with local law enforcement partners, the creation of an Aviation and Airspace Security division dedicated to maintaining the agency’s critical aerial monitoring capabilities, and modifications to the agency’s resourcing process, in order to ensure that assets are better accounted for and appropriately applied.
The Secret Service also understands the importance of accountability. Following the official disciplinary review process, the agency is taking action against six individuals. Due to the Privacy Act of 1974, the Secret Service is prohibited from releasing the names of the individuals, however those disciplinary actions range from 10- to 42-day suspensions without pay, with all individuals placed on restricted duty or into non-operational positions.
The reforms made over this last year are just the beginning, and the agency will continue to assess its operations, review recommendations and make additional changes as needed.
The Secret Service is grateful for the continued and unwavering support of President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security and Congress as we continue to work to ensure that the events of July 13, 2024, are never repeated.
Secret Service Reform Tables
Reforms from Recommendations in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Interim Report | ||
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Recommendation | Implemented | Summary of Secret Service action taken/to be taken |
1 – For all protective events, the Secret Service should improve coordination and specify responsibilities among federal, state and local law enforcement partners. | Yes |
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2 - Secret Service policies and protocols should require advance planning leads to request and review state and local operational plans in advance of any protective event. | Yes | |
3 - In advance of each protective event, the Secret Service should designate a single individual responsible for approving all plans, including the responsibility for approving security perimeters. | Yes | The Secret Service modified the Protective Operations Manual to clarify the lines of accountability for protective events. |
4 - Congress should require that Secret Service record its radio transmissions at all protective events. | N/A - Addressed to Congress | These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations. That said, the Secret Service took the following actions that are within our authority to assist with the implementation of these recommendations:
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5 - Congress should require DHS and Secret Service to evaluate the steps it needs to take to ensure communication plans with state and local partners are fully executed when conducting law enforcement and/or first response activities at a given location. | N/A - addressed to Congress | |
6 - Congress should require that DHS and Secret Service report to Congress any steps taken to remedy past failures to execute communications plans and to ensure compliance with those plans in the future. | N/A - addressed to Congress | |
7 - Secret Service should consider sending additional assets, including counter snipers, to all future outdoor protective events as it evaluates intelligence and threats against protectees. | Yes |
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8 - Secret Service should also ensure that the appropriate agents working protective events are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against protectees. | Yes | Protective operations and intelligence policies were revised to address this recommendation, including clarifying responsibility for intelligence sharing leading up to and during protective events. |
9 - Congress should require that Secret Service allocate assets and resources based on the threat level, not the position or title of the protectee. | N/A - addressed to Congress | These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations. That said, the Secret Service took the following actions that are within our authority to assist with the implementation of these recommendations:
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Reforms from Recommendations in the House Task Force Report | ||
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Recommendation | Implemented | Summary of Secret Service action taken/to be taken |
1 - Consolidate all Operations Plans | Yes | The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners. |
2 - Consider Coverage Inside and Outside Secured Perimeter | Yes | The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities of advance team members, and updating the requirements for sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners. |
3 - Document All Line-of-Sight Vulnerabilities | Yes | The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to documentation requirements for line-of-sight concerns and mitigation measures. |
4 - Implement written policy that clearly articulates a threat-based methodology for asset and resource approval | Yes | Recent legislation, H.R. 9106 Enhanced Presidential Security Act of 2024, was signed into law on October 1, 2024. This legislation requires the Secret Service to “apply the same standards for determining the number of agents required to protect Presidents, Vice Presidents, and major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.” The Secret Service is in full compliance with this legislation. |
5 - Utilize Secret Service counter-surveillance assets for all large outdoor events | Yes | The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying roles and responsibilities for protective advance teams and the practices and procedures for determining the appropriate type and number of assets to secure protective events. |
6 - Implement a policy on sharing relevant intelligence for an advance trip among the Protective Intelligence Division, the detail, and the relevant field office | Yes |
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7 - Improve C-UAS mitigation strategies for when C-UAS or other drone systems fail | In-progress |
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8 - Implement and increase formalized training, certification, and cross-functional platform training for drone and C-UAS operator | In-progress |
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9 - Ensure that drone and C-UAS operators assigned to events have passed and maintained required training and certification as well as any necessary updates. | In-progress |
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10 - The DHS and Secret Service should consider utilizing Department of Defense (DOD) drone operators to supplement Secret Service efforts at protectee events under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act | In-progress | While the Secret Service appreciates the support from all local, state and federal partners it cannot become reliant on them to execute the protective mission as the Secret Service cannot guarantee other agencies assets will always be available when needed, due to fulfilling their own statutory missions. The Secret Service took the following actions to address the intent of this recommendation:
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11 - Congress should consider whether current legal authorities to mitigate credible threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) should be expanded. | N/A - addressed to Congress | This recommendation was addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject this recommendation. |
12 - The Secret Service needs to make every effort to ensure representatives from all state and local law enforcement agencies assisting with security for a protectee event are in a unified security room | Yes | The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and took the following actions to address this recommendation:
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13 - The Secret Service should ensure that all state and Local Law Enforcement partners have a communications plan in place for protectee events and a Secret Service special agent should be designated to collect and review those plans | Yes | The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. |
14 - Secret Service should ensure that its personnel and its state and local partners all establish a hierarchy for method of communication and each entity alert its Law Enforcement Officers when switching to a different medium | Yes | The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. This includes further refined communication guidelines regarding primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication channels. |
15 - To assist with any potential reviews and investigations, Secret Service should record all Secret Service radio communications | In-progress |
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16 - Secret Service should assess already-available technology and examine ways to utilize it to improve their operations | In-progress |
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17 - Prioritize periodic training on protective operations in order to ensure that agents stay current on their training, even during busy times | In-progress |
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18 - Provide more defined training curriculum and set specific requirements and timeframes for regular training | In-progress | The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures as they relate to training. Training courses have been refined and enhanced to ensure uniformity of training and other operational benefits. Additionally, the Office of Training continues to work enterprise wide to assess ongoing training needs, to anticipate future needs, and work to implement curricula that meets the ever-evolving mission needs of the Secret Service. |
19 - Work with DHS Homeland Security and Investigations (HSI) to ensure that HSI agents that participate in Secret Service-led protective operations receive training that is appropriate to the tasks that they are asked to support | In-progress |
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20 - Early in the planning process, the Secret Service advance team needs to confirm the primary representative for each state and local law enforcement agency and which agencies will be working jointly and independently drafting operations plans | Yes | The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, streamlined communications, and clarified the roles and responsibilities for the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event. This includes confirmation of involvement of primary representatives from each state and local law enforcement agency that will be supporting the protective visit. |
21 - Provide a unified briefing on the day of the event | Yes | It is Secret Service policy and practice to conduct a police meeting with our federal, state and local partners as the initial event of an advance. This is in addition to individual coordination meetings between Secret Service units/programs and federal, state, and local counterparts that occur throughout the advance process. The Secret Service took the following actions to address this recommendation:
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22 - Conduct mandatory pre-event meetings for key stakeholders on a daily basis | Yes | It is Secret Service policy and practice to conduct a police meeting with our federal, state and local partners as the initial event of an advance. This is in addition to individual coordination meetings between Secret Service units/programs and federal, state, and local counterparts that occur throughout the advance process. The Secret Service took the following actions to address this recommendation:
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23 - Secret Service must affirmatively state which Secret Service office or protective detail is the lead for an event | Yes | The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities of advance team members, and updating the requirements for sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners. |
24 - Implement a hardened vehicle for use on a golf course | In-progress | The Secret Service currently has two armored ATVs for use on golf courses and three additional armored ATVs are in production. Additional resources have been requested to expand the armored vehicle program. |
25 - Review protocols for sweeping golf courses | In-progress |
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26 - Increase reliance on K9 sweeps | In-progress | The Secret Service is evaluating for implementation. |
27 - Record all radio transmissions and evaluate communications retention policies | In-progress |
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28 - Consider staffing redundancies for high pressure moments | In-progress |
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29 – Develop and formalize process for escalating conflicts with protectee staff | Yes | The Secret Service updated its protective operations policies to outline how conflicts with a protectee’s staff should be addressed. This updated policy dictates when and how conflicts with a protectee’s staff should be officially documented. |
30 - Provide more robust training for non-Secret Service federal personnel on-site | In-progress |
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31 – Prioritize experience in assignment process | Yes | Secret Service has developed and is utilizing a dashboard and internal program that captures the protective experience of all special agents. This information is accessible to all supervisory staff in making staffing decisions. |
32 - In-person advance activities must include all relevant subject matter experts | In-progress |
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33 - Review Secret Service budget, staffing, and retention | In-progress |
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34 - Reduce the number of protectees | N/A - addressed to Congress | These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations. |
35 - Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security should review the Secret Service’s investigative role | N/A - addressed to Congress | |
36 - Evaluate whether Secret Service should remain inside the Department of Homeland Security | N/A - addressed to Congress | |
37 - Congress should clarify its right to obtain law enforcement sensitive information | N/A - addressed to Congress |