Published By

U.S. Secret Service Media Relations

Published Date

2025-07-10

WASHINGTON – As we approach the one-year anniversary of the assassination attempt of President Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Secret Service remembers Corey Comperatore, who was tragically killed, as well as David Dutch and James Copenhaver, who were injured that day alongside President Donald J. Trump. The July 13 attack was nothing short of a tragedy, one felt not only by those in Butler that day, but around the world. It also represents an operational failure that the Secret Service will carry as a reminder of the critical importance of its zero-fail mission and the need for continuous improvement.

As is well documented in both internal and external reports, breakdowns in communication, technological issues, and human failure, among other contributing factors, led to the events of July 13. Today, with the support of the United States Congress and President Trump, the agency is laser-focused on ensuring that those we are sworn to protect, the public, and the dedicated men and women of the Secret Service are never let down again.

“One year ago, I was by President Trump’s side when a lone gunman attempted to assassinate him in Butler, Pennsylvania,” said Secret Service Director Sean Curran. “My heart will always be with all those impacted on that day, especially Corey Comperatore, who lost his life while protecting those around him. Since President Trump appointed me as director of the United States Secret Service, I have kept my experience on July 13 top of mind, and the agency has taken many steps to ensure such an event can never be repeated in the future. Nothing is more important to the Secret Service than the safety and security of our protectees. As director, I am committed to ensuring our agency is fully equipped, resourced, and aligned to carry out our important mission each and every day.”

Under Director Curran’s leadership, the Secret Service is focused on executing his strategic plan, which aims to meet today’s challenges by aligning the organization under five pillars – Operations, Human Capital, Resources and Physical Assets, Training and Technology.

Over this last year, the Secret Service also took a serious look at our operations, reviewed the recommendations made by external oversight bodies and subsequently implemented numerous operational, policy and organizational reforms.

Of the 46 recommendations currently made by Congressional oversight bodies, the Secret Service implemented 21, 16 are in progress, and nine are addressed to non- Secret Service stakeholders. Among the reforms implemented are changes to the Secret Service’s protective operations policies to ensure clear lines of accountability and improved information sharing with local law enforcement partners, the creation of an Aviation and Airspace Security division dedicated to maintaining the agency’s critical aerial monitoring capabilities, and modifications to the agency’s resourcing process, in order to ensure that assets are better accounted for and appropriately applied.

The Secret Service also understands the importance of accountability. Following the official disciplinary review process, the agency is taking action against six individuals. Due to the Privacy Act of 1974, the Secret Service is prohibited from releasing the names of the individuals, however those disciplinary actions range from 10- to 42-day suspensions without pay, with all individuals placed on restricted duty or into non-operational positions.

The reforms made over this last year are just the beginning, and the agency will continue to assess its operations, review recommendations and make additional changes as needed.

The Secret Service is grateful for the continued and unwavering support of President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security and Congress as we continue to work to ensure that the events of July 13, 2024, are never repeated.

Secret Service Reform Tables

Reforms from Recommendations in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Interim Report
Recommendation	Implemented	Summary of Secret Service action taken/to be taken
1 – For all protective events, the Secret Service should improve coordination and specify responsibilities among federal, state and local law enforcement partners.	Yes	The Secret Service revised the Protective Operations Manual to streamline advance procedures and communication practices, to include the policies and practices for conducting police meetings with federal, state and local partners. Protective operations policies were updated to clarify staffing requirements and operational coordination expectations. Protective operations policies were updated to further clarify roles and responsibilities for the completion of successful visits.
2 - Secret Service policies and protocols should require advance planning leads to request and review state and local operational plans in advance of any protective event.	Yes
3 - In advance of each protective event, the Secret Service should designate a single individual responsible for approving all plans, including the responsibility for approving security perimeters.	Yes	The Secret Service modified the Protective Operations Manual to clarify the lines of accountability for protective events.
4 - Congress should require that Secret Service record its radio transmissions at all protective events.	N/A - Addressed to Congress	These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations. That said, the Secret Service took the following actions that are within our authority to assist with the implementation of these recommendations: Realigned radio communications and updated practices and procedures regarding radio communications and operations. Participated in the Protective Events Communications Task Force, a DHS joint effort between the Secret Service and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Agency. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
5 - Congress should require DHS and Secret Service to evaluate the steps it needs to take to ensure communication plans with state and local partners are fully executed when conducting law enforcement and/or first response activities at a given location.	N/A - addressed to Congress
6 - Congress should require that DHS and Secret Service report to Congress any steps taken to remedy past failures to execute communications plans and to ensure compliance with those plans in the future.	N/A - addressed to Congress
7 - Secret Service should consider sending additional assets, including counter snipers, to all future outdoor protective events as it evaluates intelligence and threats against protectees.	Yes	The Secret Service continued to send additional assets to outdoor protective events following July 13, to include enhanced C-UAS detection and mitigation when available and UAS support for aerial surveillance when available and appropriate. Completed revisions to the Protective Operations Manual to require personnel to define the scope of protective visits and determine the appropriate type and number of assets to support the secure environment. Developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
8 - Secret Service should also ensure that the appropriate agents working protective events are informed of relevant intelligence and threats against protectees.	Yes	Protective operations and intelligence policies were revised to address this recommendation, including clarifying responsibility for intelligence sharing leading up to and during protective events.
9 - Congress should require that Secret Service allocate assets and resources based on the threat level, not the position or title of the protectee.	N/A - addressed to Congress	These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations. That said, the Secret Service took the following actions that are within our authority to assist with the implementation of these recommendations: The Secret Service submitted resource requests to facilitate requirements for equipment, staffing, and resources to further enable this recommendation.

Reforms from Recommendations in the House Task Force Report
Recommendation	Implemented	Summary of Secret Service action taken/to be taken
1 - Consolidate all Operations Plans	Yes	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners.
2 - Consider Coverage Inside and Outside Secured Perimeter	Yes	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities of advance team members, and updating the requirements for sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners.
3 - Document All Line-of-Sight Vulnerabilities	Yes	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to documentation requirements for line-of-sight concerns and mitigation measures.
4 - Implement written policy that clearly articulates a threat-based methodology for asset and resource approval	Yes	Recent legislation, H.R. 9106 Enhanced Presidential Security Act of 2024, was signed into law on October 1, 2024. This legislation requires the Secret Service to “apply the same standards for determining the number of agents required to protect Presidents, Vice Presidents, and major Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.” The Secret Service is in full compliance with this legislation.
5 - Utilize Secret Service counter-surveillance assets for all large outdoor events	Yes	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying roles and responsibilities for protective advance teams and the practices and procedures for determining the appropriate type and number of assets to secure protective events.
6 - Implement a policy on sharing relevant intelligence for an advance trip among the Protective Intelligence Division, the detail, and the relevant field office	Yes	Streamlined communications with the advance team, state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. Revised the Protective Operations Manual clarifying roles and responsibilities for the completion of successful visits. Further clarified final briefing topics and the purpose of final briefings.
7 - Improve C-UAS mitigation strategies for when C-UAS or other drone systems fail	In-progress	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to overseeing all sUAS, C-UAS and air domain operations. A new Aviation Division was created and continues to develop capabilities to provide greater operational support for the protective mission.
8 - Implement and increase formalized training, certification, and cross-functional platform training for drone and C-UAS operator	In-progress	To improve overhead surveillance for outdoor events, the Secret Service is working to procure additional assets and capabilities to increase end user visibility by expanding video distribution capabilities. The Secret Service is evaluating training on how to best improve C-UAS coverage in support of all mission areas. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
9 - Ensure that drone and C-UAS operators assigned to events have passed and maintained required training and certification as well as any necessary updates.	In-progress	The Secret Service is working to procure additional sUAS technology and collaborating to expand additional capabilities to provide greater operational support. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
10 - The DHS and Secret Service should consider utilizing Department of Defense (DOD) drone operators to supplement Secret Service efforts at protectee events under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act	In-progress	While the Secret Service appreciates the support from all local, state and federal partners it cannot become reliant on them to execute the protective mission as the Secret Service cannot guarantee other agencies assets will always be available when needed, due to fulfilling their own statutory missions. The Secret Service took the following actions to address the intent of this recommendation: The Secret Service is working to procure additional sUAS technology and collaborating to expand additional capabilities to provide greater operational support. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
11 - Congress should consider whether current legal authorities to mitigate credible threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) should be expanded.	N/A - addressed to Congress	This recommendation was addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject this recommendation.
12 - The Secret Service needs to make every effort to ensure representatives from all state and local law enforcement agencies assisting with security for a protectee event are in a unified security room	Yes	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and took the following actions to address this recommendation: Streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. Revised the Protective Operations Manual clarifying roles and responsibilities for the completion of successful visits. Further clarified final briefing topics and the purpose of final briefings. Created a fleet of Mobile Command Vehicles that will provide an area where Secret Service leaders and key public safety partners can collaborate and share technology during large scale events and crises. These vehicles will be pre-positioned in regional field offices across the country.
13 - The Secret Service should ensure that all state and Local Law Enforcement partners have a communications plan in place for protectee events and a Secret Service special agent should be designated to collect and review those plans	Yes	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner.
14 - Secret Service should ensure that its personnel and its state and local partners all establish a hierarchy for method of communication and each entity alert its Law Enforcement Officers when switching to a different medium	Yes	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. This includes further refined communication guidelines regarding primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communication channels.
15 - To assist with any potential reviews and investigations, Secret Service should record all Secret Service radio communications	In-progress	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to realigning radio communications and operations. Secret Service continues to leverage the latest communications technology to expand the enterprise’s ability to record radio transmissions. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
16 - Secret Service should assess already-available technology and examine ways to utilize it to improve their operations	In-progress	The Secret Service continues its collaboration in the Protective Events Communications Task Force, a DHS joint effort between Secret Service and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
17 - Prioritize periodic training on protective operations in order to ensure that agents stay current on their training, even during busy times	In-progress	The Secret Service revised written policies and training curriculum concerning advance and site responsibility. In addition, The Secret Service employs the Leadership Development System (LEADS), a competency-based leadership development framework built for all occupational groups and grade levels across the Secret Service workforce. Continuous improvement of enforcement that all supervisors complete the training remains a focus. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
18 - Provide more defined training curriculum and set specific requirements and timeframes for regular training	In-progress	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures as they relate to training. Training courses have been refined and enhanced to ensure uniformity of training and other operational benefits. Additionally, the Office of Training continues to work enterprise wide to assess ongoing training needs, to anticipate future needs, and work to implement curricula that meets the ever-evolving mission needs of the Secret Service.
19 - Work with DHS Homeland Security and Investigations (HSI) to ensure that HSI agents that participate in Secret Service-led protective operations receive training that is appropriate to the tasks that they are asked to support	In-progress	The Secret Service is considering a plan to provide multi-day protection-related add-on instruction to HSI basic training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). This training would occur at the conclusion of HSI basic training and focus on preparing HSI personnel to support the Secret Service protective mission during NSSEs and other events. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
20 - Early in the planning process, the Secret Service advance team needs to confirm the primary representative for each state and local law enforcement agency and which agencies will be working jointly and independently drafting operations plans	Yes	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, streamlined communications, and clarified the roles and responsibilities for the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event. This includes confirmation of involvement of primary representatives from each state and local law enforcement agency that will be supporting the protective visit.
21 - Provide a unified briefing on the day of the event	Yes	It is Secret Service policy and practice to conduct a police meeting with our federal, state and local partners as the initial event of an advance. This is in addition to individual coordination meetings between Secret Service units/programs and federal, state, and local counterparts that occur throughout the advance process. The Secret Service took the following actions to address this recommendation: Streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. Revised the Protective Operations Manual clarifying roles and responsibilities for the completion of successful visits. Further clarified final briefing topics and the purpose of final briefings.
22 - Conduct mandatory pre-event meetings for key stakeholders on a daily basis	Yes	It is Secret Service policy and practice to conduct a police meeting with our federal, state and local partners as the initial event of an advance. This is in addition to individual coordination meetings between Secret Service units/programs and federal, state, and local counterparts that occur throughout the advance process. The Secret Service took the following actions to address this recommendation: Streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. Revised the Protective Operations Manual clarifying roles and responsibilities for the completion of successful visits. Further clarified final briefing topics and the purpose of final briefings.
23 - Secret Service must affirmatively state which Secret Service office or protective detail is the lead for an event	Yes	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities of advance team members, and updating the requirements for sharing and receiving security and tactical plans with law enforcement partners.
24 - Implement a hardened vehicle for use on a golf course	In-progress	The Secret Service currently has two armored ATVs for use on golf courses and three additional armored ATVs are in production. Additional resources have been requested to expand the armored vehicle program.
25 - Review protocols for sweeping golf courses	In-progress	The Secret Service has created a new Aviation Division to oversee all aerial operations. To improve overhead surveillance for outdoor events, the Aviation Division is working to procure additional sUAS technology. The Secret Service is actively working to recruit additional administrative, professional and technical personnel to provide additional aerial support to law enforcement personnel.
26 - Increase reliance on K9 sweeps	In-progress	The Secret Service is evaluating for implementation.
27 - Record all radio transmissions and evaluate communications retention policies	In-progress	The Secret Service updated policies and procedures with respect to realigning radio communications and operations. Secret Service continues to leverage the latest communications technology to expand the enterprise’s ability to record radio transmissions. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
28 - Consider staffing redundancies for high pressure moments	In-progress	Realigned radio communications and updated practices and procedures regarding radio communications and operations. Participated in the Protective Events Communications Task Force, a DHS joint effort between Secret Service and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
29 – Develop and formalize process for escalating conflicts with protectee staff	Yes	The Secret Service updated its protective operations policies to outline how conflicts with a protectee’s staff should be addressed. This updated policy dictates when and how conflicts with a protectee’s staff should be officially documented.
30 - Provide more robust training for non-Secret Service federal personnel on-site	In-progress	The Secret Service is considering a plan to provide multi-day protection-related add-on instruction to HSI basic training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). This training would occur at the conclusion of HSI basic training and focus on preparing HSI personnel to support the Secret Service protective mission during NSSEs and other events. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
31 – Prioritize experience in assignment process	Yes	Secret Service has developed and is utilizing a dashboard and internal program that captures the protective experience of all special agents. This information is accessible to all supervisory staff in making staffing decisions.
32 - In-person advance activities must include all relevant subject matter experts	In-progress	The Secret Service evaluated, modified policies and procedures, and streamlined communications with the advance team and state and/or local partners assigned to the event to pass and obtain information in a timely manner. Further refined communication guidelines guide discussions, practices, and procedures for determining the appropriate type and number of assets to secure the event. The Protective Operations Manual was modified to include clarifications to the lines of accountability. The Secret Service has developed additional resource requests to address the equipping, staffing, and resourcing requirements to meet the full intent of this recommendation.
33 - Review Secret Service budget, staffing, and retention	In-progress	The Secret Service is in the process of evaluating its methodology for protectee resourcing and staffing models. The Secret Service is committed to fulfilling this recommendation by increasing our own staffing and resources, versus increasing our reliance on external law enforcement organizations to augment operations.
34 - Reduce the number of protectees	N/A - addressed to Congress	These recommendations were addressed to Congress. The Secret Service does not have the authority to accept or reject these recommendations.
35 - Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security should review the Secret Service’s investigative role	N/A - addressed to Congress
36 - Evaluate whether Secret Service should remain inside the Department of Homeland Security	N/A - addressed to Congress
37 - Congress should clarify its right to obtain law enforcement sensitive information	N/A - addressed to Congress

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U.S. Secret Service One-Year Update Following the July 13, 2024, Attempted Assassination of President Donald Trump

Secret Service Reform Tables