May 4, 1981

Inspector Behl

 Attempted Assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981

Director

The Office of Inspection, U. S. Secret Service, conducted an internal investigation into the attempted assassination of President Reagan.

The investigation was conducted during the period of March 31, 1981 to May 1, 1981 and the results of that investigation are contained in the attached report.

Dennis T. Brosan
Inspector

Roger D. Counts
Inspector

William G. Driscoll
Assistant Inspector

Richard L. Foree
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TUB: sjl
The following is a list of answers to questions posed, general statements, criticisms levied and procedures questioned regarding U. S. Secret Service actions as a result of the assassination attempt on President Reagan as found in newspaper articles and media transcripts of the incident.

Question 1 - Why did the Secret Service not know about the weapons arrest of Hinckley in Nashville and what procedures would have been followed had they been informed of it?

Answer 1 - Mr. Hinckley's name had never been brought to the attention of the U. S. Secret Service. If we had been informed of his arrest in Nashville, our normal procedure is to respond to such a situation. We then determine the circumstances surrounding the incident, interview the individual and conduct a background investigation. We then make an evaluation whether we consider the individual dangerous to persons we protect.

Question 2 - BMFP advised that they knew about the explosive bullets within a few hours of the incident and had notified the Secret Service of same. Also, the possibility that a toxic lead compound (lead azide) was on the bullet - Why hadn't the Secret Service notified the President's doctor of this information?


Question 3 - Why is there not tighter Secret Service security for the President when he travels within the Washington, D. C. area and why were so few Secret Service Agents on the side of the President facing the crowd?
Answer 3  - There is sufficient security assigned to the President. The agents are required to provide 360 degree security protection. It must be remembered that six shots were fired with no direct hits.

Question 4  - Why was the Secret Service limousine not parked closer to the hotel exit?

Answer 4  - The limousine was placed to allow for the most expeditious exit from the area. Due to its location, the USSS was able to effect instantaneous evacuation following the shooting. See "Tests? in reference book.

Question 5  - Why was the accused gunman allowed to get so close to the President and if it was a designated press area, how was he able to penetrate it. Even if it was a designated press area, why was it located so close to the Presidential motorcade?

Answer 5  - The area was not a designated press area, but rather was open to the general public. We would prefer to keep these public areas further away but this area was positioned within accepted standards.

Question 6  - Witnesses at the scene described the gunman as "fidgety" and "agitated". Why did not Secret Service Agents also notice an individual displaying such traits in this crowd?

Answer 6  - It appears that witnesses are confusing an actual intelligence subject with Mr. Hinckley and this intelligence subject was under surveillance. Another witness (Antonucci) was standing next to Hinckley and advised that Hinckley never appeared to be "fidgety" or "agitated".
Question 7 - Why were Metropolitan Police officers facing toward the President and away from the crowd and had they been given a proper briefing by the Secret Service advance team?

Answer 7 - A study of tapes showed that the police officers were facing the crowd; however, in glancing around, providing 360 degree coverage, or checking on the exact position of the President gave the impression of watching the President. There was no USSS briefing given to the police officers. Sgt. B7CB6 (MPD) was thoroughly familiar with protective movements and briefed and positioned his men.

Question 8 - Do agents on the President's detail receive enough training to be able to observe the situation that occurred and react properly to it?

Answer 8 - Yes, agent training begins at the recruit stage and continues throughout their career, to include "AOP" and "In-Service". They reacted properly to the situation.

Question 9 - Why was the name of the gunman not found in Secret Service files?

Answer 9 - Hinckley’s name never came to the attention of the USSS, either through letters, calls, or notification by another agency.

Question 10 - Why was the President not wearing a bullet proof vest that day and why does not the Secret Service insist that he wear one on all outdoor movements?
Question 11 - Can communications between the Secret Service and the local law enforcement agency (Metropolitan Police Department) be made better and how good are they?

Answer 11 - Communications between the USSS and MPD are very good; however, as in all matters, they can be made better and efforts are being made to do so through closer liaison.

Question 12 - Couldn't "plexiglass tunnel" be designed and used to protect protectees from the limousine to a door entrance?

Answer 12 - A "plexiglass" tunnel is impractical.

Question 13 - Why aren't there controls and stricter limits placed on a President's appearance in crowds? Why are "photo" opportunities necessary and permitted on routine arrivals and departures of the President?

Answer 13 - The President's appearances in crowds are based on personal, political, and staff considerations. While press are checked and monitored during "photo" opportunities, these opportunities are also based on personal, political, and staff decisions.

Question 14 - Why wasn't a security perimeter established further from the President's path and the people within the area more closely scrutinized?
Answer 14 - The people within area were under surveillance. The distance is a matter of judgment and civil rights as to how much an area can be restricted.

Question 15 - Were Secret Service post-standards lax in their observations of the crowd from where the gunman fired?

Answer 15 - The USSS certainly was not lax in their observations of the crowd. SA D. V. McCarthy responded within two seconds to Hinckley.

- Why did the Secret Service permit the President to walk into the hospital upon his arrival? Why was not a stretcher ordered to be brought forward? By allowing him to walk, was not the President's life more in danger?

Answer 16 - The President insisted on walking into the emergency room at the hospital and there was no stretcher at the entrance. A stretcher had been requested in a telephone call but it was not available upon the motorcade arrival as the arrival was within two minutes of the phone call. It is not normal procedure to have a stretcher at the entrance to the emergency room. A doctor would have to present a medical explanation with respect to the President's walking into the emergency room.

Question 17 - Why was Agent McCarthy not wearing his bullet proof vest? Would it have protected him from the bullet if he had been wearing it?
Answer 17 - A bullet proof vest is furnished to each agent but it is not mandatory that it be worn. Its use is up to the judgment of the agent and there was no adverse intelligence information that day. If he had been wearing his vest, it probably would have stopped the bullet.

Question 18 - Why are the times that the President or the Vice President are to appear in public allowed to be given to the press in advance?

Answer 18 - USSS does not release the times of Presidential movements and prefers that they not be given out, but this is not always under our control.

Question 19 - Why did it take so long to get the gunman under control and handcuffed and why was he not put into the first police vehicle that he had been taken to?

Answer 19 - The gunman was under control within two to three seconds of the incident. The door of the first police vehicle could not be opened due to its malfunctioning.

Question 20 - Why was no Secret Service action apparently taken when cameramen complained of citizens mingled among them?

Answer 20 - No complaint was received from newsmen by USSS agents. A complaint was made to a White House staff member inside the Hilton but no mention of the situation was made in the public area outside of the Hilton Hotel.
Question 21 - What is the morale of the Secret Service? It appears to be lower than normal and could this have had an effect on agents on the day of the shooting?

Answer 21 - The morale of the USSS is good and it is believed that morale did not have any effect on USSS actions the day of the shooting.

Question 22 - How good is communications between the Secret Service and the FBI? What can be done to make it better?

Answer 22 - Communications between the FBI and USSS are very good. They are continually being made better through close liaison.

Question 23 - Does the U. S. Secret Service stress close up body protection at the expense of advance precautions?

Answer 23 - No, the USSS stresses a combination of close up body protection and advance precautions.

Question 24 - The following was found in the New York Post dated 4-2-81 in an article which stated that Hinckley had been heard to say in Lubbock, Texas that all Presidents should be "eliminated". No further background was provided.

Another news article noted that Hinckley apparently made a statement to an apartment maintenance man in Lubbock, Texas during the Presidential campaign that all the Presidential candidates should be "eliminated" except Libertarian Party Candidate Ed Clark. Was this information ever brought to the attention of the Secret Service?
Question 24 - The article also stated that Secret Service Agents were staying in rooms adjacent to Hinckley at the Park Central Hotel. No further background provided. The article also stated that Representative Edward R. Roybal, Democrat of California, charged that the agency should have known the whereabouts of Hinckley but that there had been a "breakdown in communications". No further background information provided. Article also stated that House Speaker Tip O'Neill charged the Reagan Detail with being "incredibly lax" at the time of the shootings. No further background provided.

Answer 24 - No information with respect to Hinckley was ever brought to the attention of the USSS. While it was possible that USSS agents were staying in rooms next to Hinckley at the Park Central Hotel, it would have had no bearing on the shooting. There may have been a "breakdown in communications" but not on the part of the USSS as we were never notified of Hinckley's existence. The Reagan Detail was certainly not lax, six shots were fired without a direct hit, the President was placed within the limousine within three seconds and it departed the area within ten seconds.

Question 25 - Why did the Secret Service insist that five shots had been fired and not six?

Answer 25 - The USSS has never insisted that five shots were fired. Various numbers were mentioned as news is attempted to be passed as quickly as possible. Perhaps only five shots could be accounted for initially.
Question 26 - Why was Hinckley's presence in Washington, D. C. not known by the Secret Service?

Answer 26 - No information with respect to Hinckley had ever been brought to the attention of the USSS.

Question 27 - Why the apparent confusion on the part of the Secret Service in first identifying incorrectly the weapon used as a 9 shot Harrington Richardson revolver instead of the Roehm Model RG-14 that it was? Why the apparent initial confusion as to the suspect's age and background?

Answer 27 - Can't verify in fact that incorrect information was given by the USSS. Again, an attempt is made to pass information to the public as quickly as possible and sometimes mistakes are made.

Question 28 - Why were policemen, rather than Secret Service Agents, closer to the President as he left the hotel?

Answer 28 - It is not true that policemen are closer to the President than USSS agents as he left the hotel.

Question 29 - How come police officers and civilians had to wrestle the gunman to the ground before Secret Service Agents even got to him?

Answer 29 - Mr. Antonucci, a civilian, first hit Hinckley, but SA D. V. McCarthy grabbed Hinckley within two seconds of the shooting.
Question 30 - Alfred Antonucci, a by-stander who helped wrestle Hinckley to the ground, was hospitalized for high blood pressure after becoming "very emotional" during four hours of questioning following the incident. Was this questioning done by the Secret Service?

Answer 30 - Mr. Antonucci was not immediately questioned by the USSS.

Question 31 - Why did the Secret Service padlock the iron gates on West Executive Alley after the arrival of Vice President Bush on the night of the shooting?

Answer 31 - A serious incident had occurred that day and this was an added security procedure, but it is not an unusual security measure.

Question 32 - Is the Secret Service spread too thin? Are they asked to protect too much?

Answer 32 - For this question you should reference the Director's remarks before the Congressional Hearings.

Question 33 - Why didn't the Secret Service insist on using a less conspicuous (underground) exit for the arrival and departure at the hotel?

Answer 33 - All entrances were considered and the one chosen permitted direct access to the holding room and ballrooms without passing through public areas. The one chosen was considered to be more secure.
Question 34 - The New York Daily News dated 4-1-81 stated that a video tape shot by TV Station KMC in Lubbock, Texas shows that Hinckley may have shaken hands with President Reagan at an airport rally during the campaign and the FBI is presently conducting an examination of that tape. Is this fact true?

Answer 34 - We must defer to the FBI in this instance as they are conducting the criminal investigation into this matter.

Question 35 - The motorcade was facing west to pick up President Reagan as he departed the hotel. Why wasn't it facing east which would appear to be a more normal security departure?

Answer 35 - The location of the limousine was best for the options that it provided in evacuating the President in the safest and quickest manner. See "Tests" in reference book.

Question 36 - Were there sufficient detail trained Secret Service Agents to secure the hospital upon the arrival of the President and immediately thereafter?

Answer 36 - Yes, there were without question.

Question 37 - Were the agents on duty fit for duty the day of the attempt? Were they properly rested or had they been working many hours overtime? How could this happen? Why isn't security tighter to prevent an incident such as this from taking place?
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Question 37 - Even if the arrest of Hinckley in Nashville had been reported to the Secret Service, would they have been aware of the fact that he was in Washington, D. C. on the day of the shooting?

Answer 37 - The agents were fit for duty (See Reference Book). They had not been working many hours overtime. The security around the President was considered adequate by the USSS. Hinckley's presence in Washington on the day of the shooting, and the knowledge of it, would have depended on the results of the interview conducted on him in Nashville.

Question 38 - Why do Secret Service Agents appear to be watching the President rather than the crowd?

Answer 38 - The entire film or tape must be seen. It must be remembered that agents have to provide the President and all protectees with 360 degree coverage.

Question 39 - Has investigation determined the possibility that Hinckley had stalked either President Carter or Ronald Reagan during the 1980 Presidential Campaign?

Answer 39 - We must defer to the FBI in this matter as they are conducting the criminal investigation into the background of this incident.

Question 40 - Did the Presidential Detail have a sufficient number of agents on duty with President Reagan on the movement to/from the hotel?

Answer 40 - Yes, a sufficient number of agents were present with the President.
April 30, 1981 - 1st Telephone Interview of Officer B7c B6
3rd District, by Inspector Kevin R. Houlihan

On April 30, 1981 I telephonically interviewed Officer B7c B6. He stated he assumed his post at the Hilton Hotel approximately 15 minutes prior to the President's arrival. His post was the top of the wall above the VIP entrance.

He remained on post through the arrival, while the President was inside the hotel and during the departure.
April 1981 - 1st Interview of Officer BnC Bn6 U. S. Park Police, District 7, Washington, D. C.

(Interview was conducted by telephone and dictated by Assistant Inspector Richard Forese)

Officer BnC Bn6 was contacted by and his statement was reviewed with him on the telephone. Officer BnC Bn6 said the statement is his recollection of the events on March 30, 1981. He has been on sick leave since March 31, 1981, due to a motorcycle accident.

Officer BnC Bn6 advised that he was one of the three Park Policemen who rode motorcycles in the motorcade on March 30, 1981. They reported to the Southwest gate of the White House approximately 1:15 PM and received the necessary information pertaining to the motorcade. Upon departing the White House approximately 1:45 PM, he was the fifth motorcycle in the single file formation. They arrived at the VIP entrance to the hotel approximately 1:50 PM. They parked their motorcycles approximately 20 to 25 yards west of the VIP entrance on T Street. The six motorcycles were parked in a row with the back wheel next to the curb and the front of the motorcycles facing across the street. Officer BnC Bn6 motorcycle was the fifth parked motorcycle from the direction of Connecticut Avenue.

Approximately 2:26 PM while sitting on his motorcycle, Officer BnC Bn6 observed movement of agents around the motorcade indicating the President was getting ready to exit the hotel. At this time, Officer BnC Bn6 Park Police, started his motorcycle and pulled out into the
street. Officer BnC B6 did not observe the actions of the other motorcycle
officers since Officer BnC B6 was the only motorcycle officer to his
left as he was looking in the direction of the motorcade.

Within approximately a minute, the President exited the VIP entrance
with several agents around him. As he was walking to the limo, he waved
to the crowd on his right and then turned to wave at the crowd on his left.
At this time, Officer BnC B6 heard what sounded to be two quick gunshots
then a short pause followed up by four additional gunshots. Officer BnC B6
got off his motorcycle, drew his service revolver, and was running in the
direction of the President. He saw several people fall to the ground.
Officer BnC B6 thought the President had been injured; however, when
he got approximately halfway to the crowd, he heard a voice say "get him
out of here" or words to that effect. Officer BnC B6 reholstered his
weapon and returned to his motorcycle. By the time he got to his motor-
cycle, the limo had passed him and he fell in behind it going up T Street.
The limo turned left on Connecticut Avenue traveling southbound. At the
intersection of Connecticut Avenue and Florida Avenue, Officer BnC B6
BnC B6 passed the limo and the MPD lead car. He heard someone say
the President was returning to the White House. The motorcade continued
south on Connecticut Avenue to 17th Street at a high rate of speed.

Upon reaching 17th Street and H Street, he noticed the limo reducing
speed. Officer BnC B6 continued through the intersection of 17th Street
and Pennsylvania Avenue. He looked back and saw the limo turn right onto
Pennsylvania Avenue indicating to him the limo was going to GW Hospital.
Officer BnC BnB immediately made a U-turn at G Street and attempted to catch up with the limo. Upon reaching Washington Circle, the limo continued around it. Officer BnC BnB went the opposite way to divert traffic so the limo could enter the emergency room driveway. Officer BnC BnB then assisted in securing the area as the President exited the vehicle. He remained in the vicinity of the emergency room entrance assisting in the security until around 3:00 PM.

Attached is a copy of Officer BnC BnB statement.
April 23, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Robert Taylor by Assistant Inspector William Rolin.

On March 30, 1981 SA Taylor reported to the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel. He received a briefing from SA __________ The briefing was adequate and all necessary information was provided. The briefing lasted about 25 minutes and then he was posted by SAs __________

After the President left the ballroom, he switched his radio to frequency to hear the departure. He heard "shots fired, some injuries, Rawhide okay, enroute __________ He then started for the departure site to assist. He passed SA Miller (MPO) and told him what he had heard. Then he and SA Miller continued to the departure site. When he arrived at the site, the limo, follow-up, Hinckley, McCarthy and Brady were gone and they were loading Delahanty into the ambulance. He assisted with crowd control until he was directed to return to the Adams Room for instructions. He stayed in the Adams Room until 4:30 PM and then was instructed to return to his office, which he did.
April 23, 1981 - 1st Interview of Metropolitan Police Officer by Inspector Steve Garmon and Assistant Inspector William Rolin
(This interview was dictated by Asst. Inspector Rolin)

On March 30, 1981 Officer was assigned to the Washington Hilton Hotel with Sergeant and his

He was on the same post for the arrival and departure. He stated that he was observing spectators across T Street and had his back to the Presidential party. When shots were fired, he turned and saw three men on the ground and the President was almost all the way into the limousine. He radioed for additional ambulances. He went into the drive-thru near the left front fender of the limo and assisted in the departure. After the limo departed, he continued with crowd control.
April 23, 1981 - 1st Interview of Metropolitan Police Officer by Inspector Steve Garmon and Assistant Inspector William Rolin

(THIS interview was dictated by Asst. Inspector Rolin)

On March 30, 1981 Officer was assigned to the Washington Hilton Hotel as one of Sgt. men. He was posted by Sgt. and his

He was further up the island toward Connecticut Avenue. After the arrival, he crossed the ramp to the upper level to stand with his back against the wall. He was facing T Street. He stated that as soon as the first SA exited the VIP entrance, he immediately crossed back to his original post. He stated that he was watching spectators across T Street and had his back to the Presidential party. When shots were fired, he turned, saw the commotion, and ran into the middle of T Street to assist the limo in departure and then assisted in crowd control.
April 23, 1981 - 1st Interview of Sergeant Bnc Bc by Inspector Steve Garmon and Assistant Inspector William Polin

(This interview was dictated by Asst. Inspector Polin)

On March 30, 1981 Officer Bnc Bc was assigned to the Washington Hilton Hotel as one of Sgt. Bnc Bc men. He was Bc Bc Bc Bc Bc. He was posted by Sgt. Bnc Bc and was on the same post for the arrival and departure although at departure he had moved a little closer to the drive-thru (about 3-4 feet). When shots were fired, he started across the drive-thru towards the limo. When he arrived at the left rear fender of the limo, he began crowd control and assisted the limo in its departure. After the limo departed, he continued with his crowd control duties.
April 22, 1981 - 2nd Interview with Special Agent D. V. McCarthy at 1310 L Street by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

McCarthy first became aware that he was to be the PI Coordinator for the Hilton when he saw the assignment on the PI Squad assignment board on Friday evening (3/27). He inquired as to the type of function and who was to be the advance agent. He had no contact with SA 67C on Friday or through the weekend.

On Monday morning he checked with PI Ops for information as to possible demonstrations and threats, etc., and found there was none. SA 67C then called him by phone and provided a complete rundown on the Hilton movement. He asked if there were name checks to be done and 67C said there were none.

McCarthy attended the security briefing at 12:00 Noon at the Hilton and he gave the ID briefing. He knew there had been two ID teams scheduled but was advised by SA Spriggs that the other team had been scratched. He saw no problem with working this stop with one team.

After the briefing, McCarthy and Spriggs went with SA 67C while he was posting the agents, so they would be familiar with each post and who was
manning it. They then went to the main checkpoint of the ballroom to observe
the guests as they were entering. McCarthy recalled checking at least two
people who appeared to have bulges under their clothing.

A short while before the arrival of the President, they were called to
respond to the VIP entrance. When they arrived, the agent on duty
advised
of
being present in the crowd. McCarthy then
went to
and was able to observe that he was not carrying anything.

McCarthy then took a position behind the crowd near the curb. Spriggs
was also behind the crowd near the wall. When the President arrived, they
went through the Terrace doors and the main checkpoint to the ballroom and
took a position at stage right.

When the President departed the ballroom, they followed him down the
hall and then ran up the stairs near the VIP entrance. They went outside
just ahead of the President. McCarthy went to the rope line and took a
position near the curb to prevent people from coming around the rope line.
He recalled Spriggs going to the right toward the limo.

McCarthy heard people calling to the President and he knew he had exited
the hotel. He then heard what he first thought was a firecracker. He turned
to his left toward the sound. At first, he didn't see anything. Then he saw
the gun coming out of the crowd and he leaped on the subject.

McCarthy got a headlock on the subject and with his left hand he grasped
the subject's left wrist. Other people then piled on top and McCarthy couldn't
tell what happened to the gun.
McCarthy released the subject's wrist and got his cuffs in his left hand. He then released his headlock and cuffed the subject's left wrist. He had some difficulty cuffing the right wrist because of the number of people holding the subject.

McCarthy was forced to strike two citizens to get them to release the subject. He then assisted in protecting and moving the subject to a police car. He and SA's Spriggs and got in the car with the subject. Officer drove the car.

While transporting the subject, his hands were held against the protective screen as he had not been searched. The subject's only comment was a request that the cuffs be loosened as his right wrist was hurting. This request was denied.

McCarthy had Officer call to have the basement area at the Central Cell Block cleared for their arrival. There was no one in the basement when they arrived. McCarthy drew his gun as they walked through the basement to protect the subject.

When they entered the cellblock, McCarthy asked immediately for a cell. He removed the cuffs and SA Spriggs searched him. SA McCarthy gave the subject his rights. He then asked if the cellblock was clear of other prisoners, and finding out that it was, he placed the subject in a cell. SA Spriggs took the subject's property and McCarthy remained by the cell door.

When the homicide detectives arrived, they, accompanied by McCarthy, took the subject to their offices. He was placed in an interview room and the
detectives again read him his rights. This was done at 3:10 P.M.

The subject was asked to tell what had happened, but he refused saying he wanted to talk to a lawyer first. He was then told that he had to give his name and address which he did. A test was then run to detect powder burns on the subject's hands.

When the FBI arrived, McCarthy refused to leave the subject until told to do so by a supervisor. ATSAIC Densereau was then brought in and he relieved McCarthy.

While at the Central Cell Block, SA McCarthy was unaware of who had been shot. He was also unable to recall exactly where the rope line was and did not know it had been moved after the arrival.
April 21, 1981 - 1st Interview of Uniformed Division Chief Harvey Prior
at 10:35 AM by Inspector Dennis T. Brosan

Chief Prior stated that he, DAD Edwards and Deputy Chief Connors, MPD,
were having lunch when he, Prior, was notified by pageboy there had been
an incident involving the President at the Washington Hilton Hotel. All
three immediately proceeded to the Hilton Hotel. They arrived at approximately
3:00 PM. Chief Prior stated that he and DAD Edwards remained on the scene for
approximately 15 minutes.

Chief Prior stated that upon his arrival the scene was what he termed very
organized. He stated that the crime scene had been secured by agents and MPD
officers and that the general public were kept well back from the crime scene
as were the members of the press. At one point during his stay at the crime
scene, officers and agents began traversing the crime scene and were admonished
by, he believes, an MPD official and an SA of the Secret Service, thereupon the
law enforcement traffic in the crime scene area ceased. He stated that every-
thing was apparently under control and everyone was doing pretty much what they
should. Witnesses had been segregated for interview and interviews were beginning.
He recognized some agents on the scene, such as Agent Varey, Agent Wood and
Agent [redacted]. He stated that there was another person he recognized as an agent
but he could not remember his name and he was in possession of the assailant’s
weapon.

The investigating agents from the Washington Field Office and from the FBI
had not yet arrived on the scene and he and DAD Edwards left.

Chief Prior did talk with K-9 Officer [redacted] Uniformed Division, as to his
involvement as to what happened. He stated that he did not interview the
counter-sniper team on the scene, that was done at a later time. Other officers
were on the scene from the Uniformed Division and were assisting the Metropolitan Police with traffic control. Chief Prior stated that this would be normal procedure in an incident with the President or an incident of this magnitude.

He stated that when he returned to his office at 1310 L Street, there was a call from Deputy AD Bechtle. He returned the call whereupon DAD Bechtle told him to send Uniformed Division officers to George Washington Hospital to assist in crowd control and traffic. Shortly thereafter Mr. Simpson called with the same request. Chief Prior stated that it should be noted that 32 of UD officers had been sent to GW Hospital by the Watch Commander or Dispatcher upon notification that the President was being taken to GW Hospital. Chief Prior states that this is normal procedure for Uniformed Division in an incident involving the President. They will assist in crowd control at the directions of the special agents and be dismissed by the special agents. At this time, however, the detail was up to 32 personnel after surveys and posting had been completed.
April 20, 1981 - 1st Interview with Inspector Bnc B6

Metropolitan Police Department at his office, by Inspector Steve Garnon and Assistant Inspector Bill Driscoll

(Interview was dictated by Inspector Steve Garnon)

The interview deals with Inspector Bnc B6 recollections of his involvement in the activities at the George Washington University Hospital and the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981.

On that date Inspector Bnc B6 reported for duty at approximately 1:30 PM at the Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters. His assigned duties that day were the 4-12 Shift Night Supervisor for the Metropolitan Police Department. In that role he performs as the acting chief during that shift. As a consequence, he is considered, or the individual filling that position, the ranking police official during his duty hours.

At approximately 2:30 PM he was in his office, Room 5080, at MPD Headquarters, when he was contacted by the Communications Unit of MPD and informed that the President's motorcade had been fired upon. Immediately thereafter he proceeded to his cruiser and in that vehicle proceeded to the Washington Hilton Hotel. Enroute he overheard several transmissions on various MPD units. Transmissions were to the effect that a Secret Service Agent as well as a D. C. Police officer had been wounded and that the assailant was in custody. After having visited the crime scene at the Washington Hilton, he determined that President had been taken to GW Hospital and that Officer Bnc B6 of Metropolitan Police had been wounded and taken to the Washington Hospital Center, Med Star Unit.

After stopping at the Med Star Unit to check on the situation reference Officer Bnc B6 Inspector Bnc B6 proceeded to the GW Hospital and arrived
there at approximately 4:00 PM. On his initial arrival, he observed that
security measures were in place on the outside of the hospital inasmuch as
Metropolitan Police, Park Police and Secret Service Uniformed Division
personnel were posted and were maintaining control on the crowd and other
activities on the exterior of the hospital.

He proceeded to the inside and to Room 2500 where he met with Mayor
Barry and Deputy Chief Turner of the Metropolitan Police Department.
At that time he observed that the Secret Service Command Post was already
in place there and a process of establishing communications was under way.
At Deputy Chief Turner's direction, Inspector B7c B6 remained on the scene
at the hospital for the duration of his duties on that day. He characterized
his role as being one of cutting through the red tape that might have otherwise
arisen between the Secret Service and the Metropolitan Police Department.
However, he pointed out that the official from the Metropolitan Police
Department in charge was in fact Deputy Chief B7c B6 of the Special
Operations Division of MPD. In view of the fact that Deputy Chief B7c B6
was not immediately on the scene until considerably later in the afternoon
or evening hours, Inspector B7c B6 was tasked with assisting in making a
number of decisions that normally would have been incumbent upon Deputy
Chief B7c B6. For instance, at 8:30 PM he attended a meeting in the
hospital which otherwise may have been attended by Deputy Chief B7c B6
Therein were personnel from the Secret Service, both agents and Uniformed
Division, from the Metropolitan Police Department Special Operations Division,
and Second Precinct, from the office of security at the GW University Hospital
and the administrator's office at the GW Hospital. During the course of that
meeting, discussions were convened relative to separation of responsibilities
between the various security elements present. It was agreed therein that the Metropolitan Police would take all posts outside the hospital and that the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service would handle all uniform police posts inside the hospital. Subsequent to the meeting, all parties present proceeded to their specific areas of responsibility and commenced to review the situation at that point to determine any adjustments that might have been necessary in the number of posts and the location of posts.

Thereafter the group reconvened at approximately 10:00 PM and discussed their findings and reflections after having reviewed the posts. Inspector advised that in attendance at the second meeting, 10:00 Session, Inspector attended rather than himself.

Inspector advised that he saw no conflicts or confrontations or significant problems during the time frame he was present at GW Hospital. He advised that cooperation and harmony between the Secret Service and other police elements there as well as the hospital staff appeared to be extremely good. He said that the Secret Service was clearly in charge and that no friction between any of the agencies or elements present was apparent to him. He said that the normal lines of authority certainly within the Metropolitan Police Department and as far as he could observe were intact and that there was no breach of such authority as far as he was concerned.

Inspector provided a copy of his notes relative to his activities and recollections during that time frame and they will be attached to the results of this interview.

This concludes the interview with Inspector.
April 17, 1981 - 1st Telephone Interview of B16 B6 Clerk at George Washington University Hospital by Inspector Steve Garmon

The purpose for contacting B16 B6 was to see if he could recall any telephone conversations wherein information was received at the GW Hospital relative to the President being enroute to that location. B16 B6 is a clerk who is employed in the hospital emergency room and who was on duty on March 30, 1981, when the assault on President Reagan occurred at the Washington Hilton Hotel and the subsequent movement by him to the GW emergency room.

B16 B6 advised that his recollections were very uncertain in regard to this particular day's activities. He said the situation had been so hectic that he really could not recall whether he ever took a telephone call or several phone calls or in fact how he came by any knowledge that the President had been wounded and evacuated to GW Hospital.

In light of B16 B6 failure to recall the specifics, it was deemed unnecessary to personally interview him. This concludes comments relative to B16 B6.
This interview is an accounting of ASAIC Guy's activities in the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981.

On that particular date ASAIC Guy was on duty as the Operations Supervisor in Room 12 at the White House. He received a telephone call at Room 12 from SA Steve Ramsay at the Washington Hilton Security Room. In that conversation, SA Ramsay advised Guy that - They're moving to the cars, meaning the event was breaking up and the President was enroute to his limousine. Simultaneously in the background from Ramsey's location, Guy heard what he interpreted to be a radio transmission to the effect "There's been an AOP". He inquired of Ramsay what the transmission was and what it meant. Simultaneously, SA Joe Trainor was monitoring a transmission from ASAIC Shaddick in the follow-up car that shots had been fired and they were enroute to Room 12. Subsequently, with Trainor, Guy and DeNulio who was also present in Room 12, monitored Parr's transmission to the effect that "We're okay, we're enroute to Room 12". Then a subsequent transmission "We're going to GW right now". Joe Trainor then contacted GW Hospital immediately via Signal line and according to Guy advised that "The President's motorcade is enroute to GW".

Guy then contacted Room 12 and requested that Bobby DeProspero come to Room 12 immediately.

Thereafter Agent George Opfer entered Room 12 and inquired relative to what was happening. He was informed that the President had shots fired at him and Guy advised Opfer that he should proceed to the second floor of the White House residence and inform Mrs. Reagan relative to the situation. Opfer proceeded to comply with ASAIC Guy's directions and Mrs. Reagan joined Opfer
in B7 to await further information. For the duration of Guy's presence in B7 there was a continuing array of telephone calls from people seeking information and direction relative to their required response and ASAIC Guy as well as others present to direct them in that regard or inform them as far as information would allow. Simultaneously, telephone calls to all appropriate Headquarters and other Secret Service personnel as well as Presidential Protective Division personnel were underway immediately and agents present who were not specifically involved or assigned at that point, were directed to go to GW Hospital immediately.

In summation, ASAIC Guy was not directly involved in the decision making processes at the hospital or in specifically directing the activities of anyone at the hospital. He remained in B7 at the White House until approximately 7:00 to 7:30 PM at which time he terminated for the evening, went to his residence and then returned to the hospital to be the Midnight Duty Supervisor at the hospital that same evening.

This concludes the substance of the interview with ASAIC Guy.
April 17, 1981 - 1st Interview of Lieutenant B7c B6 Metropolitan Police Department, 2nd District Precinct, Detective Squad, at the 2nd District, MPD, by Inspector Steve Gannon and Assistant Inspector Bill Driscoll

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Gannon)

At the outset of this interview, B7c B6 expressed his high regard for the performance of the Secret Service at the George Washington University Hospital on March 30, 1981. He indicated that his previous with federal law enforcement agencies had been somewhat negative in comparison to that of the Secret Service at GW Hospital. He simply could not be too complimentary of the Secret Service's performance during that time frame.

He advised that he had been directed by MPD officials at the 2nd District to proceed to the hospital approximately 15 minutes after the President's arrival there. He estimates that within 30 minutes of the President's arrival which would have been 15 minutes after his arrival, the situation was in the state of very good control. His immediate impression was that ATSAIC Pat Miller was in charge from the Secret Service standpoint. He saw no evidence to indicate any confusion or any conflict in the Secret Service's activities from the standpoint of who was in charge. There was no question in his mind that agents at the hospital were responding to the directions given by ATSAIC Miller and that it has never crossed his mind that there was any potential for conflict in that respect. He said that his role in having been sent to the hospital was to perform in a liaison capacity between Metropolitan Police Department and the Secret Service as well as the hospital and any other elements concerned there. In that respect he would have had the knowledge as to who was the proper official to be contacted or consulted with relative to MPD activities and responsibilities in and around the hospital. In that role, he took up a
position in the command post, Room 2500, at the hospital and made himself available to both the Secret Service and the Metropolitan Police officials on the scene to assure that proper communications flowed between the Secret Service and the MPD. Normally, according to his role at the hospital would have been one filled by a Special Operations Division officer of the Metropolitan Police Department. However, circumstances of the day dictated extra measures and by virtue of those extra measures he wound up being the individual on the scene at the hospital.

In addition to high praise and compliments to the Secret Service, he was also quite laudatory in his compliments to the hospital staff. He said that in other situations significant problems could have been encountered from the standpoint that decision making people are not always available in a hospital of the size of GW. In this particular circumstance, the key individuals and those with the authority to make decisions were on the scene and were in fact willing to make those decisions. According to their presence short-circuited what could have been very significant problems in these those first few hours at the hospital.

In response to a specific question, said he knew of no problems that might have been generated by Secret Service or police presence at the hospital on March 30, 1981 and he knows of no conflicts or confrontations which may have occurred during that time frame. Again he reiterated his praise for the Secret Service and the manner in which all personnel which he observed during that time frame had performed.

This concludes the interview with Lt.
April 17, 1981 - 1st Interview with Deputy Chief Robert Banocy, Uniformed Division, at his office at 1310 L Street, by Inspector Steve Garmon

This interview dealt with Banocy's involvement and recollections of his involvement in the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981.

Banocy recounted his involvement as follows. In the normal course of his duties at 1310 L Street, on March 30th, he was informed by phone from the dispatcher—Uniformed Division dispatcher that it appeared some sort of an attempt on the President had occurred at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Simultaneously, Uniformed Division Chief Prior and other officials in UD were informed. Prior responded to the Hilton Hotel and briefly thereafter he returned to 1310 L Street where he met with Banocy and Deputy Chief B7c B6. At that point he informed them that the Uniformed Division would provide a detail for posting at the George Washington University Hospital. He directed Banocy to proceed to the hospital, link up with the agents there and determine what the needs would be from the Uniformed Division. Banocy estimates he arrived on the scene at the hospital at approximately 4:00 PM. There he immediately met with Officers of the Metropolitan Police Department to include Inspector B7c B6 and Inspector B7c B6 as well as MPD Deputy Chief B7c B6.

By the time Banocy arrived on the scene, decisions had already been made between Chief Prior and Metropolitan Police Department officials that the Uniformed Division would assume any interior post within the hospital and the Metropolitan Police Department would assume all the posts on the exterior of the hospital. Those posts were those to be manned by Uniformed police officers and does not relate to the posts manned by Secret Service Agents.

By the time Banocy arrived on the scene, he said it was simply a situation where
survey of sorts had to be conducted on the various floors at the hospital which were involved and determining where posts should be appropriately positioned. Many of those determinations had already been made by that time by a combination of Metropolitan Police officers, Agents and Uniformed Division personnel already on the scene. According to Banocy, by 5:00-6:00 PM the Uniformed Division had replaced all of the Metropolitan Police officers who were posted inside the hospital.

On Banocy's arrival at the hospital, he described the situation as confused. He said that stemmed from the lack of anyone being in charge or the lack of someone to coordinate all of the various security elements as well as hospital staff elements. At approximately 6:30 PM, Banocy encountered AD John Simpson and suggested that some sort of meeting be convened to provide the coordination which to that time had been lacking. As a consequence, Simpson directed ATSAIC Pat Miller of the Field Office to put together such a meeting. Miller complied and at approximately 8:30 PM a meeting was convened with representatives of the Secret Service, Presidential Protective Division, Washington Field Office, Uniformed Division, Technical Security Division, Metropolitan Police Department and hospital administrator and security staff in attendance. Prior to this meeting, the various responsibilities and areas of concern had been sorted out between the involved elements. The meeting simply served to confirm that one police department would provide a service in one area while another took care of another task in the hospital and formalized the agreements to proceed in that direction. The participants departed from that meeting, went about an essential re-survey of the situation and reconvened at approximately 10:00 PM. Thereafter, the appropriate actions to implement all of the agreements as well
as to assure that the posts were manned and orders were being circulated relative to particular post assignments were undertaken. Banocy has no knowledge of any conflicts or confrontations or any significant problems that may have occurred during that day at the hospital.

This concludes the interview with Robert Banocy.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Miss B7C B6 Registered Nurse and Assistant Head Nurse in the George Washington University Hospital emergency room, at the emergency room, by Inspectors Roger Counts and Steve Garmon

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Garmon)

Miss B7C B6 advised that she recalled having been informed by B7C B6 one of the nurses in the emergency room, that she had received a telephone call on the White House phone that the President's motorcade was enroute. Miss B7C B6 had no information that the President might have been injured or at least Miss B7C B6 does not recall any comment to that effect. Subsequently Miss B7C B6 thinks she recalls being informed by Miss B7C B6 that there were potentially three gunshot victims being transported to the hospital as well. Miss B7C B6 said that with no knowledge as to whom or why the Presidential motorcade was enroute, she began immediately to arrange to accommodate the President, should it in fact be him who was injured. In that respect she began to advise her head nurse and other key hospital staff personnel, such as Dr. B7C B6 and the hospital administrator's office. In a telephone conversation with Dr. B7C B6 she said she suggested that the hospital command post be implemented or instituted as was the normal practice for disaster plan type operations. She also informed Dr. B7C B6 that the President was enroute. During the course of that conversation, she looked up from the phone and observed the President actually entering the emergency room area and beginning to collapse before those persons around him assisted him into the emergency room.

Miss B7C B6 said that she immediately began to render assistance to the agents with the President to determine who should be in the emergency room area. She said that a Dr. B7C B6 was the hospital staff doctor on duty in the
emergency room at the time and was the first doctor to examine the President. Miss BnC B6 immediately had summoned a Dr. BnC B6 and Dr. BnC B6 to the scene when she determined that it was in fact the President who was wounded. It is her recollection that she observed blood on the President's shirt as he was brought into the emergency room and consequently she assumes she knew he was wounded at that point. At the time of the President's arrival, Miss BnC B6 was the effective nurse in charge of that location in view of the fact that her supervisor was in another office located at some distance from the emergency room. Miss BnC B6 advised that there are certain informal rules in the emergency room to accommodate the presence of individuals such as the First Family or the President. Those rules are not formally promulgated in any fashion but have been the subject of conversations by a number of people working in the emergency room area. She said the subject of those conversations have usually concluded with a notion that the staff there should make efforts to clear the lobby and the emergency room of lesser priority cases or secondary trauma situations and generally to institute measures to summon the medical staff so that all potential requirements can be available on short notice.

BnC B6

She responded to a question that she knew of no problems which this Service had generated as a result of the President's presence in the hospital and had nothing except the highest of praise in regard for personnel of the Service as a result of this situation.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Miss Bn B6 Hospital Staff Nurse, at the George Washington University Hospital, by Inspectors Steve Garmon and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Garmon)

Miss Bn B6 advised that on March 30th at approximately 2:30 PM she was on duty in the emergency room in the vicinity of the nurses' station there. Her normal duty hours that day were 7:30 AM to 4:00 PM. During the course of her activities there she overheard the White House phone ringing and she responded to it. On answering, she heard a person on the other end of the line say something to the effect that the Presidential motorcade is enroute and she thinks they may have commented something to the effect that someone may be injured. To the best of her recollection this call was received at approximately 2:30 PM that day.

Her response was to advise the assistant head nurse, a Miss Bn B6. It is Miss Bn B6 recollection that additional calls or at least one additional call was received in the emergency room and they there may have been other transmissions via D. C. Fire Department facilities that persons were being transported to the hospital emergency room due to gunshot wounds. Miss Bn B6 could provide no other information of substance; therefore, that concludes the interview with her.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Secret Service Uniformed Division Lieutenant

BNC B6

at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Steve Garmon

Lt. BNC B6 advised that on March 30, 1981 at approximately 2:15 PM he was in the building at 1310 L Street having just reported for his normal 3-11 Shift. He is in the Foreign Missions Branch of the Uniformed Division and at the second floor where he was located at that time he as others was able to monitor a transmission from a Uniformed Division Unit which he interpreted to be something to the effect that an officer was in trouble. The transmission was from an obviously excited officer and indicated that the trouble was occurring at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Lt. BNC B6 and Lt. BNC B6 who was also present at that time awaiting duty roll call, immediately proceeded to their Uniformed Division cruiser and proceeded to the Washington Hilton Hotel. BNC B6 estimates that they arrived at the hotel somewhere between 2:20 and 2:25 PM.

On their arrival at the hotel, they determined there had been a shooting incident, from a Uniformed Division Officer BNC B6 had been on duty at the hotel in support of the Presidential visit there. At the T Street entrance to the hotel, Lieutenant BNC B6 inquired of an agent at that location if any assistance was needed. He received a negative response; therefore, he and BNC B6 proceeded inside the hotel to locate a phone and provide a situation report to the Foreign Missions Headquarters Unit at 1310 L Street. On the inside of the hotel Lieutenants BNC B6 and BNC B6 encountered Cabinet Secretary Donovan and two aides or security agents accompanying him. Those individuals requested assistance from BNC B6 and BNC B6 in proceeding to Secretary Donovan's vehicle. They responded affirmatively to this request. Subsequently they met Chief BNC B6 and Deputy Chief BNC B6 at the scene. BNC B6 advised Lt. BNC B6 that he should take appropriate action to
keep Uniformed Division personnel clear of the hotel in order to avoid contributing to congestion at that location. Lt. Bc B6 thereafter advised the UD Dispatcher to put that word out over the air. Bc B6 and Bc B6 on their own volition decided then to proceed to GW Hospital to see if they could render assistance at that location.

According to Bc B6 prior to this decision they had monitored commercial radio broadcast that indicated there was a possibility that the President might be injured and that he was located at the GW Hospital. They likewise assumed that he would be taken in the event of an injury since it was their knowledge that that was the closest hospital to the Washington Hilton and one that the Secret Service often times designates as the primary hospital.

At approximately 2:45 PM they arrived at the GW Hospital emergency room. At that location they met with an agent who was posted at the emergency room door. They asked him if any assistance was needed and he responded affirmatively that they could be of assistance to the Metropolitan Police in keeping the press clear of the area and out of the emergency room entrance location or vicinity. Bc B6 then via radio requested the UD Dispatcher to send Bc B7 available scooter men to the scene to assist the Metropolitan Police officers there. On arrival of those personnel they assisted in setting up a secure perimeter around the emergency room entrance and vicinity.

Approximately 20 minutes later Deputy Chief Bc B6 contacted Bc B6 and requested that Bc B7 telephone him. In the ensuing telephone call, Bc B6 was informed that additional men, Uniformed Division officers, were enroute to assist at the hospital. According to Bc B6 those men should be used on the inside of the hospital to assist SA Bc B6.
Thereafter, \( B_{16} \) met with SA \( B_{16} \) and inquired of \( B_{16} \) as to how soon the Uniformed Division could relieve the Metropolitan Police Department officers on the inside posts in the hospital. \( B_{16} \) advised it would occur as soon as possible and with the \( B_{16} \) UD officers already in place and the \( B_{16} \) additional officers enroute, he began to make this relief. In effect, the Uniformed Division officers replaced the Metropolitan Police officers inside the hospital and the Metropolitan Police officers replaced any UD officers on exterior posts. In \( B_{16} \) estimates, the swap had occurred essentially by 3:30 PM.

Subsequently, Lt. \( B_{16} \) again met with SA \( B_{16} \) and requested additional Uniformed Division officers for posting inside the hospital. \( B_{16} \) submitted that request to the Uniformed Division officials at 1310 L Street. They informed him in response that additional officers would be supplied and they would be forthcoming from the White House Branch of the Uniformed Division. A short time thereafter Deputy Chief Bob Benoy arrived with Captain \( B_{16} \) of Uniformed Division Administrative Unit. They were briefed by Lt. \( B_{16} \) and set about securing additional officers for the posts previously referred to. As soon as those posts were manned, Captain \( B_{16} \) and Lt. \( B_{16} \) began to prepare written orders for each post. From that point for the duration of Lt. \( B_{16} \) duty which terminated at approximately 11:00 PM, continued adjustments to the posts and briefings to the individual post standers was the order of business.

It was Lt. \( B_{16} \) impressions that SA \( B_{16} \) was the agent in charge at the hospital in the immediate aftermath of the President's arrival there.

\( B_{16} \) characterized the situation of one where people were rushing around to get done what needed to be done. Their haste, however, was an ordered and
purposeful one and even though it may have appeared to have been chaotic and confused, people in fact knew what they were doing and why they were doing it. B7C B6 has no knowledge of any incidence, problems, conflicts or confrontations which may have occurred at the hospital during this time.

This concludes the interview with Lt. B7C B6.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Mr. Bn B6 Chief of Security for George Washington University Hospital, at the hospital by Inspectors Roger Counts and Steve Garnon (Interview dictated by Inspector Garnon)

This interview focused on Mr. Bn B6 recollections of the activities at the hospital surrounding the President's arrival and treatment in the hospital on March 30, 1981.

Mr. Bn B6 recalled that the time this incident occurred, he was in the hospital cafeteria. He recalled having observed portions of what he termed a Presidential motorcade passing on the street below, his observations having come through a window viewing that area. Subsequently an announcement over the hospital PA to the effect that there was a double trauma in the emergency room was overheard by himself. With other persons present in the cafeteria, they proceeded to the emergency room to observe a trauma situation. At that point he had no idea that the President was enroute to or already at the hospital. At his arrival at the emergency room, he encountered Secret Service agents. He identified himself and at their request, began to assist in identifying other persons needing access into the emergency room. He inquired of the SA's what the injuries were and who it was in fact that was injured. At that time he was apparently informed that the President was the party who had been brought to the hospital but the extent of injuries at that point was as yet unknown. Within minutes a Miss Bn B6 arrived on the scene. She is the hospital registrar. Bn B6 introduced her to the agents there and informed them that she could assist them in identifying persons needing access into the emergency room. Miss Bn B6 immediately began to render this assistance. In addition to Miss Bn B6 arrival, Bn B6 supervisor, as well as a Dr. Doctor Bn B6 Hospital Administrator Bn B6, and other hospital officials, began to arrive on the scene and likewise render
assistance in identifying the doctors and medical staff as well as patients
who were already in the emergency room or needed access to the emergency
room.

It is significant to note that Mr. Bc was under the impression that
he arrived in the emergency room prior to the President, but he says he
recalled SA McCarthy and Jim Brady having arrived prior to the President.

Mr. Bc suggested that the hospital is not equipped with an identification
system which immediately provides information as to a person's identity, that
is, there is no requirement that people wear a visible form of identification.
He also advised that the hospital is a teaching hospital and consequently all
activities there are learning situations for interns and student nurses.
Therefore, the situation in the emergency room was one with many people coming
simply to observe in the normal learning situation and in view of the fact
they are not required to wear identification, it was obviously one of a situation
of chaos and histrionics in the first few moments.
A short while thereafter, decision was made by hospital management officials to effectively close the hospital and implement a disaster plan. Mr. characterized the disaster plan as being one intended to severely restrict and limit visitors into the hospital. Those limitations would essentially restrict access to visitors wanting to see critically ill or dying patients, and then hospital staff being the only other category of personnel admitted to the hospital.

As time passed, the security situation had to be adjusted in terms of expanded parameters and in terms of the limitations placed on visitors seeking access to other patients within the hospital. Mr. characterized the situation as being one which forced the hospital to be flexible but only with regard to areas outside of that occupied by the President. The area occupied by the President was very tightly controlled and persons with access to his immediate vicinity were clearly identified by agents of this Service, other police officers working in conjunction with the hospital and medical staff. Mr. said that in that respect he instituted measures with his own security force to effectively close all hospital entrances very soon after the President's arrival at the hospital. He particularly emphasized the closure of the 22nd Street entrance which is in the same area as the emergency room and operating room.

At approximately 9:00 PM that evening he had occasion to attend a meeting where agents of this Service as well as police officers and other hospital staff personnel were present. The purpose of that meeting was essentially to coordinate security within the hospital and to establish guidelines on what units would perform in what area.
Mr. Bn B6 estimation was it took some time to figure out who the key officials of the Secret Service were and who was in charge. Nevertheless, he said it caused no significant problem in the first couple of hours since it seemed any number of people, particularly agents, were in charge or at least were effective in getting done those things that needed to be done. It is his impression that ATSAIC Pat Miller was in charge during the first couple of hours and subsequently that SA B6 seemed to ascend to that role.

Mr. Bn B6 advised that it was somewhat ironic that his security force at the hospital had only that morning begun wearing a uniform and a visible identification while on duty at the hospital. As a result, it was considerably easier for agents to recognize his people as well as police officers.

Mr. Bn B6 said he had the impression that Secret Service and Uniformed Division communications were inadequate in the hospital and his impression is based on a notion that the hospital construction may have severely limited the effectiveness of radio equipment. As a potential consideration for future hospital activities, he suggests that a transmitter antenna and appropriate phone lines be pre-installed at the hospital so that such service would be available in a crisis of this nature.

Mr. Bn B6 had no recollection of any significant problem, confrontation or conflict that may have arisen or occurred during the first day or at any point during the President's stay at GN Hospital.

This concludes the interview with Mr. Bn B6.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Howard I. Hendershot by Assistant Inspector William Rollin.

On 3-30-81 Hendershot reported to SA at 12:00 Noon for a briefing. The briefing was adequate and necessary information provided. The briefing lasted about 30 minutes, then SA - 52:16:70

After departure, he waited for quite some time, then heard on frequency "AOP, AOP". Then he heard on frequency something about an ambulance. He remained on post until he was instructed on frequency to report to the briefing room (Adams Room). He waited there for about 45 minutes and then was instructed to return to WFO for assignment. At WFO, ASAIC Berger directed him and SA to be a PI team with Ron, Jr.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview with Special Agent 66167C
by Assistant Inspector 66167C

SA 66167C has recently been assigned to TSD and when he learned that
SS 66167C was handling the TSD function at the Washington Hilton, he
requested that he be allowed to assist for the experience.

He stated that he and SS 66167C arrived at the Washington Hilton
at approximately 10:30 AM on 3-30-81. Each took an EOD team and began
their sweep. He stated he did not hear SA 66167C briefing because
he was busy with the sweep but that he entered the Adams Room just as
SA 66167C was finishing up. He was inside the hotel when the President
arrived and during the visit he moved around looking for problem areas.
About 15 minutes before the speech was to end, he walked the President's
exit route looking for packages, etc. At the exit door he stepped outside
and talked with SA Russ Miller for a few minutes before returning to the
speech site. He did not go out far enough to see the crowd.

He returned inside and when the Presidential party departed, he followed
about 15 seconds behind them in case he was needed. He did not have an
assignment at this time.

He was walking up the stairs when he heard a commotion outside.
He ran up the stairs and out the door. He saw the limo pulling away, three
men down, and a crowd struggling with a man (Hinckley). He went to
but didn't see anything he could do to help. He then went to Brady who
was bleeding badly, when he saw a gun on the pavement. He realized this
had to be the weapon. He picked it up with his handcuffs and kept it in
his possession.
He telephoned AD Investigation's Office and talked with ASAIC Caputo. He was advised to insure that proper chain of custody was maintained when he turned the weapon over to the FBI. He noted the make, model and serial number of the weapon. He scratched his initials on the hammer of the weapon and placed it in a plastic bag provided by MPD. He surrendered the weapon to SA Bnc Bto of the FBI. He then helped the FBI reenact the crime scene and provided them with a statement before returning to TSO.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent by Assistant Inspector William Rolin.

On March 30, 1981 SA reported to SA at 12:00 Noon in the B2 of the Washington Hilton Hotel. SA provided a briefing which lasted about 30 minutes. The briefing was adequate and necessary information was provided. After the briefing, he was by SA at the with SA Ruggins (WFO). There were no unusual incidents and after the President left the ballroom the crowd began leaving. At this time SA Norton went into the security room and heard on the radio, frequency, about the attack. He immediately went to the departure area. The limo and follow-up were gone as was the assailant. Three men were on the ground and he went to assist but there was help already there. He then assisted in placing SA McCarthy on the stretcher and into the ambulance. The ambulance was having a hard time because of traffic and he assisted with traffic control and then crowd control at the crime scene until notified to report to the Adams Room for instructions. He was told to return to WFO which he did where he was interviewed by the FBI. He remained in WFO until 12:00 Midnight.
April 16, 1981 - 1st Interview with Special Agent John Miller by Assistant Inspector William Rolin.

On March 30, 1981 SA Miller reported to the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. The briefing was given by SA Bob Taylor and it was inadequate and necessary information. The briefing lasted about 25 minutes and after the briefing, he was - by SA Bob Taylor. After the President left, he maintained - until SA Bob Taylor came in and said there had been an attempted assassination. He then went to the departure site and assisted with crowd control at the crime scene. When he arrived, the limousine, follow-up, the assailant and all wounded were already gone. He then heard on SRO frequency to report to the Adams Room which he did. He remained there for about 45 minutes and then returned to the Washington Field Office as instructed. He remained on stand-by at WFO until 12:00 Midnight.
April 15, 1981 – 1st Interview of Special Agent 60167C by
Assistant Inspector William Rolin

SA 60167C was in the Washington Field Office when the assassination
attempt was made. He and SA 66167C were dispatched by ATSAIC
Densereau to the Washington Hilton Hotel. When they arrived, everyone,
including injured, were gone. He contacted the FBI and MPD on the
scene. All agreed that the FBI had primary jurisdiction and SS and
MPD would assist. He froze all SA's on the scene until the FBI could
talk with them. He instructed SA 60167C to hold onto Hinckley's
weapon until the FBI needed it. The FBI and MPD gathered all witnesses
on the street into the ballroom for interview. At the same time they
(MPD, FBI and SS) were setting up a command post at the hotel where
leads could be investigated immediately. MPD started searching the
area for a vehicle and the FBI had approximately 219.42 teams
working. He assisted in re-enacting the crime scene. He also was
passing all information he received to WFO and ID and passing all
information from WFO and ID to the FBI and MPD.

About 11:00 PM that night, they closed the hotel command post
and moved it to the FBI-WFO where it is still operating. He is
liaison Special Agent with the FBI command post at the time.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview with Special Agent by Assistant Inspector William Rollin.

On March 30, 1981 SA 661,676 reported to the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel for a briefing. The briefing was given by SA 661,676 and it was adequate and necessary information. After the briefing, he was 62,1672. He stated he heard the applause for the President when he arrived and music when the President left the ballroom. He remained on post until he heard "AOP" on 62,1672 frequency and also a call for an extra ambulance. He proceeded to departure site. When he arrived, the limousine and follow-up were gone as were all the wounded. He then was told to report to the Adams Room on 62,1672 frequency which he did. He was then instructed to return to WPO which he did. He was on standby at the Washington Field Office until 10:00 PM.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent 66167c
Assistant Inspector William Rollin.

On March 30, 1981 SA Jacobson reported to the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel. He received a thorough briefing from SA 66167c SA Jacobson's 67c was to be with the 62167c 62167c. He picked up a set of car keys from SA Mobley and a set from SA 66167c. He also stopped at the security room to pick up a PT-400 for the ambulance. He advised that he was on 62167c at 12:30 PM in the 62167c.

At 12:45 PM he notified the security room that the ambulance had not arrived. He learned that the ambulance was not due until 1:10 PM. The ambulance arrived on time and he placed the PT-400 in the ambulance with it set on 67c. He had the ambulance park in the designated area (near the 53.07c and returned to the 62167c. He had his 67c or 67c frequency and with the car radio, he monitored 67c frequency.

At 2:20 PM he heard SA 66167c on 67c 67c say "He's coming to Halfback." He then heard four or five shots. He could not see the shooting site but heard on 62167c frequency "ACP - enroute Crown." He saw the limo turn the corner and disappear. Everything was quiet for what seemed like a long time when he saw SA 62167c shouting, waving and talking into his radio. He could see 62167c send an ambulance. About this time he heard the limo say they were going to GW emergency room.

He directed the ambulance to go around to the departure site. He returned to the 62.07c because he did not know where the President was. He started the car, then turned it off because he realized that the 62167c would not be needed. He does not know what made him realize this.
He then ran down the ramp to the departure site. He stated he saw what he thought was two SA's and one police officer on the ground. The ambulance was arriving and they loaded SA McCarthy into that one. He began assisting in crowd control and called on 63/67 frequency for a 2nd ambulance. The ambulance arrived shortly. He was not sure who went into that one but continued helping with crowd control and helped load Brady into an ambulance. This ambulance went out under the canopy. He said the area was now being secured by MPD and SS agents and his watch read "2:33 PM". He returned to the 63/67 until he was directed on 63/67 frequency to return to the Adams Room. He went to the Adams Room, gave a statement to the FBI and then returned to WFO.

About 6:45 PM he was sent home and told to return at 12:00 Midnight. He returned at 12:00 Midnight to work at Blair House (Netherlands).

On March 30, 1981 SA Smith reported to SA 66 574 at 12:00 noon in the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton. SA 67C provided a security briefing which was adequate and he provided the necessary information. The briefing lasted about 35 minutes. SA 67C then 674 674 SA Smith 62 672

674 There were no unusual incidents and he remained on his 674 after the President had left the room.

When no departure was transmitted, he contacted the security room on 674 672 674 frequency to see if the inside post could discontinue. At that time he heard on 674 674 674 frequency "AOP". He remained on 674 674 until he heard on 674 674 frequency that he was to report to the Adams Room. He stayed in the Adams Room for approximately one hour and then was told to return to NEO for assignment.

He returned to NEO and was sent to GW Hospital where he was assigned to the main switchboard to handle incoming calls that were of an interest to this Service. He received his 674 674 t the hospital from AT&SF Crovatto.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Charles Bourne by Assistant Inspector William Rolin.

On March 30, 1981, he reported to SA 66167 at 12:00 Noon in the Adams Room of the Washington Hilton Hotel. He received a briefing from SA 661670 which was adequate and the necessary information provided. After the briefing he was briefed by SA 661670.

After the President left the room, he remained on post until he heard on frequency "There's been an AOP - maintain your post". He remained on post until he was instructed on 661670 82 frequency to report to the briefing room (Adams Room). He was in the briefing room about 45 minutes when he was told to return to WFO for assignment.

He remained at WFO until 7:00 PM when AISAIC Shawver told him to go home and get some sleep and be back at 12:00 Midnight to work. He returned at 12:00 Midnight and worked to 8:00 AM the next day on FT response.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview with [Special Agent SD] at the Technical Security Division Operations Office by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview deals with Agent's recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan and his activities at the George Washington University Hospital subsequent to the President's arrival there.

On March 30, 1981 was working the 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Shift on the duty desk at the Technical Security Division Operations Office. He overheard a radio transmission on frequency which he immediately recognized as indicating some sort of problem. He characterized his recollections as being one of realizing there had been an attempt of some sort. He tuned up the volume of the radio and heard additional comments or transmissions relative to Rawhide being okay and returning to B2. He summoned John Cannon from an adjacent office and together they monitored the transmissions that Rawhide was enroute to GW Hospital and immediately they began making notifications to their SAIC and ASAIC.

Acting SAIC Ray and ASAIC Pabst arrived in the Operations Office at a very short time frame later and within 15-20 minutes Ray directed to proceed to GW Hospital to perform as the TSD representative on the scene. At that point no one in the TSD Operations area was aware that the President had in fact been wounded. It was assumption at that time that he had simply gone to GW to possibly drop off someone else who may have been wounded.

immediately proceeded to raise directions to the GW Hospital emergency room. On his arrival at the emergency room he started searching for familiar faces. After questioning several persons present, he was advised of the presence of ATSAIC Shaddick. He approached Shaddick and informed him that he was the TSD representative and that any assistance in that respect could be obtained through hi
It was during that conversation that he determined that the President had in fact been wounded. He also learned that the President would be moved to another location within the hospital in a short time. As a consequence he began actions to conduct those areas. It was assumed the President would be taken, namely, the intensive care unit and the recovery room. Simultaneously, he contacted by phone the Technical Security Division and informed persons present there of the situation at the hospital, namely, that the President had been wounded.

He was informed during the course of that conversation that Explosives Ordinance Detail Unit was enroute to the hospital. He estimates they may have arrived at the hospital in a half hour to an hour later.

\[6077\] then proceeded to the intensive care unit where he joined with SA and assisted in making arrangements relative to the anticipated move of the President to that location. During the course of his activities in the intensive care unit the President was moved to the operating room. \(6077\) advised that no was conducted in the operating room or obviously in the emergency room.

\[6077\] then proceeded to the recovery room where he began conducting if that area. At approximately that time he was joined by Acting SAIC Ray and Agents. According to Ray, Ray took charge of the TSD related activities and began directing them. Those activities included as are mentioned above, obtaining additional and determining the where they should be and determining was measures were necessary related to \[6077\], what measures were necessary relating to hospital power, electric, etc. and hospital air supply, elevators, the entire gamut of technical security related measures.
At some point later that night or possibly the following day a Uniformed Division canine unit was summoned to the hospital to remain on stand-by there for whatever needs may have arisen. 67C advises that his duties continued in that respect until approximately 12:00 Midnight at which time he terminated. 67C thinks he was designated as the TSD advance representative at the hospital in view of the fact that he is now charged with preparing the paperwork and records relative to the TSD activities at the hospital. He has no specific recollection of every having been informed that he was in fact the TSD advance agent at the hospital.

In 67C's recollections, SA 67C seems to have been the individual from PPD most early on determined to be the advance agent at the hospital.

By the time of 67C's arrival on the scene, the situation seemed to be well under control both by the police on the outside and agents on the inside, with the exception of a rather chaotic situation that existed at the emergency room entrance. However, even in that location posts had been established and were functioning and the area appeared to be relatively secure in 67C's observations.

67C knew of no incident or conflict that may have arisen during the initial hours that could be characterized as a problem.

This concludes the interview with Agent 67C.
April 15, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA, PPD, at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview relates to Agent's recollections of the immediate aftermath of the President's arrival at the George Washington University Hospital emergency room on March 30, 1981.

Agent was previously interviewed and little additional information was obtained during the course of this interview. For the record, his comments are provided as follows.

On the President's initial arrival at the emergency room driveway entrance, visually observed the President and SAIC Parr exit from the car. It is his recollection that the President was assisted by SAIC Parr in his efforts to exit from the car; however, the President was capable of moving on his own at that point according to . Due to the conversations which had occurred in the car as they were enroute to the hospital both the President and SAIC Parr as well as Agent were at that point unaware that he, the President, had in fact been shot. Consequently, assumed that the President would be at the hospital for only a brief time frame.

Shortly after the President had entered the hospital, Mary Ann Gordon advised that she had information that an additional couple of individuals were enroute to the hospital by ambulance. According to her information to , they were gunshot victims but he nor she had any way of knowing who they were or in fact that they were in fact SA Tim McCarthy and Jim Brady.

As a consequence of this information the motorcade vehicles were moved from the driveway to make room for the ambulances arrival. As soon as the ambulances had arrived and the individuals being transported were removed to the emergency room, the ambulances were moved and the limousine and follow-up were placed
back into the driveway. SS-200X, the President's limousine, was parked with the right side of the vehicle against the emergency room wall so as to limit the visibility of the public of the damage suffered by the limousine, namely the bullets having struck the limousine door and window. B7C advised that he and BNC B6 as well as PST BNC B6 remained with the vehicles in order to secure them. Subsequently the limousine was replaced by a limo brought from 1310 L Street by Special Agent Ricky Dry and again replaced at a later time by a third limo again brought by SA Ricky Dry to the scene.

On the President's initial arrival at the hospital, B6, 57C has a vague recollection of having seen someone (he assumed it was a hospital employee) in the driveway signalling with his hand up at what point the limousine should stop. According to B7C, he does not know who the individual was but when asked specifically replied that it could have been Assistant Director White; however B7C does not know White and consequently could not have recognized him. B7C further recalled having seen SA B6, 57C of the Washington Field Office almost immediately upon the arrival; however, he had no knowledge of precisely where was when he saw him in relation to the limousine.

B7C recalled the sequence of events wherein Agent Gordon placed the President's clothes in the back of the limo and him subsequently having moved them when the limos were replaced by SA Dry, and forthwith further, the sequence of events wherein the FBI requested those clothes, discussions with DSAIC DeProspero that ensued and subsequently handing them over to the FBI.

On the initial arrival or in the moments subsequent to the initial arrival, characterized the situation as being one of a crowd building and simply
Milling around in the area outside of the emergency room. Within a very short time frame, only minutes, the police descending on the scene had established a control on the crowd and had barricades in place and agents of this Service were assuming post and assisting the police in maintaining crowd control.

I knew of no problems or conflicts of significance which may have occurred in the initial hours subsequent to the President's arrival at the hospital.

This concludes the interview with Special Agent.

Huggins advised that on 3-30-81 he was told by SA 66107C, that he would be standing post at the Hilton and that WFO SA's would be leaving the office at 11:30 AM for briefing and posting. He stated that he was briefed by advance agent SA 66107C and then posted by SA 66107C. SA Huggins advised that he received an adequate briefing and was posted on the main checkpoint with SA 16107C. He stated that he was briefed that there would be 3,000-4,000 people in the ballroom but it appeared that there were a lot more than that in the room. He stated that when the President entered the room, he and SA 66107C closed the doors and allowed no one else into the room (as they had been instructed).

He stated that it was very crowded and warm in the room and people were constantly being leaving even during the President's speech. He stated that anyone who wanted out was allowed to go but that no one was allowed back in. He stated that when the President left the room, the doors were opened and all the people began leaving. He stated this negated his function and he stepped next door to the security room to pick up his coat.

Huggins stated that he started to exit the building and that he had heard nothing on the radio 621011 frequency concerning an attempt on the President. He stated that as he left the building, he saw three people on the ground and a lot of confusion. He started to draw his weapon but then realized the President's car and the follow-up were gone and then holstered his weapon. As he started toward the crowd around
Hinckley, he saw a gun on the pavement. Someone said - don't touch it - and then SA 4016 picked up the weapon with a set of handcuffs. He then continued to officers around Hinckley and assisted in putting him in a police car. He stated the back door on the first police car wouldn't open so they put Hinckley in another police car which was nearby. He said SA Spriggs and somebody else got in the police car with Hinckley and left. He then went to SA McCarthy and assisted in putting him on a stretcher and into an ambulance. He then went to help Brady and assisted in loading him into an ambulance. He got in the ambulance with Brady. B7E B6 was also in the ambulance. The attendant told the driver to go to the Washington Medical Center. The driver said he was new and unfamiliar with the area. SA Huggins then said "Take him to GW". The attendant agreed and as SA Huggins climbed into the right front seat, the driver said he knew how to get to GW. He stated that ambulance was facing toward Florida Avenue and the ambulance turned to go that way but was blocked by a police car. The ambulance then backed around toward the hotel, pulled out, went across Connecticut and onto to Florida Avenue, then proceeded to the hospital with traffic control at one intersection.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent 661074, by Assistant Inspector William Rollin.

661074 reported to SA 661074 at the Washington Hilton Hotel at 12:00 Noon on 3-30-81 for a briefing. The briefing was adequate and necessary information provided. After the briefing, he was mobilized by SA 661074.

When the shift arrived, he was relieved and moved over to a set of doors approximately 15 feet away from the podium. He maintained the bible after the President left and finally heard on his radio, bible frequency, "AOP AOP", then a short time later "get an ambulance up". He maintained his bible until he was instructed on bible frequency to report to the briefing room. He was in the briefing room about 30 minutes and then told to return to WFO for assignment. At WFO, he was assigned to PI team for Ron, Jr. and then worked PI response for nine days.
April 15, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent 66167C by Assistant Inspector William Rolin.

On 3-30-81 at approximately 10:00 AM 66167C was notified by SA 66167C that he had a 62167C at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

He travelled to the Hilton and attended the 12:00 Noon briefing given by SA 66167C. The briefing lasted about 35 minutes and then he was briefed by SA 66167C. The briefing was adequate and necessary information was provided.

68 and he was on 672 frequency. After the President left the ballroom, he remained on 672 frequency for quite some time until he heard on 672 frequency "ACP, get another ambulance up here". He stayed on 672 until he was instructed on 672 frequency to report to the briefing room. He was in the briefing room about 30 minutes and then was instructed to return to WFO for assignment. He returned to WFO and was dispatched by ASAIC Berger to the residence of Secretary Regan to transport Mrs. Regan if she was to be moved. He stayed at Secretary Regan's residence until 9:30 PM, then returned to WFO for briefing on next day's assignment.
April 14, 1981

I called FBI, WFO, regarding World Wide Photos. I asked him if World Wide Photos was to be subpoenaed by the FBI for still photographs. He replied in the negative.

I told him that we have had conversations with World Wide Photos, 2021 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. (833-5327). He advised that he had photographs of the March 30, 1981 incident at the Hilton Hotel.
April 14, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Joe Trainor, PPD at the Old Executive Office Building by Inspector Steve Garmon

This interview concentrates on SA Trainor's recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan both during the evacuation phase from the Washington Hilton to GW Hospital and then the activities at the George Washington University Hospital as participated by SA Trainor.

Trainor advised that he was working the B7e B2 at the White House, PPD, on the date in question, March 30, 1981. He was assigned by ATSAIC Shaddick, his shift leader, to remain in B7e B2 as the operations agent there during the President's movement to the Washington Hilton Hotel. In addition to SA Trainor, Trainor recalls that ATSAIC Guy and ATSAIC DeNulio were present in what he termed B7e B2 area or the supervisors' room B7e B2.

As the event at the Washington Hilton approached its conclusion, Trainor overheard a transmission which he could not read. He telephoned the security room at the Hilton and was informed that that transmission was from SA B6 B7c, the advance agent at the Hilton, advising that the meeting was beginning to break up.

SA Trainor then contacted Uniformed Division control center, B7e B2 and asked if they knew which gate the President would be entering on his return to the White House. They informed him they were not aware and he responded that the arrival point would be through gate B7e B2. He kept the line open to B7e B2 in anticipation that the President's departure was imminent from the hotel.

At 2:27 PM, Trainor recalls a transmission from Shaddick to B7e B2 to the best of Trainor's recollection, that transmission was "Shots fired - three men down, coming to B7e B2. Trainor said he immediately noted the time
on the wall clock. He still had the Uniformed Division control center on
the line and he advised them to open every gate entering into the White House
area. ASAIC Guy and ATSAIC DeWally immediately came from their side of
to the console area where Trainor was positioned both to monitor what the
transmissions were as well as to assist SA Trainor. Subsequently there were
additional transmissions from SAIC Parr in the ( ) that "Rawhide is all
right, repeat - Rawhide is okay". A short time thereafter there were additional
transmissions he monitored by himself from SAIC Parr to Shaddick to the effect
"We're going to GW Hospital."

Trainor immediately called the Signal operator and requested that he be
put through to the George Washington University Hospital Signal Drop. Signal
operator responded - Hold on for a second. During that time frame, ATSAIC
Shaddick again transmitted via radio "notify the hospital". Trainor responded
"That's already being done". Simultaneously a female, presumably at the
hospital, answered the phone. Trainor identified himself to her and advised
her that "The President is enroute to the emergency room". The nurse asked
Trainor if he had been shot. Trainor advised her he did not know but he
didn't think so. He added that he thought there were may be three other
individuals who had been wounded that also would be enroute to the hospital
shortly. He thinks he directed her to assure that all doctors available were
summoned to the emergency room as soon as possible. At the conclusion of
those comments, the conversation between Trainor and the female on the other
end were terminated. Trainor says he marked the arrival given by Shaddick
at 2:30 PM. Thereafter, Johnny Guy's direction the agents from the
who had made the movement but missed the follow-up car with Trainor regrouped in the and proceeded to the GW Hospital. He estimates their arrival at the emergency room at the hospital was between 2:45 PM and 3:00 PM.

Prior to his departure from enroute to the hospital, he contacted the Washington Field Office and advised ASAIC Berger there relative to what he knew, namely, that the President was not hurt, that a suspect was in custody at the Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters, C Cell Block, and that requesting an ID team and assistance at that location. Prior to his having called ASAIC Berger, SA had contacted and talked with Trainor to make the request for additional assistance at the hospital, namely, an ID team and a PPD supervisor to respond to the C Cell Block at MPD Headquarters. He also asked Berger or directed Berger to send all available agents to George Washington University Hospital emergency room to assist in the situation at that location.

He does not recall any transmissions by phone or a radio from the hospital or agents at the hospital to providing a situation report prior to his departure from. He assumes that must have been the case, however, since it is his recollection that on arrival at GW, he was already aware the President had in fact been wounded by gunshot.

On his arrival at the GW emergency room, he encountered SA Denny Finch and just inside the emergency room entrance. He inquired where help might be needed and Finch directed him to clear the hallway between the emergency room and the operating room. At the time of his arrival, the President, Jim Brady, and Tim McCarthy were already present in the emergency room trauma area.

Trainor immediately set about determining from hospital personnel that the
President would go to the operating room from the emergency room and the route
through which he would be transported. Trainor walked that route and assured
that the hallway was secure. He reported his efforts to SA Finch and then
proceeded to the main entrance to the operating room where he took up a post.
He recalls that SA Phil Ley and B6167C plus two other unknown agents had
already secured the interior in area of the operating room.

When the President was moved to the operating room, Parr and Trainor changed
into surgical garments and proceeded inside the operating room.

When Trainor entered the operating room, he immediately checked on SA Tim
McCarty, explained to McCarty's doctors who he, Trainor, was and while he
was there, in Trainor's estimation, it was proper for him to be there since he
wanted to assure that appropriate evidentiary chain of any items from McCarthy
was maintained as well as to monitor McCarthy's condition. From McCarthy's
area, he proceeded to the President's operating room and determined that Phil
Ley, Parr and AD Simpson were already inside. They instructed Trainor to remain
in the adjacent area for any needs they might dictate.

Trainor talked with a nurse in the operating room occupied by Jim Brady.
He informed her of the need for the Secret Service to be present in that area,
particularly regarding the chain of evidence that might be produced from Jim
Brady.

He returned to the operating room occupied by Tim McCarthy and stood by
there until a bullet was recovered from McCarthy. He recalls B61B5C, of
the Field Office having received the bullet after its removal from McCarthy and
marking it plus initialing it and then turning it over to he presumes a Metropolitan Police Detective. Thereafter, Trainor returned to the President's operating room and awaited any further directions from supervisors from that particular location.

When the bullet was removed from the President, it was initially given to SA Ley who in turn passed it to SA Trainor who initialled the cup and dated it containing the bullet. Trainor in turn gave it to MTAIC Pat Miller who he presumes gave it to the FBI. According to Trainor's recollections, all of the bullet fragments removed from Jim Brady were accepted and handled entirely by 661674.

At 6:45 PM the President was taken from the operating room to the recovery room. He was accompanied by SA Trainor, AD Simpson, SAIC Parr, SA Phil Ley and SA 661674. On their arrival at the recovery room, it was Trainor's recollection that he was relieved by members of the 4-12 Shift. He terminated shortly thereafter and proceeded to his residence.

Trainor was asked directly if he recalled any specific or significant problems, conflicts or confrontations. He said the only thing he could recall that might be characterized as a problem occurred as a result of the insistence or what he termed the overconcern of the FBI and MPD Homicide detectives with evidence as it may have been available. Apparently, according to Trainor, the President's vest suitcoat, tie, shirt and cufflinks were lost during the course of his treatment in the emergency room or the operating room. The FBI agents at the hospital could not understand, according to Trainor, how this could have occurred. As a result, Trainor recalls having returned to the operating room the President was in the recovery room and searching for any items of
the nature listed above. His search met with negative results.

Trainor characterized the relationship that was established between the medical and hospital staff and the Secret Service as having been optimum. He said no problems were encountered between Secret Service and those elements at any point, as far as he is aware.

Trainor's recollections of the situation on his initial arrival at the GW emergency room was one of chaos at the main entrance into the emergency room. He said he did not personally proceed to the immediate area of the President so he can't speak for precisely what the situation was at that location.

It is his impression that most of the agents present followed their own instinctive notions of what to do and what not to do rather than having been given explicit directions by a supervisor.

The few directions or instructions that Trainor himself took came from a combination of SAIC Parr, AD Simpson and ATSAIC Shaddick. In his recollections DSAIC DeProspero was in charge of those activities which were occurring outside of the President's immediate vicinity and the other supervisors previously listed took charge and gave any necessary directions relative to those activities occurring in the President's immediate proximity.

This concludes the interview with SA Joe Trainor.
April 14, 1981 - 3rd Interview of SA Kent Wood, PPD, at the Old Executive Office Building by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview concentrates on Wood's activity at GW Hospital or the immediate aftermath of the assault on President Reagan on March 30, 1981.

Wood began by stating that subsequent to his return to the hospital with the President, he and others realized there were very agents who had been at the hospital with the President. Immediately with ATSAIC DeNella and agents Jack Taylor, Jim Varey, Bob Wanko, and Joe Trainor, Wood at the direction of ASAIC Guy proceeded to the GW Hospital emergency room. Wood estimates their arrival occurred at some point approximately 2:50 to 2:55 PM. Once they were at the hospital they proceeded into the trauma room area of the emergency room. At that location SA Dennis Finch or ATSAIC Shaddick directed Wood to assist the police in securing all areas inside and out. With SA Jack Taylor, Wood went outside the emergency room and assisted the Metropolitan Police and Park Police in securing the area on the exterior. The police had already set up secure barriers and Wood took up a position on the right hand side, or 22nd Street side, that is, of the emergency room entrance while Jack Taylor took up a position on the left hand side or 23rd Street side of the emergency room entrance. In that respect they simply assisted the police in determining the access of anyone entering the emergency room. Basically it is his recollection that all employees were referred to other entrances of the hospital when they came to that location seeking entrance.

Wood was relieved at approximately 4:00 PM by unrecalled agent of the Washington Field Office whereafter he proceeded to the inside and joined a rotation of agents holding post in the 4th floor intensive care unit area. He recalls SA Tom Wiley as having been in charge at that location. At approximately 9:00 PM, Wood was relieved and terminated his activity at the hospital. He
thereafter proceeded to the Washington Field Office where he was interviewed by agents of the FBI.

Wood advised that he took directions from no specific supervisor but suggested that his activities were essentially on his own.

He knew of no problem of significance nor of any confrontations or conflicts which may have occurred at or around the hospital during the course of his activities there on March 30th.

This concludes the interview with SA Kent Wood.
April 14, 1981 - 1st Personal Interview of AISAIC Will Slade, PPD, at the Old Executive Office Building by Inspector Steve Garner

AISAIC Slade was assigned to operations position, PPD, on March 30, 1981. In that assignment he normally would provide the support relative to logistics decisions for advances being conducted for Presidential and First Family activity.

As a matter of course on that day Slade had departed from the White House environs at approximately 2:30 PM en route to a training session being conducted at National Park Service Police facilities regarding horseback riding. Slade subsequently learned of the shooting incident and immediately returned to the White House at approximately 3:10 PM. For the duration of the day and until approximately 2:00 AM he remained in the White House. Shortly after his arrival there, he was directed by ASAIC Guy to coordinate the activities of all Reagan Family Detail matters. He advised that he dealt almost exclusively with those matters until his termination that night.

For the record he advised that Ronald Reagan, Jr. returned to the Washington area via commercial arrangements and Maureen, Michael and Patti Davis all returned to the Washington area via Air Force C-141. Slade made a substantial portion of those arrangements in conjunction with the military office at the White House. Slade was assisted by Special Agent Jim Parker in that respect. Parker was also interviewed with Slade. Information of a pertinent nature was limited with the exception that Parker advised that he had delivered an emergency identification kit to the hospital at approximately 3:30 to 4:00 PM that day. He can't recall from whom the directions to do so came but he said he turned the kit over to SA Tom Wiley and thereafter went back to the White House and assisted AISAIC Slade in whatever Slade required.
It is Slade and Parker's estimate that SA 64674 was assigned the advance at the GW Hospital within an hour after the President's arrival there. They presume that assignment was made in a concerted fashion by SAIC Parr, NISAIC Shaddick or SA Dennis Finch. Parker advised that during the brief time frame he was at the hospital delivering the SARGE kit, the situation appeared to be well in hand both in terms of security as well as control at the hospital. Neither Parker nor Slade had any knowledge of any problems or significant confrontations or conflicts having occurred at the hospital, during that initial day.

This concludes the interviews and comments relative to Slade and Parker.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Assistant Director Frederick White, Office of Administration, at his office by Inspector Steve Germon

This interview dealt with Mr. White's presence at the George Washington University Hospital in the afternoon of March 30, 1981 and his recollections relative to the President's arrival there and the following activities that surrounded his treatment in the emergency room at GW Hospital.

Assistant Director White overheard a female in the emergency room make an announcement "Attention everyone, the President's motorcade is on its way here". AD White proceeded to the location of the female who had just made this announcement, identified himself as being with the Secret Service, and suggested that they begin to clear
the emergency room. AD White advised that, of course, he had no idea why the
motorcade was enroute to that location.

He characterized the situation in the emergency room as being one of relative
calm even after this announcement. There seemed to be little if any notion of
what the impending situation might involve.

White then proceeded out to the main emergency room entrance. At that
location he suggested to an individual who he described as being dressed in a
blue blazer that the emergency room doors be locked in an open position. At
that point White said that he could hear sirens in the distance as they approached
the hospital. He walked outside the emergency room and observed the motorcade as
it proceeded up Pennsylvania Avenue and around the Washington Circle. He observed
the President's arrival and agents on the follow-up car with Uzi's in hand. He
advised that he was at the precise point of arrival and signalled to the limousine
the point at which they should stop.

He recalls that SAIC Parr was in the back seat with the President and exited
the vehicle in advance of the President. The President, in White's estimation,
got out of the limousine on his own and walked into the emergency room on his own.
It is AD White's recollection that he led the President into the emergency room
and offered directions as to which way they should proceed once they were inside
the emergency room.

White described the President's appearance on his initial arrival as being
very pale. White suspected that he had been the victim of a heart attack. He
does recall having observed considerable redness around the President's mouth
but would not characterize this as having the appearance of blood. When the
President was inside the emergency room, White observed that his expression turn
to one of anxiety and his knees began to buckle. At that point Parr and others present picked up the President by his feet as well as head and shoulders and carried him the remainder of the way into the trauma room. According to White's recollections, no stretcher or wheel chair were available inside the emergency room at the President's arrival point.

White recalled that immediately at the President's arrival the hospital medical staff began to arrive as well.

White observed very shortly after the arrival that some of the White House staff and military aide took control of the phones in the emergency room entrance and he overheard the military aide dial a number and direct that the line be held open. The Military aide, according to White's recollections, advised that the President was at GW Hospital before he directed that the line be held open.

He recalls that the hospital administrator and agents set up a checkpoint in the immediate area entering the emergency room. He recalls the arrival of ATSAIC Pat Miller and SA 56167C of the Field Office within 5-10 minutes after the President's arrival.

As time progressed, the hospital personnel began moving patients from the emergency room; however, he does not have the impression that they moved all patients who were present when the President initially arrived.

White recalls overhearing an announcement that a number of additional gunshot victims were enroute. Who may have made such an announcement he has no recollection.

Shortly thereafter White recognized Jim Brady as he was wheeled into the hospital, the emergency room. A short time later SA Tim McCarthy was brought into the emergency room.
In describing the situation in the emergency room prior to the President's arrival, White estimates there were 12–15 patients present at that location at that time. In addition, there may have been as many as 10–12 medical staff on location prior to the President's arrival. When word was received that the President was enroute, within seconds an additional 10–12 medical staff arrived in the emergency room. Thus at the time the President arrived, there may have been as many as 30–45 people present in the immediate area of the emergency room.

White said he observed no situation wherein the medical staff may have been inhibited in gaining access to the emergency room.

White commented that implementation of security at the hospital was immediate by the agents who arrived on the scene. Very shortly thereafter Metropolitan Police Department officers began arriving and assumed posts in the outer emergency room area. It was White's impression that they obviously were seeking directions from the Secret Service on what to do and where to do it. In a very short time frame those directions were forthcoming, according to White's recollections.

White recalled having observed a "NBC" news correspondent who somehow or other gained access to the area inside the emergency room and x-ray lab which is adjacent to the emergency room. White recalled that he suggested to agents and officers that the correspondent be removed from the area and the police officers complied with his suggestion. He has no further awareness of any additional news media representatives having been present at any time or point in the emergency room. White said he remained in the area until approximately 5:00 PM at which time he departed the hospital again in the company of.

This concludes the interview with Assistant Director White.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Deputy Assistant Director Gerald Bechtle, Office of Protective Operations, at his office by Inspector Steve Garmon.

This interview concentrates on Bechtle's recollections of the events following the assault on President Reagan on March 30, 1981.

Bechtle said he first became aware of the assault when he overheard transmissions on his office scanner relative to "Rawhide is okay" and then subsequent transmissions that "We're enroute to the hospital." At that point he directed B/C B6 to contact B/2 to determine if there was some situation to which FO should be made aware. Within a moment or so, SA Steve Ramsey called that office by phone and advised that an incident had occurred at the Washington Hilton Hotel and that the President was enroute to the hospital. Bechtle said he advised SA Ramsey to take all measures necessary to maintain a federal presence at the hotel, to secure the scene, obtain any witnesses' names, and a room to conduct interviews. This presence and security for the scene was to be maintained until the Federal Bureau of Investigation could arrive on the scene and assume the investigative role required of them.

Bechtle then contacted AD John Simpson at his residence and advised him of the situation and suggested that he should proceed to the hospital.

Bechtle then directed ASAIC Gary Yanger to proceed to the Intelligence Division and determine if a crisis center would be established. If so, Yanger was to remain as Protective Operations representative in the crisis center.

At approximately 4:00 PM Bechtle recalls having contacted Chief Pryor, Uniformed Division, and further directing Pryor to muster all of the Uniformed Division personnel he could and instruct those personnel to proceed to the GW Hospital where they were to report to SA B6 for any assignment which might be necessary
at that location. Bechtle recalls activities between himself and DAID Ashley Williams wherein requests for manpower from ATSAIC Pat Miller at the Hospital were coming. Bechtle and DAID Williams discussed the situation and it is Bechtle's recollection that Williams took care of Miller's request.

An initial request for a counter-sniper group at the hospital was forthcoming and the initial response was negative. After a brief exchange and additional facts were presented, the response was changed to an affirmative one and the counter-sniper unit was dispatched at the direction of Bechtle to the hospital.

Bechtle recalled conversations with DSAIC DeProspero relative to the chain of custody for the President's clothes and to the Presidential limousine and further to the cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on providing those items to them for their investigation. Bechtle recalls having given an approval to DeProspero and to SAIC Bob Melchiorre that these items were to be turned over to the FBI as their request came in.

Bechtle does not recall when or how he became aware the President in fact had been wounded. He estimates it may have been two to three hours before he was informed. In that regard he commented that an obvious problem on communications of information was experienced in the aftermath of the assault. He said that it was his conscious decision that Protective Operations should maintain a "low profile" since any demands that PO be provided information would probably have impacted negatively on the situation at the hospital. It was his thought that Assistant Director Simpson on the scene at the hospital, there was an effective protective Operations presence there and any requirements that came from him relative to information would simply add to confusion which was obviously the situation at the hospital during the first few hours the President's location there.
Page 3 - 1st Interview of DAD Gerald Bechtle

Bechtle recalled having contacted ASAIC Johnny Guy at PPD and informing him that he should contact the Reagan Family Details and apprise them of the situation.

From a critical standpoint, Bechtle suggested that in the future stronger emphasis might be placed on agents being required to provide information to Protective Operations relative to the status in any such situation. This requirement stems from a demand by other Headquarters units that they be informed of the situation as soon as information is available. Bechtle recalls the Office of Public affairs having been particularly insistent that they needed such information in order to respond to press queries with which they were being deluged. As an aside, Bechtle commented that it was proper that the people on the scene should deal with the situation at hand and establish proper control there before they concerned themselves with informing others as to the circumstances and the situation.

Bechtle has no knowledge of any significant conflicts, confrontations or problems which may have risen at the hospital either on March 30 or in the subsequent stay of the President at the GW Hospital.

This concludes the interview with DAD Gerald Bechtle.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent 60167C at the Washington Field Office by Inspector Steve Garbon

This interview deals with SA 60167C recollections of the events at the George Washington University Hospital relative to the President's treatment there on March 30, 1981.

At approximately 2:30 PM, 60167C was in the Field Office, and was directed by ASAIC Berger to "Go the the GW Hospital emergency room. The President has been shot." 60167C and SA Bob 60167C proceeded directly to the emergency room via official vehicle. 60167C, who was the first to arrive, characterized the situation there as being one of mass confusion. 60167C said he took action to identify the hospital administrator, Mr. N 60167C, and after having done so, he requested 60167C assistance as the first person present in the emergency room and thereafter clearing the room of any persons unnecessarily present. He recalls ASAIC Pat Miller as having proceeded to ASAIC Shadick's location and discussing the situation with Shadick relative to any necessary assistance. He recalls the presence of several PPB agents, particularly SA Dennis Finch in the emergency room entrance area and the fact that measures were under way in an effort to establish control in the emergency room.

He recalled the presence of Metropolitan Police Department officers on the outside and subsequent directions from ASAIC Pat Miller that 60167C should get together with those police officers and establish security on the exterior of the hospital.
He recalls SA [redacted] arriving at some time considerably after his arrival and commencing efforts to establish a command post in the hospital. As soon as the situation in the emergency room was relatively controlled, [redacted] went to the command post to determine any needs at that location. There he was informed that the situation was well in hand and he directed [redacted] to remain there and establish an open telephone line communication to the Intelligence Division.

[redacted] then returned to the emergency room area where he coordinated and took directions from AISAIC Pat Miller. With the arrival of additional Washington Field Office agents and Metropolitan Police officers, [redacted] established security posts in and around the operating room. This security, according to [redacted], consisted of a combination of posts between agents and police officers. [redacted] directed SA Ruggins of the Field Office and SA [redacted] of the Field Office to scrub up, don surgical gowns and take posts on the interior of the operating room. Additionally, FBI agents Phil Ley and Joe Trainor took directions to prepare themselves for duty in the emergency room.

A short time later the President was moved into the operating room and with the assistance of others, cleared the hallway for the movement of the President from the emergency room to the operating room. [redacted] remained in the main checkpoint area with the assistance of the hospital administrator in identifying people seeking entrance as well as other agents. Subsequently additional agents attending an in-service training session began to arrive at the hospital. [redacted] says he took some of those agents and replaced Metropolitan Police officers on posts in the interior of the hospital.
Simultaneously, additional PPD agents began arriving and directed them to proceed to SA . Location on the fourth floor intensive care unit for posting there.

Subsequently, Uniformed Division officers arrived on the scene with a Lieutenant Bn Bf in charge. The UD officers were briefed and posted by SA Bn Be and Lieutenant Bn Bf. They essentially were used to relieve posts that were previously manned by Metropolitan Police officers.

Bn Bf returned to the emergency room and assisted in clearing Jim Brady's wife into the hospital. He escorted her to Bn Bf and suggested that Bn Bf accommodate her, which Bn Bf complied with. Bn Bf said he assisted the Metropolitan Police in establishing posts on the exterior of the hospital thereafter and particularly a press area outside the emergency room.

He recalls arrival of Mrs. Reagan and having assisted her and her detail in gaining access to the emergency room.

At the initial arrival of Bn Bf and other Field Office agents particularly MEAC Pat Miller at the hospital, it appeared to Bn Bf that no one was in charge. He advised that he and Pat Miller simply took the bull by the horns and began to give directions. He stated that at no point did he encounter any negative response to his directions.

Bn Bf stated that he terminated his duties at the hospital at approximately 12:00 Midnight. He recalled no problems, conflicts or confrontations of significance during the time frame of his duties at the hospital on March 30, 1981.

This concludes the interview with Special Agent Bn Bf.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Don Ruggins at the Washington Field Office by Inspector Steve Gammon

This interview focuses on Ruggins' recollections of his activities at the George Washington University Hospital in the afternoon of March 30, 1981.

Ruggins began his account by recalling an assignment at the Washington Hilton on a main checkpoint at that location. In the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan, Ruggins advised that he accompanied Mr. Jim Brady to GW Hospital in an ambulance transporting Brady. It is his recollection that Tim McCarthy departed from the Washington Hilton Hotel by ambulance subsequent to Jim Brady's departure. On arrival at the GW Hospital, Ruggins says he had no awareness of who was there, particularly the President. He also had no awareness that the President had been shot until considerably after his arrival at the hospital.

On his arrival there, he recalls having entered the emergency room and observing SA 66-070 and NTSAIC Pat Miller on location there. He said he assisted them in establishing checkpoints and removing people from the emergency room. He also assisted in establishing liaison with the hospital in obtaining hospital staff personnel assistance to identify people who should and should not be in the emergency room.

It is his recollection and observation that NTSAIC Pat Miller simply assumed command at the hospital in view of the fact that no one else was there in a position to do so. At the direction of Miller and SA 66-070, Ruggins and SA 66-070 proceeded to the operating room where they donned surgical gowns and scrubbed up in preparation for the President's movement to that location. They thereafter established a post at the two main checkpoints in entering into the operating room which would be occupied by the President. They established contact with the nurses in that area in order to obtain their assistance in identifying
persons entering the operating room. Ruggins recalled the President having been placed in Operating Room No. 2, Jim Brady in Operating Room No. 4 and Tim McCarthy in Operating Room No. 5. McCarthy, according to Ruggins, was the first of the three to be brought to surgery, second was the President, and Jim Brady third. Ruggins remained in the operating room throughout the surgery on the President with the exception of one or two brief moments when he exited to take a relief break.

Ruggins advised the situation in the operating room was one of relatively relaxed atmosphere on the part of the medical staff. There seemed to be confidence on their part that the President was in good shape and that the operation was a routine one, not requiring a great deal of extra concern on their part. He advised that initially there were spectators in the operating room inasmuch as the GW Hospital is a university situation and more often than not, surgical procedures are a classroom situation. Most of those spectators were removed from the situation but according to Ruggins' recollection, there were some who were able to remain in the surgery in a strictly observation capacity. Ruggins says he obtained a list of all parties present during the surgery and subsequently gave that list to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He recalls a security officer from the hospital as having been present in the observation deck of the operating room. That officer was posted there by SA  
and directions given that the observation deck would remain off limits throughout the surgery to anyone else seeking access. According to Ruggins' recollection, the President was brought into surgery at approximately 3:30 PM and exited at precisely 6:45 PM. Ruggins recalls the sequence which the three parties being operated on came out
of surgery - first was Tim McCarthy, second the President and third Jim Brady. According to Huggins subsequent to the President's surgery being completed, he was removed from the operating room to a recovery room. At that point Huggins terminated his assignment and returned to the Washington Field Office.

Huggins recalls no problems, conflicts or confrontations of significance during his presence at the GW Hospital on March 30, 1981.

This concludes the interview with Special Agent Huggins.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent William B. Hackenson at the
Washington Field Office by Inspector Steve Casson.

This interview concentrates on Hackenson's recollections of his activities on
March 30, 1981 at the GW Hospital in the aftermath of the assault on President
Reagan.

Hackenson recalls a commotion in the Field Office and information coming
to the attention of those present that the President had suffered an assault
or an attempt in the minutes immediately prior. He recalls MSAIC Dasmereau
of the Field Office had having directed him to proceed immediately to GW
Hospital and establish himself as a Protective Intelligence coordinator.
Thereafter Hackenson obtained his official vehicle and proceeded to GW Hospital
arriving at the emergency room at 2:55 PM. On his arrival he observed motorcade
vehicles and agents to which he posed the question - What happened? He received
negative response inasmuch as no one seemed to know.

He entered the emergency room and encountered MSAIC Pat Miller. He
informed Miller that he had been directed to proceed to the hospital and fill
the role as the intelligence agent.

Shortly thereafter he responded to a request from a hospital receptionist
that dealt with an incoming threat call by phone. The receptionist advised
that an anonymous caller had made a threat relative to the President. Subse-
quent to handling that interview with the receptionist receiving the call, he
proceeded to make efforts to determine a situation report relative to the
President. He could obtain no such situation report from the doctors and nurses
present and contacted the Washington Field Office, SA Yonkus, while and provided
him with a negative situation report.
At approximately 3:15 PM he was informed of the situation mainly that
the President had received a gunshot wound and he immediately provided that
information to SA Yonkus at the Field Office by phone, as well as information
relative to SA Tim McCarthy and Jim Brady having been wounded.

As soon as the President was removed to surgery, SA Hackenson proceeded
directly into the trauma area where he had been treated on his initial arrival
in search of any evidentiary items remaining there. He observed nothing
except for Presidential physician, Dr. , bag having been left there.
He obtained the doctor's bag and approximately 30 minutes later gave it to
staff person . He stated that his search, although a cursory one,
last four or five minutes. He spoke to a nurse by the name of whether
any items of an evidentiary nature may have been left to remove from the trauma
room. She responded negatively.

Briefly thereafter he encountered Metropolitan Police Homicide Officers
who, as well as FBI agents, inquired relative to the presence or availability
of any evidentiary items. They proceeded to an available room in the emergency
room area and began to establish a system whereby they could inventory evidentiary
items. As soon as this was done Hackenson informed AUSAIC Pat Miller of his
actions and briefly thereafter the evidence was available began to be presented to them from whatever direction it was provided.

Hackenson recalls in this respect a situation relative to a highly classified
item removed from the President's coat pocket and a hassle that seemed to develop
between a demand for control of that item by agents of the FBI and staff member
and Military Aide . According to Hackenson the Secret Service
was not involved in this situation. He, Hackenson, only observed it.
At approximately 9:30 PM ATSAIC Miller convened a meeting of all security elements present at the hospital. Hackenson and SA Dennis Chomicki of the Field Office attended relative to intelligence matters. During the course of that meeting it was determined who would provide what elements of coordination for security arrangements at the hospital and Hackenson was charged with the traditional

and all intelligence related activities in and around the hospital.

It is noted that immediately on Jackson's arrival at the emergency room, telephone calls began to come in of a threatening and psychotic nature. Hackenson directed SA Frank O'Donnell to the Washington Field Office to establish contact with the hospital switchboard personnel and begin to monitor those incoming calls. Also to establish or put in place According to Hackenson, O'Donnell did as he was directed and the only failing was that the , never seemed to work as they were designed.

During the course of conducting name checks, only one exclusion was determined and one additional hit was made on persons working at the hospital.

Hackenson advised that he continued in the ID coordinator's role until approximately 12:00 Midnight at which time he terminated, returning to the hospital at approximately 6:00 AM on March 31, 1981. Initially Hackenson  additional ID teams were in place at the hospital within a 2-3 hour time frame after the President's arrival there. The ID teams consisted of the following personnel:

Those agents all continued on duty throughout the night of March 30/31/1981 into Tuesday March 31st at approximately 9:00 AM.
During the course of the interview, SA Hackenson provided an Office Memorandum written by himself to SAIC Powls. It deals with the activities he observed and participated in relative to receipt and disposition of evidence from the President, SA Tim McCarthy and Mr. Jim Brady as well as to general comments on the situation at the hospital and measures implemented to secure the situation there.

Hackenson has no knowledge nor any recollection of any significant conflicts, or confrontations that may have occurred in or around the hospital during the initial 24 day of the President's stay at that location.

This concludes the results of the interview with SA Bill Hackenson.
Office of Inspection  
1310 L Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20223  

April 13, 1981

Mr. Theodore Gardner  
Special Agent in Charge  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Division

Dear Mr. Gardner:

Reference Inspector Kevin Houlahan's telephone conversation with Special Agent [Redacted], FBI, on April 10, 1981.

Inspector Houlahan requested copies of the video tapes and still photographs subpoenaed by the FBI relating to the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981.

I am in charge of the Secret Service internal inquiry into the events of March 30. These tapes and photographs would enhance our ability to establish the proper sequence of events at the Hilton Hotel.

My office is located at 1310 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and I can be reached at 566-8352.

Your cooperation in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Behl  
Inspector

cc: SA [Redacted]

KMH: sjl
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview of Uniformed Division Officer BNC B6 at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan (This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

On April 13, 1981 Officer BNC B6 was interviewed by Inspectors Counts and I at the Office of Inspection, 1310 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Officer B6 stated he received his assignment to report to the Hilton Hotel on Monday, 3-30-81, on that date.

His instructions were to report to SS Troutman at the Hilton Hotel at 11:00 AM. The frequency to be used was 131.675 MHz.

BNC B6 stated he met Troutman at approximately 10:50 AM and the EOD teams were with Troutman at that time. There was another individual who was described to him by Troutman as a TSD trainee.

BNC B6 stated he previously had an assignment at the heliport at the Naval Observatory for a Vice Presidential departure. He conducted that sweep at approximately 8:00 AM on 3-30-81.

When he met Troutman at the Hilton, Troutman advised of the general itinerary as known for the President at the Hilton Hotel. He introduced him to the other personnel from EOD, etc.

He met Troutman at the main ballroom at approximately 11:30 AM to start the sweep.

BNC B6 with his dog, arrived at the ballroom at approximately 11:30 AM and he, two EOD teams and the trainee went upstairs over the ballroom to 

BNC B6 stated he has performed this function at the Hilton ten or fifteen times in the past.
EOD placed in the balcony as they did the sweep. He believed the entire sweep took between one-half hour and 45 minutes. He returned to the ballroom and observed two MPD canine units on the scene already engaged in the scene.

He then returned to the Adams Room and remained there until approximately ten minutes prior to the arrival.

and noticed an MPD officer on the scene. He returned his dog to his cruiser and then returned to the where he remained through the arrival.

He recalled leaving that area and proceeding to the arrival area and spoke with Officer a friend. He noticed nothing unusual during this time he was outside.

He returned his dog to his cruiser which was parked close to the intersection of Connecticut and T Street, in fact it was the closest car parked to Connecticut Avenue on T Street.
April 13, 1981 - 1st Interview with [Officer B76 B6] UD K-9, at 1310 L Street by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

Officer B76 B6 received his assignment at 7:00 AM on Monday. He had worked the weekend and Monday was his RDO. He was instructed to meet SS Troutman at 11:00 AM.

At 10:50 AM, he met Troutman and the BDD team in the hotel lobby. They discussed the assignment and he was told to meet at the ballroom at 11:30 AM to begin the briefing.

The MPD teams were released at the conclusion of the briefing. He put his dog in his car and took a post on the ledge over the arrival area with an MPD officer. He was in the same position as on departure.

After the President entered, he went down and talked to Officer B6. He saw and recognized the subject. He also heard the MPD officers talking about the subject, B70 B6.

B70 B6 did the departure sweep about ten minutes before departure and resumed his position on the ledge. He did not see the MPD officer on the ledge.
He began observing the crowd across the street as he could not see the limo from his position. He did not hear any departure notice and did not see an EOD sweep of the departure area.

He next heard clapping and saw the crowd waving. He heard four shots. He ran toward Connecticut Avenue to get down on the sidewalk. As he reached the sidewalk, the limo passed him. He then called "We have an AOP" on B7C B6 frequency.

When he reached the scene, he saw McCarthy down and a person attending him. He asked what he was doing and the man said he was applying direct pressure to the wound. He next noticed a gun on the ground near the wall. He went over and stepped on the gun so no one would bother it.

B7C B6 next went to get his to his car radio to call for more ambulances. While enroute he encountered Officer B7C B6 and used the radio on his bike. He called Foreign Missions and advised that three people were down and for them to send more ambulances.

B7C B6 recalled he could see the reflections of the flashes from the gun but he could not see the assailant.

B7C B6 was interviewed by the FBI, MPD Homicide and SA B7C B6.

Ten minutes after the shooting, the wounded were removed and the area began to clear.

He felt the limo was moving up the street within five seconds after the shots. It was at this time that he made the "AOP" call.
He returned to the overhead area; however, this time he did not notice an MPD officer positioned overhead.

From this position he was watching the people who had assembled across T Street.

He recalled no transmission on VHF frequency regarding a movement and his view of the limousine was blocked by the overhang above the VIP entrance. He then heard four shots, three in quick succession with a pause and one other follow-up. He ran to the driveway near Connecticut Avenue and proceeded down the taxi ramp towards the VIP area. When he reached the bottom of the ramp, the limousine was on T Street proceeding towards Connecticut.

He made a transmission on VHF frequency, words to the effect - All agents be advised AOP AOP.

He then directed his attention to the wounded on the street. He spoke with an MPD sergeant located near the wall and they both noticed there was a gun lying next to the wall. It was not the weapon located near Mr. Brady's head.

He stepped on the gun so that no one could pick it up.

He then proceeded towards his cruiser in order to transmit on the B7C B6 frequency. As he arrived he noticed Officer B7C B6 on a scooter arriving. He used Officer B7C B6 radio to advise the dispatcher that there was an emergency at the hotel and to send ambulances, at least three people who were down.

Officer B7C B6 then took a position on the east side of Connecticut Avenue and he took a position on the west side of Connecticut Avenue and stopped all traffic for the ambulances to depart the scene.
He estimates that within ten minutes of the incident, the ambulances were loaded with the wounded and had departed the scene. After the ambulances had departed the scene, he returned to the crime scene area and observed agents and MPD officers clearing the crime scene, obtaining names of possible witnesses and generally keeping the crime scene intact. He assisted with this for a period of time.

He noticed many people exiting the office buildings and surrounding buildings coming to the area in curiosity.

He estimated that it took him approximately five seconds to leave the overhead area and arrive at the bottom of the taxi ramp. Therefore, he estimates that within five seconds that limousine was passing him on T Street headed towards Connecticut Avenue. This is five seconds from the time of the first shot.
On Monday, 3-30-81, at approximately 10:30 AM he was assigned to the Hilton as a B7c B7. He, SA B7f B6, took a vehicle to the Hilton Hotel and attended a briefing by SA B7c B6 at 12:00 Noon. He was B7c B7.

B7c B7

stated the briefing was the standard Secret Service briefing and recalls that B7c B7 asked SA D. V. McCarthy if there was any intelligence connected with the visit and the reply was negative, that the visit looks like a routine stop.
There were rows of tables set up in front of the stage for the writing press. The area between these tables was the center aisle of the hall and was reserved for the press pool.

He stated that there were no unusual problems at his table, however, there were the normal complaints by the news media regarding access.

The President left the stage and SA Hall remained on awaiting notification of departure.

He heard on frequency words to the effect - We have EOP EOP. He, SA 66167C and SA 66167C were confused by this transmission. Approximately 30 seconds later he again heard - EOP EOP.

Then left the ballroom, proceeded through the holding room area up the VIP entrance stairs. As he approached the top of the stairs, he heard sirens, etc.

He stepped outside at the VIP arrival entrance. When he stepped outside, the Presidential limousine and follow-up were gone, and the assailant was no longer on the scene. To his left there were wounded persons being administered to.

The first ambulance was just backing in at that time and it is his recollection that this ambulance took SA McCarthy, a second ambulance took Mr. Brady and a third ambulance took Mr. Delahanty. He recalled a short wait for the third ambulance to arrive but in reconstructing the time frame, he believed it took no longer than one minute for this ambulance to arrive.
When he stepped outside crowd control was being implemented by MPD and Secret Service Agents on the scene. Before he left the scene, there was a rope in place near the Terrace doors. SA 66 noted this rope because he felt that the rope line was in a different spot than on his last stop at the Hilton for a Presidential movement.

The overhang area at the Terrace doors had people in the driveway, etc. but things were under control by MPD and Secret Service Agents on the scene.

He then heard a transmission on 66 which advised that all agents should return to the briefing room. SA 67 then returned to the Adams Room.

He estimated that he arrived outside the VIP doors approximately four minutes from the time the President left the stage.
The following is a list of questions posed, general statements, criticisms levied and procedures questioned regarding U. S. Secret Service actions as a result of the assassination attempt on President Reagan as found in newspaper articles and media transcripts of the incident.

1. Why did the Secret Service not know about the weapons arrest of Hinckley in Nashville and what procedures would have been followed had they been informed of it?

2. BATF advised that they knew about the explosive bullets within a few hours of the incident and had notified the Secret Service of same. Also, the possibility that a toxic lead compound (lead azide) was on the bullet — Why had the Secret Service not notified the President's doctor of this information?

3. Why is there not tighter Secret Service security for the President when he travels within the Washington, D. C. area and why were so few Secret Service Agents on the side of the President facing the crowd?

4. Why was the Secret Service limousine not parked closer to the hotel exit?

5. Why was the accused gunman allowed to get so close to the President and if it was a designated press area, how was he able to penetrate it. Even if it was a designated press area, why was it located so close to the Presidential motorcade?

6. Witnesses at the scene described the gunman as "fidgety" and "agitated". Why did not Secret Service Agents also notice an individual displaying such traits in this crowd?

7. Why were Metropolitan Police officers facing toward the President and away from the crowd and had they been given a proper briefing by the Secret Service advance team?
Page 2 - Questions, statements, criticisms, procedures questioned

8 - Do agents on the President's detail receive enough training to be able to observe the situation that occurred and react properly to it?

9 - Why was the name of the gunman not found in Secret Service files?

10 - Why was the President not wearing a bullet proof vest that day and why does not the Secret Service insist that he wear one on all outdoor movements?

11 - Can communications between the Secret Service and the local law enforcement agency (Metropolitan Police Department) be made better and how good are they?

12 - Couldn't "plexiglass tunnel" be designed and used to protect protectees from the limousine to a door entrance.

13 - Why aren't there controls and stricter limits placed on a President's appearance in crowds? Why are "photo" opportunities necessary and permitted on routine arrivals and departures of the President?

14 - Why wasn't a security perimeter established further from the President's path and the people within the area more closely scrutinized?

15 - Were Secret Service post-standards lax in their observations of the crowd from where the gunman fired?

16 - Why did the Secret Service permit the President to walk into the hospital upon his arrival? Why was not a stretcher ordered to be brought forward? By allowing him to walk, was not the President's life more in danger?

17 - Why was Agent McCarthy not wearing his bullet proof vest? Would it have protected him from the bullet if he had been wearing it?

18 - Why are the times that the President or the Vice President are to appear in public allowed to be given to the press in advance?
19 - Why did it take so long to get the gunman under control and handcuffed and why was he not put into the first police vehicle that he had been taken to?

20 - Why was no Secret Service action apparently taken when cameramen complained of citizens mingled amongst them?

21 - What is the morale of the Secret Service - It appears to be lower than normal and could this have had an effect on agents on the day of the shooting?

22 - How good is communications between the Secret Service and the FBI? What can be done to make it better?

23 - Does the U. S. Secret Service stress close up body protection at the expense of advance precautions?

24 - The following was found in the New York Post dated 4-2-81 in an article which stated that Hinckley had been heard to say in Lubbock, Texas that all Presidents should be "eliminated". No further background was provided.

Another news article noted that Hinckley apparently made a statement to an apartment maintenance man in Lubbock, Texas during the Presidential campaign that all the Presidential candidates should be "eliminated" except Libertarian Party Candidate Ed Clark. Was this information ever brought to the attention of the Secret Service?

The article also stated that Secret Service Agents were staying in rooms adjacent to Hinckley at the Park Central Hotel. No further background provided. The article also stated that Representative Edward R. Roybal, Democrat of California, charged that the Agency should have known the whereabouts of Hinckley but that there had been a "breakdown in communications". No further background information provided. Article also stated that House Speaker Tip O'Neill charged the Reagan Detail with being "incredibly lax" at the time of the shootings. No further background provided.
25 - Why did the Secret Service insist that five shots had been fired and not six?
26 - Why was Hinckley's presence in Washington, D. C. not known by the Secret Service?
27 - Why the apparent confusion on the part of the Secret Service in first identifying incorrectly the weapon used as a 9 shot Harrington Richardson revolver instead of the Roehm Model RG-14 that it was? Why the apparent initial confusion as to the suspect's age and background?
28 - Why were policemen, rather than Secret Service Agents, closer to the President as he left the hotel?
29 - How come police officers and civilians had to wrestle the gunman to the ground before Secret Service Agents even got to him?
30 - Alfred Antonucci, a bystander who helped wrestle Hinckley to the ground, was hospitalized for high blood pressure after becoming "very emotional" during four hours of questioning following the incident. Was this questioning done by the Secret Service?
31 - Why did the Secret Service padlock the iron gate on West Executive Alley after the arrival of Vice President Bush on the night of the shooting?
32 - Is the Secret Service spread too thin? Are they asked to protect too much?
33 - Why didn't the Secret Service insist on using a less conspicuous (underground) exit for the arrival and departure at the hotel?
34 - The New York Daily News dated 4-1-81 stated that a video tape shot by TV Station KAMC in Lubbock, Texas shows that Hinckley may have shaken hands with President Reagan at an airport rally during the campaign and the FBI is presently conducting an examination of that tape. Is this fact true?
35 - The motorcade was facing west to pick up President Reagan as he departed the hotel. Why wasn't it facing east which would appear to be a more normal security departure?

36 - Were there sufficient detail trained Secret Service Agents to secure the hospital upon the arrival of the President and immediately thereafter?

37 - Were the agents on duty fit for duty the day of the attempt? Were they properly rested or had they been working many hours overtime? How could this happen? Why isn't security tighter to prevent an incident such as this from taking place? Even if the arrest of Hinckley in Nashville had been reported to the Secret Service, would they have been aware of the fact that he was in Washington, D. C. on the day of the shooting?

38 - Why do Secret Service Agents appear to be watching the President rather than the crowd?
The following documents were reviewed by the Inspection team investigating the assault on President Reagan. The purpose of the review was to ascertain if existing Secret Service policy was followed on March 30, 1981 and to determine if a review of said policy, training directives and procedures should or could be improved upon.
April 10, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Billy Williamson, WFO, at 1310 L Street, by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

SA Williamson received a call on his car radio at about 10:30 AM on Monday that he was needed for a protective movement at the Hilton at 12:00 Noon. He had begun work at about 8:30 AM.

He arrived at the hotel about 11:00 AM-11:15 AM and went to the Adams Room. The briefing began at 12:00 Noon and was conducted by SA B76. It was a standard briefing and there were no outsiders present other than possibly WHCA and BOD.

Williamson was assigned to work with SA B6157C. The briefing was over by 12:30 PM.

Williamson and B6157C then met with the B2167C and they discussed where they were to be.

Williamson and B6157C went outside about 1:00 PM.

They observed a fat blond-haired woman who was acting nervous. She talked to them about shaking the President's hand. She also said she worked in the Universal Building for Social Security.
He saw the route car approaching. He continued observing the surrounding buildings and noted that some windows were open, but C-5 did not call for response.

He recalled that SA Russ Miller had earlier mentioned that the police had pointed out subject, The ID team was called and SA McCarthy advised that he knew the subject and he had never caused a problem.

A police officer was posted near Williamson. There was a small crowd at arrival. commented on the length of the motorcade when it arrived.

Williamson and remained outside while the President was at the hotel, except for a short period when Williamson went to the men's room. They were outside when the vehicles were repositioned. He also recalled SA's D. V. McCarthy and Danny Spriggs being outside in the area of the Terrace doors.

After visiting the men's room, Williamson came back out and talked for a while to the follow-up driver. He heard over his radio that the President was coming out, so he moved over to the edge of the rope line. He recalled that a uniformed officer was also standing there, and he and the officer attempted to keep the gathering crowd up on the sidewalk.

then came out and took a position near the follow-up. Both he and Williamson tried to keep people from standing between the follow-up and limo. Williamson had moved to a position near the tail of the limo and about five feet in front of the follow-up.

Williamson heard shots, but did not at first realize they were shots. It struck him as being like a training exercise because of the sound of the small caliber gun. He looked to his left and his line of vision was clear because most of the people were down. He could see the gun, but it seemed to be pointing
more towards the intersection than at the President. All shots had been fired
when he saw the gun.

He saw Spriggs moving in on the assailant. SA's rushed by him. He then moved toward the assailant, but he had already been subdued so he backed off. He next moved to Tim McCarthy and moved people back away from him.

Williamson was not sure at first where the President was. He did not recall hearing any radio traffic. He helped clear the area for the follow-up and staff cars to move out.

Williamson then returned to McCarthy. He asked him where he was hit and Tim said he felt something in his chest. A man in a red and white shirt came up and said he was an EMT. They saw two spots of blood on Tim's shirt. They then opened the shirt and saw the wound. Tim asked how bad it was and Williamson told him that it was a small caliber gun and that it didn't look bad. There was very little blood flowing out.

The EMT said to keep Tim on his side. He then checked all of the wounded and gave the order in which they should be transported. He said Tim should go first. Williamson put his handkerchief on the wound and applied direct pressure. He stayed with him until he was put in the ambulance. He then continued to check to see that only law enforcement people were in the crime scene area. He felt things were under control by the time the ambulances began to load.
April 10, 1981 - 1st Personal Interview of SA William Williamson at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

On 4-10-81 Inspector Counts and I interviewed SA William Williamson at the Office of Inspection, 1310 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

At approximately 10:30 AM on 3-30-81 he was advised by radio to report to the Hilton Hotel for a briefing. He arrived at the hotel between 11:15 and 11:45 AM that date.

The briefing was in the Adams Room and began shortly after Noon. The lead advance agent was SA 6167C, PPD. He recalled SA 6167C from WFO was at the briefing. He recalled that no non-Secret Service Agents personnel were present except for a WHCA representative and hotel security coming in and out of the room during the briefing.

He had no recollection of MPD being at the briefing. He stated this is not totally unusual inasmuch as the Washington Field Office does not normally use MPD for inside posting.

During the briefing he noted a roll call taken of agents present, the itinerary being given, post assignments read off and recalled no special instructions for post assignments.

The agents were posted by SA 6167C and/or SA 6167C.

During the briefing he was assigned 6107C with SA 6107C

He recalled a short briefing by SA D. McCarthy of WFO regarding the intelligence situation. The briefing was not extensive as there was no specific intelligence related to this visit.
The O-S team was identified to all agents and their

At approximately 12:30 the briefing was over and Williamson and They were
spoke with the advised by that they would not be ready until approximately 1:00 PM.

At approximately 1:00 PM SA's Williamson and went to the arrival point.

He familiarized SA with the buildings in the area inasmuch as SA had not worked as many visits to that site as Williamson had.

He recalled SA Ross Miller advising them that there was MPD had advised him that a male near the rope line had been at previous functions for the President. Miller passed this information to them in the mistaken belief that they were the ID team.

Williamson called the ID team consisting of SA D. V. McCarthy and SA Spriggs who responded to the arrival area. Williamson pointed out the male subject who was later identified as SA McCarthy knew him on sight. The arrival was uneventful.

Williamson and stayed outside the hotel the whole time the President was inside.

He recalled SA Mary Ann Gordon repositioning the motorcade. He was speaking with SA at the follow-up car when he heard notification that the President
was coming out. Williamson took a position near the rope line next to a uniform police officer. He recalled SA 66167c162167e. Williamson was moving people onto the sidewalk so that they would not get in the way of the motorcade.

He recalled hearing three or four shots which reminded him of AOP training inasmuch as they sounded to be small caliber. He responded to the assailant and almost immediately knew that the assailant was under control. He decided to leave the assailant inasmuch as he was under control and went to SA Tim McCarthy to render aid, briefly. He noticed the press and general public moving in on the scene and he immediately started crowd control.

When he heard the transmission of AOP, the limousine had already departed the site. Williamson also assisted in getting people out of the way of the follow-up car in order for it to leave the scene. He returned to SA McCarthy and remained with him. Another individual identified himself as an EMT (Emergency Medical Technician) and he and this individual stayed with SA McCarthy.

He believed that SA McCarthy was placed in the first ambulance to leave the scene. He assisted in clearing the area for the arrival of other ambulances and recalled MPD detectives arriving at that time period.

He assisted in security of the crime scene and allowed only law enforcement people to enter the area. He recalled MPD and agents looking for witnesses in the crowd.

He recalled that the scene was fairly stable when the ambulances were there taking people from the scene.
He stated that crime scene was under absolute control when Mr. Brady was taken from the scene.
April 10, 1981 - Addendum to the Interview with George
Washington University Hospital Administrator, interview by Inspectors Steve Germon and Roger Counts

The following are additional items discussed during the course of the initial interview.

Mr. advised that he was aware of the fact that the Secret Service conducted periodic surveys of GW Hospital and had personal recollections of several times during which the Secret Service had contacted or visited the hospital for that purpose in the past.

Mr. commented that it would have been significantly advantageous if it had been made clear in the early stages of the President's stay at the hospital precisely who was in charge from a Secret Service standpoint.

Mr. advised that it was sometime before it became apparent who that individual was. In his estimation initially it seems to be ATSAIC Pat Miller of our Washington Field Office but he was never very certain that any particular individual from the Secret Service had the responsibility for the total security at the hospital.

Mr. advised that the hospital has its own security force, that that force was on duty at the time the President arrived at the GW Hospital on March 30. He advised that that force normally maintains post at the main entrance on 23rd Street as well as the emergency room entrance at the hospital. Those posts were in place at the time of the President's arrival and consequently were able to immediately assist the Secret Service in its effort to secure the environment there, subsequent to the President's arrival.

Mr. advised that the hospital disaster center was in Room 2500 which coincidentally was the same location selected to be the Secret Service command post.
He further advised that there were extra telephone lines and "jacks" available in that room and consequently communication support available to the Secret Service was in place at the time the command post operation was initiated.

This concludes the additional comments from b667c.
April 10, 1981 - 1st Interview of Mr. BnB6 Administrator of the George Washington University Hospital, Washington, D. C., at his office at the GW Hospital by Inspectors Steve Garmon and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Garmon)

This interview concentrates on Mr. BnB6 recollections of the activities at the GW Hospital surrounding the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred at the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

Mr. BnB6 advised that he first became aware of the assault on President Reagan when he was contacted by phone by his secretary during the course of a meeting of the hospital advisory committee. That meeting was in session at a building just across the street from the GW Hospital. His secretary advised him that the President may have been shot and was currently enroute to the hospital. Mr. BnB6 returned to the meeting after receiving the phone call and informed the advisory committee that the President was enroute to the hospital after possibly being wounded during a shooting incident. Mr. BnB6 then proceeded directly to the emergency room of the hospital. On his arrival there, the President was already in the trauma room. At his arrival at that location, Mr. BnB6 advised he was confronted by a number of agents relative to his own identity. He convinced him he was the hospital administrator and they requested his assistance in determining who should be allowed access into the emergency room.

After Mr. BnB6 established his own identity, he attempted to determine who from the Secret Service was in charge. After some difficulty, Mr. BnB6 concluded that ATISAIC Pat Miller appeared to be the Secret Service Agent exercising command.

Mr. BnB6 advised that a very short while after his arrival in the emergency room, he gave orders to his own staff that the hospital should implement what
he termed the "hospital disaster plan". Mr. advised that that plan was mainly one to secure the building and limit the access of the press to its environs.

Mr. continued his efforts to assist Secret Service at the emergency room in determining who should be allowed access and in other efforts to clear the emergency room of any extraneous people or those at least with lesser priorities for having been present. In his estimation, it took approximately 10-15 minutes to establish relative degree of control in the situation in the emergency room. In addition to that control, he advised that he felt measures were underway to establish security and control in the entire hospital. Those efforts were partly the result of his direction to implement the "hospital disaster plan" but in addition, the Metropolitan Police and Secret Service were taking action to assist at all entrances to the hospital.

Mr. advised he was required to be flexible in the location that he maintained during the course of the events on March 30 and as a consequence was required to leave the immediate area on many occasions; however, he gave explicit directions to his staff that the Secret Service was to be supported and all assistance necessary was to be rendered in that respect.

Mr. could recall no significant problems, conflicts or confrontations which may have resulted from the President's location in GW Hospital either on the first day or any time subsequent to that during the President's stay at the hospital. Mr. advised that there was initial hesitancy on the part of the Secret Service to accept his word as to who should be admitted to the environs of the President. He has concluded that as time passed, a confidence in himself as being an individual who could in fact vouch
for the need of medical personnel to be present grew and within a short time
frame any hesitancy on the part of the Secret Service had dissipated. In his
evaluation, things could not have proceeded smoother under the circumstances.

Mr. [RESTORED] advised that in his estimation no patient had been adversely
effected or in any way harmed by the presence of President Reagan or the Secret
Service either on the first day or at any point subsequent during the President's
stay at the hospital.

Mr. [RESTORED] provided copies of memoranda that had been drafted at the hospital
by hospital personnel. The first memorandum is an emergency visitor policy and
is dated March 30, 1981 from himself to all medical center personnel there.
That memorandum sets forth the policy adopted in the immediate aftermath of the
President's arrival at the hospital. It was, according to Mr. [RESTORED], implemented
for only one day, Tuesday, March 31, 1981. Subsequent to that one day the hospital
returned to the business as usual policy except for the requirement that persons
coming into the hospital be checked in and then checked out on their departure
as well as a baggage or package examination for all persons entering the hospital.
Mr. [RESTORED] memorandum will be attached to this interview.

As further evidence of the fact that no problems were encountered between
the hospital and patients as a result of the President's presence in the hospital
Mr. [RESTORED] provided a second letter or memorandum that was directed from himself
to the patients in the hospital and distributed on March 31, 1981. Therein, he
sets forth the hospital's position relative to the President being a patient
in the hospital and extends his appreciation to the patients for their understanding
during a difficult time. Mr. [RESTORED] was requested to provide information relative to
hospital's logs or records of the sequence of events that occurred from the
time frame the President arrived at the hospital continuing through his
relocation to the intensive care unit. That relocation occurred in the early
morning hours of March 31, 1981. He was also requested to provide copies of
any diagrams or architectural representations of the facilities, particularly
the first floor facilities of the GW Hospital and the emergency room, operating
room, recovery room and finally he was requested to determine who, in the hospital,
had been notified first that the President was enroute to that location. He
assured the interviewing inspectors that he would comply with these requests at
the earliest possible time frame.

As of April 13, 1981, Inspector Garmon contacted Mr. by phone. At
that point he had not yet been able to determine all of the requested information.

This concludes the interview with Mr.
(This interview was dictated by Assistant Inspector Forre)

SA Burns advised that around 11:00 AM on March 30, 1981, he received an assignment with PST B76 B6 to be the route car personnel for the Presidential movement to the Hilton Hotel. They were instructed to report to SA Gordon at

SA Gordon furnished them with a copy of the transportation survey report and briefed them on the trip.

The route car departed the White House approximately five minutes prior to the Presidential motorcade. Enroute to the Hilton the route car utilized their headlights and the red flashing light. SA Burns observed that the intersections were covered by MPD policemen. The route car arrived at the Hilton
a few minutes ahead of the motorcade. Upon arriving at the hotel, the route car turned left on T Street from Florida Avenue. They drove past the VIP entrance approximately 35 yards and parked next to the curb on the north side of T Street between the VIP entrance and the intersection of T Street and Connecticut Avenue. The six motorcycles parked behind them. There were no unusual incidents enroute to the hotel or upon their arrival at the hotel.

After the President was inside the hotel, SA Burns went to the holding room and made some telephone calls in connection with his duties at the Washington Field Office.

SA Burns advised he heard applause from the ballroom and assumed the President was finished speaking. He returned to the route car by the public T Street entrance and walked past the follow-up car and limo on the right side. He observed nothing unusual. Upon entry arriving at the route car he heard a radio transmission saying the President was preparing to leave. He plugged in the red light but discovered it was not working. He left it on the roof of the car anyway. They departed the hotel turning left onto Connecticut Avenue. After traveling approximately 100 to 150 yards, they heard a radio transmission on f1 frequency, there had been gunfire or words to that effect; that an agent and a policeman were down. SA Burns believed he heard a transmission they were going to the White House. As SA Burns recalled, he believed the intersections were covered by policemen. Prior to going under the overpass, SA Burns looked back and observed the police motorcycles. He thought he saw the spare limo in front of the limo although he was not
positive. He did not recall seeing the MPD lead car or the follow-up car.

A few minutes later he heard a radio transmission advising the President
was being taken to George Washington Hospital. SA Burns thought this trans-
mission occurred around 17th and L Streets. At that time SA Burns assumed the
limo would turn right on Pennsylvania Avenue from 17th Street. He and PST B2
also wondered if the motorcycles and the MPD lead car had received the change
in the destination. The route car turned right on Pennsylvania Avenue and
slowed down in the event the motorcycles went straight which he assumed they did.
He then observed the spare limo followed by the limo turn right on Pennsylvania
Avenue. From that point to the hospital the route car stayed in front of the
spare limo stopping intersection traffic inasmuch as there was no intersection
control. They utilized their siren, horn, and headlights. Upon arriving at
the hospital, PST B2 drove past the emergency entrance driveway and parked
next to the curb. PST B2 remained with the car and SA Burns went inside
the hospital.
April 10, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Timothy J. Burns, route car, Washington
Field Office at WFO by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector
Richard Fores

(This interview was dictated by Assistant Inspector Fores)

This report pertains to the period of time SA Burns arrived at the George
Washington Hospital until he departed the hospital approximately 8:00 PM on that
evening.

SA Burns advised when he and PST Bcc Bb arrived at the hospital in the
route car, PST Bcc Bb parked next to the curb past the driveway emergency entrance
on Washington Circle to the hospital. The limo pulled into the emergency
entrance and stopped at the doors. SA Burns immediately got out of the route
car and ran to the emergency entrance. When he got to the entrance, he observed
President Reagan walking from the limo into the emergency entrance doors to the
hospital. SA Burns followed the President and agents into the hospital acting
as a trail agent. As SA Burns was entering the hospital, he noticed the bullet
hole in the window of the limo. He could not recall the position of the detail
agents as they were entering the hospital. Once inside the hospital, ATSAIC
Shaddick asked SA Burns if he could locate any agents to be posted around the
emergency room. SA Burns did not see any additional agents for approximately
three minutes, when agents started arriving from the Washington Field Office.
During this period of time SA Burns attempted to monitor the traffic in the
hallway. As agents began arriving on the scene, SA Burns sent them to the
emergency room.

SA Burns believed that ATSAIC Shaddick was the person who asked if he could
get started on setting up a command post. SA Burns telephoned the Washington Field Office but cannot recall who he spoke with. Whoever he talked with advised that the hospital survey did not include any information regarding a location for the command post. He then talked with a woman from the hospital staff who took him to Room 2500 on the second floor which is the administrative offices. She said some of the offices in that suite could be utilized as the command post. While the woman was taking SA Burns to Room 2500, Bn Bn from WHCA arrived at the hospital and went with them. SA Burns remained on the second floor approximately two or three minutes, then returned to the first floor after seeing that Bn Bn was in the process of setting up the command post. When SA Burns returned to the first floor, he saw Agent Bob Blossman and another WFO Agent whose name he can't recall. He requested SA Blossman to go to WFO and return with some Bn Bn radios.

Around the same time, ATSAIC Pat Miller, WFO, arrived at the hospital and advised he would be in charge from the standpoint of the Washington Field Office. SA Burns believed that SA Bn Bn WFO, was with ATSAIC Miller although he is not positive. He said that he estimated that ATSAIC Miller arrived at the hospital approximately five to eight minutes after the President's arrival.

Approximately 10 to 12 minutes after the President's arrival, Mrs. Reagan arrived at the hospital. SA Burns advised he received word that she was enroute to the hospital and met them at the entrance, then led them back to the emergency room where the President was being examined.

SA Burns believed ATSAIC Miller instructed him to go to the operating room area to ascertain if it was being secured. SA Don Huggins, WFO, and a PPD agent or
possibly two PPD agents (name(s) unknown) were at the operating room area. SA Burns and Huggins went to another room and changed into surgical clothes. SA Burns kept his radio, gun, and SS pin with him and locked everything else in a locker. He returned to the operating room area where the nurses showed him the rooms in which the President, Agent McCarthy, and Jim Brady would be operated on. He believed the operating room numbers were #2 for the President; #4 for Jim Brady; and #5 or #6 for Agent McCarthy. SA Burns pre-posted SA Huggins inside the operating room of the President. A PPD Agent was posted inside the operating room door of the President.

At a later time during the President’s operation, SA 66692 from the Washington Field Office was posted in a hallway between the operating rooms of the President and Jim Brady.

Also prior to the President’s operation, there was a discussion with the hospital staff regarding a holding room or recovery room where the President would be taken immediately after the operation which was located in the same area of the operation. SA Burns stated for a period of time the Secret Service was under the impression the President would remain in the recovery room for an extended period of time; however, the hospital staff knew that he would remain in the recovery room for a short period of time such as 30 minutes. SA Burns believed the misinterpretation occurred as a result of both the Secret Service and the hospital staff assuming their own estimated time period in the recovery room was correct without actually discussing with each other the length of time the President would remain the recovery room.
In addition to the Secret Service attempting to monitor the people authorized going into the operating room area, the hospital security personnel were assisting in this regard.

SA Burns believed Agent McCarthy was the first to be escorted into the operating room area. The President was second and Jim Brady was third. SAIC Parr was furnished with surgical clothes in the operating room area as the President was being taken to the operating room. Once inside the operating room, SAIC Parr informed SA Burns he was concerned about the viewing area above the operating room. SA Burns went upstairs and learned that an MPD policeman was inside the viewing area with the door locked from the inside. (SA Huggins has the name of the MPD policeman).

SA Burns returned to the vicinity of the operating rooms. SA Joe Trainer, PPD, was in the hallway at that location. AD Simpson advised SA Burns to see that radio transmissions were kept at a minimum. SA Burns relayed the information to DSAIC DeProspero. There was also a discussion between ATSAIC Miller, WFO, and SA Burns about where the President was located. SA Burns had no further information regarding this discussion.

SA Burns furnished the following information which he believed occurred regarding the sequence of bullets taken from Agent McCarthy, Jim Brady, and the President.

(1) SA Burns obtained the bullet taken from SA McCarthy and gave it to the FBI.
(2) SA Burns obtained one of three fragments taken from Jim Brady and gave it to the FBI.

(3) SA Trainer obtained the bullet taken from the President and gave it to the FBI.

(4) SA Burns obtained the second fragment of the bullet taken from Jim Brady. It was given to the FBI.

(5) SA Burns obtained the third fragment of the bullet taken from Jim Brady. It was given to the FBI.

SA Burns advised the chain of custody regarding each bullet and fragments of a bullet were preserved. He also stated SA Hackinson, WFO, was with the FBI agent who received the fragments and bullets.

After the President's operation around 7:30 PM, he was taken to the recovery room for approximately 30 minutes. While the President was in the recovery room, SA Burns telephoned ASAIC Berger at WFO advising him of the status. Also after the President's operation, the FBI was attempting to locate the President's shirt which he had worn into the hospital. SA Burns went through the bags in the operating room but could not locate it. He believed the FBI took all the bags from the area in order to search them for the shirt.

At approximately 8:00 PM SA Burns departed the hospital and returned to the Washington Field Office.

Agent Burns stated that in his opinion there was some confusion from the time of arrival at the hospital for approximately three minutes due to lack of agents
for posting. After agents began arriving which was three minutes, he believed the confusion to be minimal. One problem encountered was the identification of operating room personnel due to the necessity for wearing surgical masks in that area.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of Officer Bn Bb U. S. Park Police,
District 7, Washington, D. C. by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant
Inspector Richard Foree.

(This interview was dictated by Asst. Inspector Foree)

He advised that he was one of the three Park Policemen who rode motorcycles
in the motorcade on March 30, 1981. They reported to the Southwest gate
of the White House at approximately 1:15 PM on March 30. He had already
been informed the motorcade was to utilize the normal route to and from
the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Upon arriving at the Southwest gate, they met with three MPD officers
who were assigned to the three MPD motorcycles along with Sgt. Bn Bc
who was driving the MPD marked lead car. No changes had been made in the route.
They received their assignments and prepared for the departure from the
White House.

Approximately 1:45 PM the motorcade departed the White House with the
six motorcycles in single file leading the motorcade. The motorcycles
remained in front of the motorcade throughout the route to Washington
Hilton Hotel. MPD policemen were assigned to provide intersection control.
The motorcade arrived at the Washington Hilton Hotel approximately 1:52 PM.
The President immediately went inside the VIP entrance after waving to the
crowd. The six motorcycles were parked approximately 30 yards from the
VIP entrance on the north side of T Street. The six motorcycles were parked
in a row with the back wheel next to the curb and the front of the motor-
cycles facing across the street.
Officer BnC6 stated approximately 2:18 PM they were informed by an agent that the President was on his way out of the hotel. As the President came out of the VIP entrance, he waved to the crowd area across T Street and then turned to wave to the people in the horseshoe driveway of the public entrance to the hotel. Officer BnC6 stated he then heard what appeared to be a cap pistol going off very rapidly with a slight pause between the first two shots followed in quick succession by three to four shots. Officer BnC6 saw three men fall to the ground. At the same time, Park Policeman BnC6 dropped his motorcycle and ran to the scene of the shots. The President was pushed into the limousine with an agent shouting, “Get out of here”. Officer BnC6 pulled out in front of the limousine and traveled west on T Street and left (south) on Connecticut Avenue. Officer BnC6 MPD motorcycle, was at the T Street and Connecticut Avenue intersection. He traveled south on Connecticut Avenue in front of Officer BnC6 and the limousine.

Officer 27C stated as he was going up T Street and onto Connecticut Avenue, he was transmitting to the dispatcher that shots had been fired at the President and the motorcade was traveling south on Connecticut Avenue. During this time he was unaware the President had been injured by the gunfire. While traveling on Connecticut Avenue and 17th Street, he was transmitting on the radio the motorcade's location. Officer BnC6 stated as he approached Pennsylvania Avenue from southbound 17th Street, he observed the route car, a green Buick, driven by PST 27C stopped at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 17th Street. After
Officer B6c B6 passed the intersection, the route car proceeded westbound on Pennsylvania Avenue towards George Washington Hospital. It was at this time he also observed the motorcade turning right onto Pennsylvania Avenue. He then realized the President might have been injured by a bullet. He immediately advised the dispatcher they were traveling towards George Washington Hospital.

Upon arriving at George Washington Hospital, he observed the President walking inside with agents on each side of him. Officer B6c B6 assisted in securing the entrance to the hospital from the public and press. He then asked for a barricade truck to respond with barricades to close off the south side of Pennsylvania Avenue to keep the crowd away from the hospital.

Officer B6c B6 advised Officer B6c B6 to stay on the scene at the Washington Hilton Hotel and to relay any information to the dispatcher. Approximately 20 to 30 minutes later, Officer B6c B6 responded to the hospital and assisted in securing the area. Sgt. B6c B6 and Lt. B6c B6 responded to the hospital and Lt. B6c B6 went inside.

Officers B6c B6 and B6c B6 responded to the scene with barricades and assisted with crowd control to ensure that emergency vehicles could arrive at the hospital.

A copy of Officer B6c B6 statement regarding his duties on March 30, 198, is attached.

(This interview was dictated by Asst. Inspector Forcee)

On April 9, 1981, Officer B7c B6 was interviewed and he advised that he was one of the three Park Policemen who rode motorcycles in the motorcade on March 30, 1981. They reported to the Southwest gate of the White House at approximately 1:15 PM on March 30, 1981. He had already been informed the motorcade was to utilize the normal route to and from the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Upon arriving at the Southwest gate, they met with three MPD officers why were assigned to the three MPD motorcycles along with Sgt. Bell who was driving the MPD marked lead car. They received their assignments and prepared for the departure from the White House. Officer B7c B6 stated he was supposed to bring with him a portable radio for the Secret Service agent riding in the marked MPD lead car; however, he forgot to bring it with him. The Park Police radios are not on the same frequency as MPD or Secret Service, consequently they had no radio communication with the motorcade.

The motorcade departed the White House with the six motorcycles in single file leading the motorcade. Officer B7c B6 advised they were aligned as follows:

1. Lead MPD motorcycle - B7c B6
2. Park Police motorcycle - B7c B6
(3) MPD motorcycle - B1C B6
(4) Park Police motorcycle - B1C B6
(5) Park Police motorcycle - B1C B6
(6) MPD motorcycle - B1C B6

The motorcycles remained in front of the motorcade throughout the route to the Washington Hilton Hotel. MPD policemen were assigned to provide intersection control. There were no incidents enroute to the hotel or upon their arrival.

The motorcycles parked approximately 25 yards from the VIP entrance on the north side of T Street. The six motorcycles were parked in a row with the back wheel next to the curb and the front of the motorcycles facing across the street. The alignment of the six parked motorcycles from the direction of Connecticut Avenue to the VIP entrance is as follows:

(1) MPD motorcycle - B1C B6
(2) Park Police motorcycle - Larry Evans
(3) MPD motorcycle - B1C B6
(4) MPD motorcycle - B1C B6
(5) Park Police motorcycle - B1C B6
(6) Park Police motorcycle - B1C B6

When the motorcycles received information the President was coming out of the hotel, the six motorcycles pulled away from the curb preparing for the departure. Officer B1C B6 advised when the shots were fired, the six motorcycles were located as follows:
Page 3 - 1st Interview of Officer \textit{B7C B6}

(1) MPD motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - was at the intersection of Connecticut avenue and T Streets;

(2) Park Police motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - on T Street headed in the direction of Connecticut Avenue;

(3) MPD motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - on T Street headed in direction of Connecticut Avenue and behind to the right of Officer \textit{B7C B6};

(4) MPD motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - on T Street headed in direction of Connecticut Avenue; beside MPD motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - behind and to the left of Park Police motorcycle - Officer \textit{B7C B6};

(5) Park Police motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - on T Street behind MPD motorcycles - \textit{B7C B6} and \textit{B3C B6};

(6) Park Police motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6} - on T Street behind Park Police motorcycle - \textit{B7C B6}.

The foregoing alignment was furnished by Officer \textit{B7C B6}. It is noted that from viewing the video tapes of the scene taken by the news network, it appeared some of the motorcycles were at the curb at the time of the gunfire.

Officer \textit{B7C B6} stated that prior to the shots, he called the station advising them of the upcoming departure and requested channel one operation. While walking, Officer \textit{B7C B6} watched the door and observed the President walking to the limousine. As the President got close to the limo, Officer \textit{B7C B6} heard a noise and saw a flash of light. He realized the noise was a gunshot and he dropped his motorcycle to the ground and ran to the aid of
the President. During the time that he left his motorcycle and ran down the street, several more gunshots were fired. Officer BnC B6 stated as he ran he drew his service revolver. As he reached the group who was attempting to subdue the subject, he reholstered his weapon or thought he placed it in the holster. Officer BnC B6 stated he assisted with handcuffing the subject and removing him to an MPD vehicle. As the vehicle departed the scene, Officer BnC B6 realized that his gun was missing and his motorcycle was on the ground. Shortly thereafter, he observed his service revolver on the sidewalk and retrieved it.

Officer Loveland explained that he must have placed his service revolver in his raincoat pocket, which was torn, and it fell out of the pocket. He then went and stood his motorcycle up, notified the station as to what occurred and remained at the Hilton Hotel until relieved by Lt. BnC B6.

Attached is a copy of Officer BnC B6 statement.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of Deputy Assistant Director Don Edwards, at 3:00 PM in Suite 304 at 1310 L Street, by Inspector Dennis T. Brosan

DAD Edwards stated that on March 30, 1981 Chief Prior and Metropolitan Police Department Deputy Chief were having lunch together when Deputy Chief page enunciated. Upon calling his office, the Deputy Chief was informed of the attempted assassination. All three participants in the lunch proceeded in the USSS vehicle to the Washington Hilton.

DAD Edwards estimates that they arrived on the scene shortly before 3:00 PM and remained for a period of approximately 20 minutes.

He states that his primary concern was to see if Uniformed Division could be of assistance at the scene. He also knew that he had a C-S team and a canine team at the scene for the visit. He ascertained that the Uniformed Division was on the scene assisting the Metropolitan Police force with traffic control and that his units were not involved in the attempted assassination.

The crime scene had been secured by the Metropolitan Police Department and the general public were kept well back from the scene and news media were on the sidewalk away from the crime scene. He explained all were being kept back from the crime scene by manpower (MPD), that no ropes or stanchions had been erected around the crime scene. A lot of law enforcement officers were traversing the crime scene and could very well have destroyed the evidence. He used as an example that they could have picked up bullet fragments on the soles of their shoes.

DAD Edwards states that SA's "department" was good. He would characterize it as professional. However, no one appeared to be in charge. He can recall only three SA's by name -
He was approached by two detectives from the Metropolitan Police Homicide Squad who appeared to have been sent to him by SA. They requested his permission to take custody of the assailant's weapon. Edwards states that he told them that SA should remain in custody of the weapon until such time as an investigating team from the Washington Field Office of Secret Service arrived and that at that time through mutual discussion custody of the weapon would be decided.

He stated that at this time SA was still in possession of the weapon. He had the weapon secured with a pair of handcuffs and had a manila folder around the weapon so that it was out of sight of the general public.

He had discussions with special agents on the scene. He inquired about witnesses to the event and was told by an SA unknown, possibly that all witnesses were being interviewed jointly by one Secret Service Agent and one MPD detective. He then inquired as to an investigating team from the WPO but was told that no one knew anything about it. He instructed the agent to inquire by radio as to the names and estimated arrival time of the team. Three calls had to be made via radio before he was informed that SA and another agent whose name he cannot remember were enroute to the scene.

At this time DAD Edwards and Chief Prior left the scene. He states that neither the FBI nor investigating agents from the WPO-SS were on the scene at the time of his departure.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview with SA 66b07c WFO, at 1310 L Street, by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

SA 67c received his assignment to the Hilton at about 10:30 AM on 3-30-81. He left the office with SA's Norton and Huggins and attended the briefing at 12:00 Noon. He was given his post assignment and thought he recalled the ID Agent mentioning that Lyndon LaRouche would be in the hotel.

The ballroom was very crowded but no one passed through his post. He heard the arrival on frequency. The speech ended about 2:20 PM and people began to depart the ballroom as soon as the President left.

He recalled hearing someone ask about departure over the air. 66/67c then left the ballroom and walked up the stairs to the Terrace level. He overheard people talking about shots being fired. He went out through the Terrace doors and through the crowd.

66/67c first saw SA 66/67c and then the three wounded. All cars were gone. He saw the agents putting the suspect in the car. There was a lot of noise. He asked 66/67c what had happened and 66/67c said an agent and police officer had been shot. He also saw Brady.

66/67c talked with 66/76 who was standing behind the assailant. He told him not to leave. He also talked to 67c 66 who said he had taken a punch at the assailant. 66/67c also obtained the names of two newsmen who had filmed the incident. These were 67c 66 and 67c 66.

He gave these names to SA 66/67c.
When Detective 612 of the 3rd District arrived, 67C pointed out Antenucci to him. He then advised 66107C that he was going to the 3rd District with 66107C statement from 66107C said he saw the assailant start shooting so he hit him with both hands in the back of the neck. He then got his foot caught and couldn't get away. He said the assailant had been standing in the front row for about five minutes with his hands in his pocket. When he began shooting, he was holding the gun in both hands. 66107C thought he hit him after the second shot.

66107C noted that all phone lines were dead at the 3rd District. He was later able to call SA 67C and tell him where he was. He also talked to SA R. A. Smith and asked if the FBI wanted to talk with 66107C. This is when he first heard that the President had been shot.

He then returned to the hotel with 66107C and turned him over to SA 66107C at the holding room. He gave 67C a copy of 66107C statement. He then went to the Adams Room where he was interviewed by the FBI. He then took a cab to WFO.

67C felt the crowd was well controlled by about two minutes after the shooting.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview with [Security Specialist] B7C B6 TSD, at 1310 L Street, by Inspectors Houlihan and Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

SS B7C B6 received his assignment from SS B6167C in Friday (3-27) morning. He went to the Hilton at 10:30 AM for a walk-thru with SA B6167C and others. He met SA B6167C, TSD, at the hotel.

After the walk-thru, he met with B7C B6 and determined there was no problem with the areas he wanted to sweep. He finished at the hotel at about 1:30 or 2:00 PM.

He then returned to his office and requested the Ops Desk to order up the following:

... 62167C ...

He was on RDO's on Saturday and Sunday.

On Monday, he and B6167C went to the Hilton at 11:00 AM. They met the EOD and K-9 units at 11:15 AM. He briefed them on the schedule and search itinerary. SA B6167C and the UD K-9 unit plus EOD began a 62167C while SS B7C B6 attended the agent briefing.

The briefing was completed by about 12:20 PM and the concluded about the same time. Agents were posted and the ballroom sweep began at 12:30 PM. It was completed by shortly after 1:00 PM with no problems. One team then did the holding room area and the street arrival area.

SS B7C B6 walked the entire route over more before the arrival. He then
remained inside. He had released the MPD K-9 units after the ballroom search and the UD K-9 unit returned to their vehicle and remained on the air. The EOD teams remained at the public and press entrances to the ballroom.

B7C B6 recalls the ballroom being extremely crowded. He checked with the Fire Marshal who said it was OK, but advised he would close the doors when it became necessary.

B7C B6 and the EOD team heard what turned out to be shots. They then heard what they thought was “BOP on 62162C over digital frequency. They thought it might have been “EOD” so they immediately went outside through the Terrace doors.

B7C B6 saw the struggle going on and noticed that the limo and follow-up were gone. He sent the EOD team back into the lobby and then became separated from them because of the crowd.

He could not find one of his EOD men so he went to the security office of the hotel. At this office he was given a note by Captain B7C B6. The note indicated that the hotel operator had received a phone call from a male guest in Room 1175 who said that the President needed an ambulance.

B7C B6 had arrived at the security office at 2:40 PM. He next went to the Adams Room and stood by waiting to be interviewed. He told the interviewing Secret Service Agent about the note. The agent told him to hold the note and
pass it to WFO later. At 5:30 PM he called 661576 at WFO and passed the information. After his interview he returned to his office.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA David Morrell, Liaison Division, at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA Morrell stated he received an assignment at approximately 10:00 AM on 3-30-81 to stand post for the President at the Hilton Hotel from SAIC Rochner, Liaison Division.

He proceeded to the hotel with SA 61,67c and SA Spriggs, WPO. They arrived at the hotel and attended a briefing by SA 61,67c in the Adams Room of the hotel. The briefing started at approximately 12:00 Noon. SA Morrell stated this was a normal Secret Service type briefing with nothing exceptional. SA 67c covered the general itinerary of the Protectee, sweep schedules, etc. There was an ID briefing by SA D. V. McCarthy which was basically negative, meaning no intelligence and no demonstrations planned.

He recalled being advised that all posts at the Hilton would be on 67b frequency.

He was posted by approximately 12:30 PM. The event went as scheduled and heard on 67b frequency that the President had departed the speech area.

The President then departed the International Ballroom, 60,67b and Morrel met at the audio room # awaiting instructions to discontinue.

He heard a transmission on 67b "All posts on basic AOP". He immediately recognized this as a signal.

He and SA 61,67c ran outside the Terrace doors to the departure area. When they arrived on the sidewalk the limousine and the follow-up were gone and some
police officers and Secret Service agents were wrestling with a person to their right.

He noticed that there was some confusion with the general public and people running back and forth but that most of the activity was by newspaper reporters, not the public.

He and SA immediately set about the task of controlling the crowd.

He pulled several people out of the general area of the scuffle with the assailant and then kept everyone out of the area except authorized personnel.

He recalled someone asking for Metropolitan Police car for the suspect and recalled one arriving and the suspect being placed in the car.

His recollection is that the first ambulance on the scene took Mr. Brady and that the second and third ambulances took Delahanty and McCarthy.

He recalls SA on the scene and Morrell asked him what had happened. Advised that there had been shots fired and Lightsey had in his possession a small caliber weapon. Handcuffs were through the trigger guard of this weapon.

The wounded were evacuated from the scene and he continued crowd control and noticed that the Metropolitan Police Department had arrived with ropes to seal off the scene.

Prior to the arrival of MPD crime scene personnel, he heard the transmission on stating that all posted agents should go back inside the hotel. He remained until the crime scene personnel from MPD arrived.

When the scene was under control, he went back into the hotel.

He stated that once the wounded left the scene, the entire area settled down remarkably well.
His recollection was the ambulances were on the scene very quickly.

He did not know who ordered the ambulances but did hear an MPD officer on his radio calling for ambulances.

Morrell stated when he first went outside the Terrace doors, the limousene and follow-up cars were no longer there.

Regarding the term "AOP", he said that as soon as he heard it, there was no doubt that we had a problem; therefore, he immediately departed his post and ran the approximate 50 feet through the Terrace doors to the departure site. He stated that he glanced at his watch when he went through the Terrace doors; however, he cannot recall now the time. He will continued to attempt to remember the time according to his watch and advise me.

He estimated that from the time of the transmission regarding "AOP" it was no more than ten seconds before he was out the Terrace doors and at the departure site.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of Sergeant Bn Bo Special Forces,
District 7, U.S. Park Police, Washington, D.C., at the U.S. Park Police
Sub Station by Inspector Jonathan Fouahle and Assistant Inspector Richard
Force
(This interview was dictated by Assistant Inspector Force)

Sgt. Bn Bo advised he was telephonically contacted by SA Mary Ann Gordon,
U.S. Secret Service, on March 28th (Saturday) or March 29th (Sunday)
informing him of the Presidential movement to the Washington Hilton Hotel
on March 30th (Monday). She requested three motorcycles and one portable
radio for communications be assigned for the motorcade during the movement
from the White House to the Washington Hilton Hotel and return. He advised
the foregoing is a standard request from the Secret Service for Presidential
movements. Further, that the Metropolitan Police Department also provides
a marked lead and tail car along with three motorcycles for the motorcade.
SA Gordon also requested that a representative of the park Police be at the
White House at 9:00 AM on March 30, 1981 to run the routes for the Presidential
movement in the afternoon of that day. He advised SA Gordon that, if possible,
he would have a representative present; however, the morning traffic commit-
ments may prevent it. Sgt. Bn Bo advised us that it is the policy of the Park
Police to be present for the "dry run" of the routes; however, sometimes it is
impossible to do. He advised that Monday at 9:00 AM was one of those occasions
when they didn't and couldn't send a representative. He advised SA Geden Gordon
of this on Monday at 7:00 AM when she telephoned him. He also informed her the
three motorcycles would be at the southwest gate of the White House at 1:15 PM
Monday, March 30, 1981.
Sergeant Bc Bc added that he did not feel it was absolutely necessary for the Park Police to be present on that date at 9:00 AM because the motorcycles officers were familiar with the 3 routes and could be briefed prior to the departure of the motorcade from the White House.

Regarding communications between the Park Police motorcycles and the rest of the motorcade, Sgt. Bc Bc furnished the following information: On most occasions the agent with the Secret Service usually requests a Park Police portable radio for the use of the agent in the MPD marked lead car. This is the only communications with the motorcade and, to his knowledge there has been no problem in the past.

Sgt. Bc Bc advised that Privates Bc Bc Bc Bc and Bc Bc were assigned to the motorcycles for the Presidential movement on March 30, 1981. Sgt. Bc Bc furnished copies of their statements regarding their participation in the Presidential movement on that day. He also provided us with a copy of a Park Police form entitled "Presidential - V.I.P. Movement Notice" executed by Sgt. Bc Bc. It shows reporting instructions for the motorcycles, request for a radio, and information regarding the running of the routes prior to the movement.
April 9, 1981 - 2nd Interview of C. A. Dennis Fabel, PPD, at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview concentrates on Fabel's recollections of the activities at the George Washington University Hospital following President Reagan's arrival at that location subsequent to the assault on him which occurred at the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

Fabel was able to provide little additional information beyond that already provided in an interview conducted with him by Inspectors Houlihan and Counts on April 2, 1981.

In addition to the information provided in that initial interview, Fabel added that he recalled having witnessed President Reagan exit from the limousine essentially on his own power. He has the impression that the President was in pain or suffering some form of discomfort but does not recall his having been supported by SAIC Parr. He characterized the reaction of Parr to the President as being one of assistance rather than support at that particular point. The sequence between the arrival and the President's entrance into the emergency room was a hasty one and beyond the entrance, Fabel has no knowledge of what may have occurred inside the trauma room.

Fabel has a recollection that Agent Mary Ann Gordon of seemed to be the Secret Service Agent who took the most immediate and positive acts to maintain and establish order outside the hospital. Fabel recalls her having directed the motorcade to relocate in order to permit the arrival of incoming ambulances at the emergency entrance of the hospital.

Fabel recalled having seen the Buses B arrive almost immediately after the President's arrival. He then recalls a continuing series of people arriving at the hospital, both Washington Field Office agents, Headquarters personnel,
additional police personnel, and so forth, as the hours passed.

He recalls an almost immediate crowd buildup, the crowd composed mostly of the public at large but considerable numbers of media began to congregate as well.

He advised that himself, Special Agent $BnC$ and Protective Support Technician $BnC$ remained with the Presidential Limousine and follow-up in order to secure them. The limousine was replaced by a second limousine by Special Agent Ricky Dry approximately one hour subsequent to the President’s arrival at the hospital. He recalls having repositioned the limousine and follow-up in the emergency entrance driveway as soon as the ambulances which transported Jim Brady and Tim McCarthy were clear of that area.

Fabel does not recall how or when he became of-the- aware of the President’s condition or the fact that the President had been wounded by gunshot. He estimates it was probably 20-30 minutes before he became aware of that situation.

He recalls efforts on a number of people’s parts to locate a copy of the GM Hospital survey and the inability of all to do so.

Fabel suggested that the lines of authority and direction of authority remained intact inasmuch as he personally took his orders from the transportation advance agent, Mary Ann Gordon, which in his mind was the normal course of action which would always be taken in such circumstances.

He recalls having witnessed nor does he recall having been aware of any significant problems, confrontations or conflicts that may have occurred at or around the hospital at any point during the evening hours of 3-30-61.

This concludes the substance of SA Fabel’s interview.
Morell and then assisted in the crowd control of the scene inasmuch as the assailant was apparently under control by other Secret Service agents and Metropolitan Police Department officers.

As he was attempting to control the scene, he and SA began asking people who were there if they had any information which would be relative to a subsequent investigation.

The gentleman in the yellow sweater with the hat stayed near the area where SA Schwarm located himself.

SA and an MPD officer got his name and the names of several news media personal who had information to contribute to the investigation.

SA Schwarm continued with crowd control until the ambulances were gone and no wounded were left on the scene. When he determined that there was enough people (Secret Service and MPD officers) to control the scene, he departed the area and went to the security room. Prior to going to the security room, Schwarm recalled that MPD was in the process of putting up ropes around the crime scene.

It was Schwarm's impression that the area was clean of unauthorized personnel shortly after their arrival through the Terrace doors. He believed that there was good control of the scene as soon after he and Morell arrived.

He recalled that SA Williamson, SA and SA D. V. McCarthy were outside when they arrived.

When he returned to the security room, he noted that SA Ramsey, SA and some WHCA people were in the room. They were still not aware that the President had been wounded. He recalled that Ramsey had asked all SA's to report to the Adams Room. This was a transmission on frequency.
Ramsey gave Schwarm a post assignment sheet and asked him to go to the Adams Room to determine which agents present had information. He was also attempting to determine the location of all agents assigned to the function. He recalled that SA Miller and SA Huggins were not accounted for after he went to the Adams Room to talk with the agents assembled.

He returned this sheet to SA Ramsey in the command post.

SA Schwarm indicated that after he removed the two civilians from the assailant, it took approximately 30 seconds or so for the suspect to leave the scene. It was his impression that prior to the suspected leaving the scene, a small perimeter had been established and crowd control was being initiated at that time by Secret Service Agents and Metropolitan Police Department officers.
He noticed the Metropolitan Police Department canvassing the people on
the scene attempting to find people who had information regarding the incident.
He specifically recalled speaking with Mr. a news person who had information
relative to the assault on the President. Cajigas brought Mr. to Captain

SA gave Cajigas a quick briefing regarding the situation; however, SA
Cajigas could not remember this briefing in detail, during this interview.

He recalled that Lieutenant of the Park Police was on the scene
as well as Chief , MPD Chief of SOD, and Harvey Pryor, Chief of the
Uniform Division, also being on site.

He recalls Ciatti and arriving and Cajigas introduced them to Captain

He then departed the crime scene and went to the security room to see if
he could be of further assistance. It was not necessary; therefore, he proceeded
to the Adams Room and advised the agents assembled that anyone who had an inside
post with no information concerning the assault could leave for their office
of assignment. He then returned to the Liaison Division.

Cajigas estimated that the departure of the President was approximately
2:30 PM and that he arrived outside at the departure point at approximately 2:50 PM.
He stated these times were definitely approximations because of the situation
he did not keep exact times.

Cajigas noted that when he arrived at the departure scene, the wounded persons
had been removed from the scene.

Again attempting to give us a time frame, Cajigas stated that the transmission
to all agents posted inside to return to the Adams Room occurred approximately 5-7 minutes after the incident.

He recalled calling SAIC Rochner at the Liaison Division regarding the events at the Hilton Hotel.

Cajigas, when he went through the Terrace doors on his way to the departure scene, his impression was that the crime scene was generally clean. There was a crowd in front of him after he exited these doors. He pushed his way through the crowd and recalls specifically having to step over a rope to enter the crime scene area. This rope was in place parallel to the Terrace doors. His opinion was the immediate scene was controlled by Uniforms and Special Agents of the Secret Service. He would not describe it as a chaotic situation when he first arrived. He recalled that agents and MPD officers were controlling the scene physically at that time.

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Force)

PST advised that to the best of his memory he received the assignment as driver of the route car for the movement of the President to the Washington Hilton Hotel during the morning of the movement, Monday, March 30, 1981, sometime during the morning after he reported for work at the Washington Field Office. He believed SA informed him of the assignment and that SA Timothy Burns would be the Washington Field Office Agent assigned to the car.

PST checked out a .12 gauge shotgun from the equipment room and he and SA Burns drove to the White House around 1:00 PM for their assignment.

Upon arriving at the White House, they were briefed by SA Mary Ann Gordon who furnished a transportation survey report which included the necessary information. PST and SA Burns departed State Place at the White House approximately five minutes prior to the departure of the Presidential motorcade. There were no unusual incidents from the White House to the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Upon arriving at the Washington Hilton Hotel, the route car parked at curbside on T Street approximately 30 yards past the VIP entrance headed in the direction of Connecticut Avenue.

PST advised he remained in the vicinity of the route car during the time the President was inside the Washington Hilton Hotel. SA Burns initially
remained in the car but later went inside the Hilton Hotel.

PST read advised when he heard a transmission on the radio that the President was preparing to depart, he contacted SA Burns on the radio who returned to the route car. He and SA Burns departed the hotel, turned left on Connecticut Avenue, after reaching the intersection of Connecticut Avenue and Florida Avenue, he heard a radio transmission that shots had been fired. A few seconds later, PST read saw the motorcade turn onto Connecticut Avenue from T Street. He could not recall the alignment of the motorcade when it turned onto Connecticut Avenue. He remembered hearing a radio transmission about this time asking the destination of the President. Another transmission said the White House. PST stated that approximately one minute later there was a radio transmission saying the motorcade was going to George Washington Hospital. The route car turned right on Pennsylvania from 17th Street and attempted to establish intersection control to the hospital since the motorcycles and MPD lead car continued straight on 17th Street due to the MPD lead car not knowing there had been a change from the White House destination to George Washington Hospital. The route car continued on Pennsylvania Avenue out in front of the motorcade going around Washington Circle and stopping immediately beyond the emergency entrance driveway at the hospital. SA Burns got out of the car and went inside to assist. PST advised he stayed with the car until 4:30 PM. He then went to the Washington Field Office and reported to SA Don Lawton.
April 8, 1981 - 1st Interview of Lieutenant [Redacted]

Hilton Hotel

Security, at the Hilton Hotel by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

Lieutenant [Redacted] said he was assigned by Mr. [Redacted], chief of Hilton security, to the arrival area prior to the President's arrival. He placed the stanchions two stanchions with a rope type line between them right in front of the grate which is on the sidewalk to the right of the VIP entrance as you face it. This was normally set up to control the press and public for VIP type arrivals at that location.

He assisted in clearing out this area with the Metropolitan police and advance agents from the Secret Service.

For the arrival Lt. [Redacted] remained near the rope line in the driveway leading to the Terrace doors. He stated he takes that position to assist the police and Secret Service agents in controlling the hotel guests who might try to reach the VIP's to shake their hand, etc.

He recalls specifically being in the driveway helping with this crowd control assignment.

He had been advised by Mr. [Redacted] that once the President had entered through the VIP doors and the Presidential party proceeded through them, he was to close the doors tightly, which he did.

After the arrival of the President, a female Secret Service Agent wanted to reposition the limousine and follow-up from the point where they had left the President. Lt. [Redacted] recalls helping the follow-up driver back the car from the entrance to the VIP door back towards the Terrace door entrances.
He then assisted the limousine driver in placing the limousine.

He recalls that the limousines' right taillight was very close to the grill
and that the car was at an acute angle towards the street. He remembers this
because he was concerned that the President would have to step from the curb
to reach the car to enter.

Lt. 26 noticed that the rope was very close to the rear door of the
limousine and it is his recollection that he and the MPD sergeant on duty
there moved the rope line back to a crack in the sidewalk which is to the rear
of the grate towards the Terrace doors.

He noted that the ropes were in place when he went outside for the arrival.

(NOTE - CHANGES MIGHT HAVE TO BE MADE RE. THE ABOVE)

He recalled that the female cafeteria manager in the hotel approached the
motorcade after the arrival of the President. She was very excited and wished
to be able to get closer to the cars to look at them. 26 asked the follow-up
car driver if it would be all right for this woman to look at the limousine.
He was advised by the driver that that would be all right as long as she did not
touch the car. 26 escorted her to the car and stayed with her while she looked
at the Presidential limousine.

He then returned to the follow-up car with this lady and she was asking
the driver questions about general security, etc. 26 then directed her to
the sidewalk to await the departure of the President.

Lt. 26 then engaged the follow-up car driver in a short conversation.

estimated that across T Street near the drug store in the doorway was
full of people which would be 15 people or so, that there were a few people up
toward the bank towards Connecticut Avenue but not too many and that there were
very few people across T Street towards Florida Avenue.
Just prior to the departure he estimated at the crowd at the roped area to be 10-15 people with another 10-15 people around the Terrace door entrance.

It is his experience that when the limousine driver and the follow-up driver start their car, that the President would shortly be coming out.

When this happens he takes a position near the stanchions holding the rope to assist the police and Secret Service in crowd control. He does this because when the limousine departs, the cars following the limousine normally are going fairly fast and he did not want anyone to get hurt by the vehicles.

Lt. B6 noticed a tall, skinny man in the exit crowd. B6 had told him to watch this individual. He described him wearing red pants with a reddish shirt, blue jacket with a torn shirt pocket, White male, 6'3"-6'4", with brown hair. He observed this subject take his jacket off and place it on the planter to the rear of the rope line.

For the departure he was in the vicinity of the Terrace doors entrance and moved towards the rope line. When he saw the vanguard of agents coming out of the VIP exit, he knew that the President would be following shortly. He then helped in maintaining the people behind the rope line on the sidewalk. He looked back at the President one time to see whether or not he would be going to the rope line to shake hands. At approximately this time he was distracted because the pool press were coming through the Terrace doors and coming—trying to make their way to the left side of the Presidential limousine. During this distraction he heard three shots, looked down the rope line and observed the assailant crouched and firing a weapon which was in his right hand.

He observed the sergeant grab the assailant's arm and then a number of other people jump on him.
He looked back towards the limousine and saw bodies going down and an agent closing the limousine door and starting back towards the follow-up car. Lt. then was pushing people back onto the sidewalk because they were generally confused.

He recalled ambulances arriving on the scene and some difficulty he had with one of the ambulances going around the Terrace entrance driveway and being blocked by several police department vehicles which were in the driveway.

He was then told by to remain at the VIP door until relieved and only permit officials through the door. He remained at the door until 4:40 PM at which time he was relieved.
April 8, 1981 - 1st Interview with Officer B36, USD, at the Washington Hilton Hotel by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts.

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

Officer B36 was posted in front of the rope line on both the arrival and the departure. He recalls the rope line being very near or on the grate for the arrival. It was moved back about 4-5 feet for the departure. He thinks he and Officer B26 moved the rope after the limo was repositioned.

B26 has worked the Hilton on several previous occasions while being assigned to SDD. He was watching B6 on arrival. He had mentioned B6 to a Secret Service Agent.

On departure, the rope line had about six people across the front. There may have been a total of 25 people in the crowd.

B36 heard the shots and turned to see the President being put in the car. He turned back towards the shot and saw the assailant. He moved in on the assailant and assisted in moving him to a police car. He had to push B26 out of the way to get to the assailant.

They first took the assailant to Car #938, but they couldn’t get in. They then placed him in Car #97, a 3rd Dist. car. B26 drove the car. He was asked where the nearest precinct house was and he said the 3rd Dist. He was then instructed to go to the Central Cellblock instead. He did not hear the assailant say anything during the trip.

B26 said he was distracted by the press pool arriving at the scene. B6 was still in the crowd and Delahanty was watching him. B6 was positioned near a suspicious acting female. He said he was on the sidewalk near the right rear fender of the limo.
April 7, 1931 - 1st Interview of Officer B72 B6  Metropolitan Police Department, at his Headquarters, 2301 L Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Force

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Foushee)

Officer B72 B6 advised that his bike was parked out on T Street close to the curb and when the limousine pulled out on departure from the Hilton, they limo pulled around him; however, by the time the limo reached Florida Avenue, he was back in front of the limousine in his correct position and he stayed in front of the limo all the way to 17th and Penn. at which time he went straight ahead thinking the motorcade would be going to the White House. He later turned around and caught up with the motorcade and went on to GW Hospital.
April 7, 1981 – 1st Interview of Officer Bc Bc Metropolitan Police Department, at his Headquarters, 2301 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forcee

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Foushee)

Officer Bc Bc advised that after arrival at the Hilton Hotel, he parked his bike on T Street up above the VIP entrance and that as the President began to come out of the Hilton, he moved up T Street to the intersection of Connecticut Avenue, and when the limousine came out he was in front of the motorcade on departure all the way to 17th and Penn, at which time he thought they were going to the White House and he went straight across Pennsylvania. He later turned around and caught up with the motorcade on the way to GW Hospital.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of Officer Bn C 86 Metropolitan Police Department, at his Headquarters, 2301 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Force

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Poushee)

Officer Bn C 86 was one of the b.i.l.e.s men in the police escort on March 30, 1981. He advised that he was the officer who stayed with the tail car from the time they departed the Hilton until they reached the GW Hospital.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of Officer BC 56 SOD Unit, Metropolitan Police Department, at his Headquarters at 2301 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Force

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Poushee)

Officer BC 56 was in the tail car on March 30, 1981. He advised that no agent was in the car with him although he did have a Secret Service Radio that had been given to him by Agent Gorden (apparently this was also a P-33).

Officer BC 56 advised that when the motorcade arrived at the Hilton, he did not want to get blocked in the traffic around the canopy area of the VIP entrance; therefore, he stayed parked on the street on T Street south of the public entrance. He recalls when he heard that the President was coming out of the Hilton to depart, he moved his police cruiser up closer to the departure area and actually when he moved his car, he was almost adjacent to the public entrance still sitting on T Street. He stated that the shots were fired and he noticed that the limousine and the tan spare car began pulling out from the VIP entrance, that he then moved the tail car up behind the spare car and followed them up on T Street to Connecticut and almost as soon as he had turned on Connecticut it appeared that the limo and spare cars slowed down a little and some of the other police escort got ahead of the limousine at this point.

Officer BC 56 also advised that from departure at the Hilton until arrival at GW Hospital, motorbike No. 12 was behind him. While on Connecticut Avenue, Officer BC 56 notified the dispatcher that a shooting had taken place.

Officer BC 56 advised that he had no agent in the tail car, that we used to put one in there with him, but it seems here of late we only use an agent in the tail car on some of the f bigger foreign dignitary movements.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of Sergeant Bn Bn, Special Operations Division, Metropolitan Police Department at his office, 2301 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forcea

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Poushee)

Sgt. Bn Bn advised that he remembers after church on Sunday, March 29, 1981, he talked by telephone with Agent Mary Gordon about the trip the President was making to the Hilton on the following Monday and he agreed to meet her at 9:00 AM on Monday morning to run the routes for the motorcade from the White House to the Hilton and return. Sgt. Bn Bn advised that Mary Gordon requested three bikes for the motorcade escort from the SOD.

On Monday morning at 9:00 AM, 3-30-81, he met Agent Gordon as planned and they ran the routes together.

At 1:45 PM the motorcade left the White House en route to the Hilton. The police escort consisted of Bn Bn bikes from SOD and Bn Bn bikes from the Park Police. He had no communications with the Bn Bn Park Police bikes since they are on a different frequency and he did not have one of their radios. He does not know whether or not Agent Gordon had one of their radios. He advised that Agent Gordon rode with him in the lead car and that he remembers she did put a Secret Service radio in his cruiser and it stayed there throughout the trip until they reached the hospital. (Apparently this was a Bn Bn, the way he described it).

He advised that upon arrival of the motorcade at the Hilton Hotel, he parked his car on T Street just up above the VIP entrance and he stayed with
his cruiser while the President spoke. Sgt. advised that when they received
word that the President was coming out of the Hilton for his departure, his
cruiser was running and Agent Gordon had the right front door open and was standing
on the sidewalk beside the #1 door looking back in the direction of the motorcade.
When the shots were fired, Agent Gordon ran towards the limousine and at that
time Sgt began moving slowly with the cruiser up T Street and at about
that time he saw the limo coming out, he attempted to accelerate his car and
he stalled the car. The limo swerved around him. He did notice that agent
Gordon had gotten into the spare car.

Sgt. got his vehicle started again, proceeded on up T Street to
Connecticut and took a left and advised that prior to the limousine reaching
Florida Avenue on Connecticut, he was able to get his vehicle back in to the
lead position in front of the limo. He recalls coming down Connecticut, that
he picked up the Secret Service radio, and called and asked where they were
taking the President and he seems to recall that he heard someone come back
and say - The White House. He proceeded on down Connecticut in front of the
limo and when they got to 17th and Penn., figuring they were still going to
the White House, he proceeded directly across Pennsylvania Avenue as if he
was going to the White House. At this time the limo took a right on Penn. and
he realized they were going to GW and he eventually caught back up with the
motorcade and followed the limo and follow-up and several of the vehicles on
to the hospital.
April 7, 1981 - 2nd Interview of 5A 66,67c by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forsee
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Poushee)

BTS

On March 30, 1981, on the day of the visit of the President to the Hilton Hotel, he was assigned as the 62 62.67c from the White House to the Hilton Hotel. Upon arrival there he escorted the President through the VIP doors and to the elevator and once the President was on the elevator, he and some of the other shift agents made their way down the staircase to the next level which is actually the ballroom area. He was met there by Special Agent 66,67c the advance agent, and he remembers that prior to leaving the White House on March 30, 1981, for the visit he had reviewed the survey report and noticed that the 62,67c did not have an assigned post at the Hilton; therefore, he assumed 62,67c of Presidents. Actually this is fairly close to the President's holding room.

On the departure he met Bob Wanko close to the stage to be with the shift formation when the President left the stage. As soon as the President got on the elevator to go back up to the next level, 67,68c with the other agents made their way back up the staircase and awaited the arrival of the President at the next level.

67,68c remembers coming out of the VIP doors just ahead of the President. Actually he and Varey came out at about the same time. Littlejohn veered off to
right around the front of the limo and assumed his

As the President was coming out of the VIP doors was looking across the street and up the street towards Connecticut. When the first shot was fired, he turned, looked over to the crowd area beside the Hilton Hotel. Actually he remembers that his viewpoint was just about over the shoulders of Agent Tim McCarthy who was on the right rear door of the limousine. At this point he drew his gun. He stated he knew the shots were from a .22 caliber. He knew that the shots were from behind him and as far as he's concerned, no other shots came from any other area other than from the crowd area. At this point he came back towards the left rear door of the limousine and at this point he saw the President being pushed into the car. He had his gun out. He came to the rear of the limousine and he saw two bodies on the sidewalk and someone was— he observed the agents holding a subject and he heard someone saying— Get the gun— Get the gun. He advised he had a bead drawn on the subject they were holding, at this point he did not know whether or not the subject still had the gun in his hand or not. He proceeded on up closer to the subject to give assistance but once he got up closer he noticed the subject did not have a gun and therefore he holstered his. At this point the follow-up car was leaving and there was no chance to get on it.

also remembers that he told Agent Nanko to stand on the gun (the .22 pistol that was lying on the sidewalk). He assisted the agents in handcuffing the subject and helped place the subject in the MPD cruiser, that he rode with the in the police cruiser's right front seat to the Central Cell Block. He remembers upon arrival at the Central Cell Block the vehicle proceeded to the sub-basement and that after arrival there they went to the Homicide interview room. He remembers seeing
a United States Attorney from Superior District Court. He got on the phone and called and he was advised that the FBI was on their way. The FBI came within a matter of a few minutes and he was interviewed at the Central Cell Block by FBI agents.

He remembers at this time agent Spriggs kept asking him what caliber of gun it was because the President was being operated on. Spriggs relayed this to WFO to Yonkus who apparently gave the information to George Washington Hospital. He remembers that Tom Holman was the first supervisor from PPD to arrive at the Central Cell Block and later he did see Supervisor Ed Dansereau from the Washington Field Office.

Holman and made their way back by cab arriving there between 4:15 - 4:45 PM. He stayed at for quite some time and later that evening was interviewed by FBI agents at the Washington Field Office.

Later in the evening he went to George Washington Hospital to report to his shift leader Shaddock at which time Shaddock dismissed the shift for the evening. This was around 11:00 PM.

also advised he recalls that the subject was searched by himself, Spriggs and Dennis McCarthy along with police officers once they arrived at the Central Cell Block.

also advised that he remembers as he came out of the VIP doors on departure he looked back up over his shoulders to check the Terrace del level. This is something he always does when he comes out of the this entrance to be sure no one is up above that shouldn't be.
April 3, 1981 - 1st Interview with SA Jaime Cajigas at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts (Dictated by Inspector Counts)

Cajigas reported to the Hilton Hotel at 12:00 Noon on 9-30-81 for the briefing. He recalled SA b6b10c saying there would be 1/2 ID teams and then being advised by either H6b1e or D. V. McCarthy that that had changed and there would only be 1/2 team.

The President arrived and then departed the ballroom without incident. Cajigas then heard, over 86 frequency, "AOP" twice. He later found out it was "AOP", but it did alert him to the fact that something was wrong.

An assistant manager came by and looked very pale. Cajigas asked him what happened and he said that shots had been fired. He then asked him if the President had left and he said, yes.

Cajigas discontinued post and went to the security room to help SA Ramsey who he knew was alone. He remembers hearing a call that more ambulances were needed. He then heard that two were there. Ramsey asked if they needed more, but Cajigas didn't hear the answer.

When he arrived at the security room, Ramsey told him he wasn't sure what had happened. About that time SA b7c1 came in and provided some information.

Cajigas then went to the crime scene where he encountered A0 DAD Edwards who said he had responded because he had heard that two UD officers had been shot. He also talked briefly with Captain b7c1 of MPD.

Cajigas called the security room to get the names of the case agents. SA b6b167c was working the radios. Ramsey inquired if he needed more agents. Cajigas said that he did not. The area was secure. The ropes were going up and the crime scene was ringed with MPD officers.
Cajigas was advised that SA's \[66, 67\] were the case agents. He recalls seeing SA \[66, 67\] with the assailant's weapon.

Cajigas talked with Hank Brown, ABC, who said he had seen the whole thing. He then introduced Brown to Captain Wilson. Cajigas also talked to SA Mobley and Lt. \[66, 67\] of the Park Police. He saw Dep. Chief \[66, 67\], SOD, and Chief Prior, UD, at the scene.

He then introduced \[66, 67\] to Captain \[66, 67\] and returned to the security room. He then went to the Adams Room and released the agents who had inside posts and had no information.

Cajigas estimates it was 20 minutes after the incident before he went outside. All the injured had been removed. The crime scene was clear. There were no civilians or press within the area, only agents and police.

Cajigas had made the call for all agents to return to the briefing room. He went outside in 5-7 minutes after making this call. He also called SAIC Rochner by phone.
April 8, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Jaime Cajigas at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

On April 8, 1981 Inspector Counts and I interviewed SA Jaime Cajigas at the Office of Inspection, 1310 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

On 3-30-81 SA Cajigas attended a briefing at approximately 12:00 Noon at the Adams Room of the Hilton Hotel. The briefing was given by SA PPD, relative to a visit of the President to the International Ballroom on that date. The assistant advance agent (counterpart from WFO) was SA.

A standard Secret Service type briefing was conducted with nothing unusual. He did recall that during the briefing SA 66/67C told the assembled agents there would be 67C protective intelligence teams on site. 66/67C was advised during the briefing at this time that there would only be 67C PI team, that there had been a change.

SA Cajigas was assigned to the 62/67C and was posted by either 66/67C at approximately 13:30 PM. Nothing unusual took transpired prior to or during the speech of the President.

When the President departed the International Ballroom, SA Cajigas remained on post. Shortly thereafter he heard on B2 frequency the term "DOP DOP". He remained on post for a short time. He recalled and assistant manager of the hotel came into his area and told him that shots had been fired. Cajigas asked this man if the President was all right and the man replied - Yes.

Cajigas asked him if the President had left the Hilton area and the man replied - Yes. He recalls other communications on B2 frequency regarding ambulances, etc. He recalled Steve Ramsey's voice answering someone and attempting
to verify the need to have additional ambulances. He recalled Ramsey saying "over", and then someone saying two ambulances were on site and Ramsey coming back and asking if this agent needed any additional ambulances. He does not recall hearing an answer to that query. He then left his post and proceeded to the security room and reported to Agent Ramsey. He asked if he could provide any assistance and Ramsey dispatched him MI to the departure point to determine if the crime scene was being preserved. At approximately this time SA 66176 came into the security room as Cajigas was going outside. When he arrived, he noticed DAD Edwards was on scene and recalls DAD Edwards telling him that the initial reports to him indicated that two Uniform Division officers had been shot. He recalls being introduced to a Metropolitan Police Department detective by the name of Captain 6766 who advised that he would be the senior MP officer to handle the MPD's portion of the investigation.

Cajigas had a short discussion with Edwards and then recalled calling the security room and speaking with SA 661676 and asked her to call the Washington Field Office and advise them to send case agents to the scene.

Agent Ramsey contacted him and asked if more agents were needed to preserve the crime scene. At this point in time Cajigas believed that the Metropolitan Police Department had a ring of officers physically around the crime scene keeping people away from the immediate area; therefore, he advised Ramsey no additional agents were necessary.

The security room contacted him on 676 frequency and advised that SA's 661676 were en route from the Washington Field Office to be the case agents. He noticed SA 661676 had a weapon at the end of his handcuffs. The handcuffs were through the trigger guard.
April 7, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA Dalton O. McIntosh by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Purse

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Foushee)

On March 30, 1981 McIntosh was assigned position in the follow-up for the trip to the Hilton Hotel. He advised that upon arrival at the Hilton Hotel he departed the follow-up car, escorted the President along with the rest of the shift to the VIP entrance and then inside to the elevator and once the President got on the elevator he and the rest of the shift made their way down the stairs to the next level and awaited the arrival of the President in the elevator. After the President arrived at the next level McIntosh advised that he and Agent McCarthy were Special Agent 62167E of the Washington Field Office. McIntosh remembers that he was and after the President's speech he followed the President across the stage walking behind him. As soon as the President got on the elevator, he and the other agents went back up the staircase to await the President's arrival at the VIP entrance level.

He remembers coming out of the VIP doors ahead of the President. He walked at an angle off to the left toward the roped off crowd and press area and went between the follow-up and the limousine. He was at approximately half way between the two cars when he heard the first shot. McIntosh advised he remembers he was trying to move some of the press away from the limousine at the time the first shot went off and when the shot went off, McIntosh turned to his right towards the crowd area on the sidewalk where the rope barrier was and sort of crouched and he saw an arm protruding out of the crowd with a gun in the hand. Someone had a hold of the subject's arm and the gun was on and arm was pointing downward and someone was taking the subject to the ground. He remembers that at one point he placed
both hands on the trunk of the limousine and looked over the front of the limousine, for crowd surveillance. He also remembered that when he was moving the press away from the limousine before the shot went off he was also looking down T Street. In his own mind he knew that agents had the subject who was doing the shooting; therefore, he moved from the rear of the limousine up to the left rear door of the limousine which was his on the shift. The limousine began moving and he at this time did not actually know if anyone had been shot and he worked the limousines out from his up the hill on 9th T Street probably half way up the hill and at some point in time he realized that there were no agents on the right side of the limo. The limo picked up so much speed, he could not keep up and somehow he got to the right side of the follow-up and it came by and got on the follow-up.

He does not remember when he drew his gun but advised once he was on the follow-up car, he remembers having his gun out and that shortly thereafter someone in the follow-up, he doesn’t know who it was, handed him a Uzi machinegun. He advised that he stayed on the running board of the follow-up from that point on to the hospital.

He also remembered that at some point in time the police bikes and the spare car passed the limousine and the follow-up car and that on the way to the hospital he actually did not know if the President was hit.

McIntosh advised he could not swear where the shots were coming from; however, after the first shot went down he looked in the direction of the crowd and in his own mind he never did think there was any other shots coming from any other direction other than the crowd or that there was possibly other people involved doing the shooting.
He advised he has done several advances at the Hilton Hotel but in all these advances he never does remember using Vehicle 200-X. He advised that on March 30, 1981, he did not consider the outside crowd anything unusual but that on the inside there was an extremely large crowd for fear this event.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA [redacted] at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA [redacted] stated that she was assigned an inside post at the Hilton Hotel and had no direct knowledge of the events leading up to the assault on the President.

When the President had left the International Ballroom, SA [redacted] maintained her post as per normal procedure. She then heard over frequency the words "TOP AOP". She asked someone if the President had departed yet and was advised that he had not. Then she heard someone on the radio, frequency, saying "TOP AOP". She still maintained her post at that time and then spoke with SA Cajigas.

After this conversation she proceeded to the security room and spoke with SA Ramsey, the security room agent. Someone notified all posts on [blueacted] to report to a specific room in the hotel, room unknown. She believes that she made this radio transmission.

SA Cajigas then entered the security room and SA Ramsey directed him to proceed to the crime scene to be sure that it was being secured at that time.

SA Ramsey directed SA [redacted] to proceed to the briefing room (Adams Room) to inquire of the agents if there were any injuries outside and who exactly had been injured. When she entered the room, there were approximately eight Secret Service agents in the room and she inquired regarding the above. She was advised by a person unknown that two SA's had been shot, a police officer was wounded and there was no mention of the President. She was told that some of the other SA's were still at the crime scene.
She returned to the security room and reported the above to SA Ramsey. About the time she entered the security room, another agent entered and advised Ramsey that only one agent had been hit in addition to a police officer and a member of the staff. She assisted SA Ramsey with incoming telephone calls, etc. She was dispatched by SA Ramsey to the crime scene to determine the caliber of weapon used by the assailant.

She proceeded to the VIP entrance of the hotel and engaged SA 66167c and SA 66167c in conversation. They were placing a .22 caliber weapon into a black envelope type container and they confirmed that this .22 caliber weapon was the one used by the assailant.

SA 66167c returned to the security room, called 877 and again advised that the weapon used was a .22 caliber.

She received a telephone call from someone advising that SA 66167c and Ciatti were dispatched from the Washington Field Office as the ID case agents.

At some time in the security room she recalled SA Cajigas returning from the crime scene and advising SA Ramsey that the crime scene was under control.

She estimates that from the initial report of "EOP EOP", it was approximately five minutes from that time to that SA Cajigas was dispatched to the crime scene.

She recalls some references to ambulances on 877 frequency while still on her post.
April 7, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA Mary Ann Gordon at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Jonathan Fouahee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forcee

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Fouahee)

She advised for the 62,107e and 62,672e had

62,874e

She has since been told that B7e B2 followed the motorcade from the Hilton to GW Hospital.

Also that her survey report shows that she called Agents 66,676e on 3-28-81, however, she actually called B7e B6 on 3-28-81 (Saturday) and B7e B6 on Sunday, 3-29-81.

She also remembers when she called the Park Police and told Sergeant B7e B6 that at 9:00 AM Monday (3-30) she was going to run the routes with MPD, Sgt. B7e B6 told her if we can make it, we will be there at 9:00 AM, if not they would get with her prior to the movement.

On 3-30-81 Sgt. B7e B6 was not there for the motorcade - just B7e B2 - usually when he doesn't come with them, he puts B7e B2 charge.

Also on movements the advance agent usually gets a radio from Park Police so they can have contact with the B7e B2. On this trip she did not have a Park Police radio, but said maybe Sgt. B7e B6, MPD, was given a radio, but she was not sure.

Upon the President's arrival at the Hilton, 62,107e from the VIP entrance. Agent B7e asked her where she wanted the limo. She told him to 62,107e in order to have easy access away in case of an emergency.
No 62,672 in motorcade - not used in D.C.

Although her survey shows the 62,672, this was not used because they were at Connecticut and K Streets before decision was made by Parr that they were going to GW and she knew that they police intersection control on Connecticut all the way to Pennsylvania.

Also that Officer 62,672 Park Police, bikes, went and assisted with the subject at the scene.

A slight change from the first interview was——

that the lead car (police) had to be in front of the limo prior to the limo reaching the overpass at DuPont Circle, but she can't remember when the lead police car passed them.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of ATSAIC Patrick Miller, MFO, at the Washington Field Office by Inspector Steve Gamon

This interview concentrates on ATSAIC Miller's recollections of the activities at George Washington University Hospital following the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Miller recalls having become aware that an incident-shooting incident had occurred relative to the President while he was at the Washington Field Office. He further recalls having been directed in addition to other agents in the field office by ATSAIC Berger of the Field Office to proceed immediately to GW Hospital. He advised that he and SA 66107C of the Field Office had proceeded to the hospital by official vehicle and entered the emergency room. In addition to 66107C and Miller, SA 64107C and SA Steve Israel of the Field Office were also dispatched by ATSAIC Berger to proceed to the hospital.

On Miller's arrival in the emergency room, he immediately observed the situation in the trauma room and observed the ambulance transporting either Tim McCarthy or Jim Brady still in the emergency entrance driveway.

ATSAIC Miller first approached SA Russell Miller in the trauma room and was informed at that time that the President had been hit. He briefly conferred with ATSAIC Shadick and then proceeded to make assignments to personnel present. He was questioned by a Metropolitan Police Department Homicide Detective B76 and asked who was in charge. Miller responded to B76 that - I am. In Miller's mind, B76 wanted an answer and Miller gave him the only logical one to his question.

ATSAIC Miller provided this Inspector with copies of no his notes made relative to the assignments he directed in his initial response. Generally his notes reflect that he established himself as the Washington Field Office
Coordinator, recognized that TSAIC Ray Shaddick was the PPD Coordinator, determined that SA 66 67 of the Field Office should concentrate on the hospital's first floor activities as the site agent for that location and included in those activities would be the emergency room, the operating room and the coordination with Metropolitan Police. At a subsequent point later, much later in that initial day, Pat also assigned 84 67 to coordinate with the Uniform Division of the Secret Service.

Pat's notes reflect that SA 66 67, PPD, was already on the fourth floor providing site advance role relative to the intensive care unit. Miller assigned SA 66 67 initially to conduct any outer perimeter security coordination, an advance that might be necessary. 66 67, it is Miller's recollections, immediately proceeded to do that and he presumes 66 67 as successful in that regard but he further recalls having seen 66 67 n the emergency room at a point not too much later in the sequence of events.

He reflects SA 66 67 of PPD as having been in the command post as basically the command post coordinator and his notes also reflect that SA Tim Burns of the Washington Field Office had established himself at Miller's direction as the operating room site agent.

SA Steve Israel of the Field Office assisted SA 67 on the fourth floor and participated or handled advances for the various family members, such as Mrs. Reagan.

SA Bill Mackerson of the Washington Field Office performed as the intelligence agent in conjunction with SA Dennis Chomicz. As the intelligence agents they performed in a liaison capacity with Agents of the FBI and gave whatever assistance they could to both the FBI and the Metropolitan Police Homicide Detectives on the scene to obtain and control the evidence which may have been forthcoming from
April 3, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA 6167C WFO, at the GW Hospital by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

He stated he was assigned as a 62167C at the Hilton for a Presidential visit at approximately 10:00 AM the morning of 3-30-81. He left WFO at approximately 11:30 AM and arrived at the Adams Room for a briefing at 12:00 Noon.

He stated that SA 6667C was the advance agent who conducted the briefing and as far as he is concerned, it was a standard briefing with no problems noted.

He recalled SA D. V. McCarthy gave the ID briefing which was essentially a negative report.

6667C 62167C He was advised that a small reception with the President would take place in the holding room for about 12-15 people plus a priest.

As these VIP's arrived in the holding room, they were permitted access to the room by SA 6667C. These people were not pinned but were escorted by pinned personnel and also had function badges on.

The scheduled speech for the President was approximately 20 minutes. 6667C happened to glance at his watch at approximately the time the President stopped speaking and it was 2:22 PM by his watch. The President then returned through the holding room to the elevator and out the doors. When the President had left the.
holding room, and together they awaited the departure. They conversed for a short period of time when they heard on "BOP BOP". Tobin and saw something that they should check out the VIP entrance to investigate. When they exited the entrance, the action was taking place on the left.

As they exited the door, the limousine and the follow-up were both gone from their view. estimated that no more than 45 seconds, probably closer to 30 seconds, had elapsed from the transmission regarding "BOP BOP".

Looking to his left he noticed bodies lying on the ground. He looked at all three and the only identification he made was that one of the men on the ground was in uniform and probably a Metropolitan Police officer. He continued to look over the area and noticed that someone was being held against the wall by a group of law enforcement officers to include Secret Service Agents. He walked towards the area where the scuffle was taking place and he noticed a gun by Mr. Brady's head which was less than five feet from SA Wanko.

Two people were crouched near the gun and he heard SA Varey, telling those people not to touch the weapon.

At that time the assailant was under control, in opinion. The people wounded were being aided by others and he then noticed a crowd coming towards the scene.

He immediately started to establish a perimeter control to include control of the press and the crowd and traffic control for the ambulances.
He recalled a radio transmission on B7E that all agents posted inside the Hilton should go back to the Adams Room.

He did not return to the Adams Room at that time because the crime scene was not totally controlled. When the scene was under control in his opinion, he went to the Adams Room as instructed.

He recalled seeing SA 66167C in possession of a small .45 caliber weapon holding the weapon by his handcuffs, the cuffs through the trigger guard.

SA 66167C estimated that within less than five minutes after the radio transmission on B7E "BOP BOP", he noticed ropes being put up by hotel people and police officers from the Metropolitan Police Department. The ropes being put up by MPD were in the vicinity of the Terrace doors, parallel to those doors. 66167C discontinued outside the hotel when he saw these ropes going up.

Outside of the hotel he noted the following agents, SA Tobin, SA Wanko, SA Wood, SA Williamson, SA Morell, SA Varey, SA 66167C. He also noticed DAD Edwards was on the scene when Lorenz went back to the Adams room. He recalled that the first ambulance was not on the scene when Lorenz exited the VIP door.
April 8, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA Mary Ann Gordon at the Office of Inspection
by Inspector Steve Garmon

SA Gordon was previously interviewed by Inspectors Foushee and Force relative to her
recollections of her involvement in the sequence of events leading up and during
the attempted assassination of President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981.
The purpose of this interview was aimed at determining her recollections of the
aftermath of assault on President Reagan. Inspectors Foushee and Force interview
with SA Gordon elaborated her recollections relative to their arrival at the GW
Hospital and her actions that followed during the evening. She could add little
to the information she had previously provided.

Miss Gordon repeated information relative to her recollection of the arrival
at the hospital and her actions to maintain a control on the crowd that began
to generate immediately around the emergency room at entrance and the Presidential
Limousine.

She reiterated her account of the arrival, information that came to her and
others present that an ambulance transporting a victim of a gunshot wound was
inbound to the emergency room, how she; [ ] and Dennis Fabel had subsequently
moved the Presidential limousine and associated vehicles. She further repeated her
recollections of how the press and the crowd began to gather around the exterior
of the hospital entrance, how she had requested the assistance of MPD and Park
Police uniform officers in establishing crowd limitations and controls to keep
people clear of the emergency room arrival point. She delineated the sequence of
arrivals for police and assisting agents. If it was her recollection in that respect
that the tail car from the motorcade arrived intact with the motorcade and the
officer driving that vehicle assisted her in her efforts to control the crowd that
was beginning to gather at that point. Very briefly thereafter the motorcycle
officers, [ ] arrived on the scene and
joined their efforts to control the crowd and press and almost simultaneously MFD Sergeant Bell arrived on the scene and added his support to the crowd control efforts.

She advised that her directions were not aimed at any particular police officer but to the group of them as a whole. She advised that as time passed police response began to multiply and in a short time there were substantial numbers of police swarming into the area.

She advised that and Fabal primarily stayed with the limousine and the follow-up car in an effort to assure that those vehicles were secured. She at the same time concentrated her efforts on securing the area around the emergency entrance. She advised that she had no recollections of any additional SA's assisting with security on the outside of the hospital during the duration of her stay. She recalled the presence of a hospital staff employee at the exterior of the emergency room who was identifying people seeking access to the hospital through that point. She can't recall whether or not that individual was assisted by or working in conjunction with a special agent. She thinks that she and SA Fabal remained at the hospital until approximately 10:00 PM. They then proceeded to the White-House Washington Field Office where they were interviewed by agents of the FBI. At the conclusion of those interviews, she returned to the hospital and remained there until 12:00 Midnight at which time the Midnight Shift made their relief and she terminated for the day. During the time she remained at the hospital on March 30, she has no recollection of anyone having made significant changes in the initial security measures she established outside the emergency room.
For the duration of her activities subsequent to initially establishing crowd control measures, she related that she stayed with the Presidential vehicles and periodically checked on the interior of the emergency room relative to the situation. She has no recollection of when or precisely how she may have learned that the President had in fact been wounded by gunshot.

At no time did she observe any significant problems, confrontations or conflicts between agents of this Service and any persons present in or around the hospital. She advised that the police contacts she worked with during her motorcade advance assignment as well as at the hospital were Metropolitan Police Sergeant 676 and Park Police Sergeant 674.
April 8, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA Russell Miller, Counterfeit Division, at the Office of Inspection, by Inspector Steve Garmon

The interview related to Agent Miller's recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Agent Miller advised that on the initial arrival of the Presidential motorcade at the hospital, he was working on the follow-up vehicle. He observed two or three people in medical garments outside the emergency arrival point as they pulled into the drive at that location. He immediately responded to the position at the left rear of the limousine but as he did so noted that the President, with the assistance of SAIC Parr, was exiting from the limousine. He consequently moved to the right hand side of the limousine and fell in behind SAIC Parr, the President, and ATSAIC Shaddick as they entered the emergency room of the hospital. It is Miller's recollection that the President exited from the car essentially on his own power but that SAIC Parr assisted him as he moved from the car into the hospital entrance. Miller recounted that SA McIntosh who was working on the follow-up car had preceded the President, Parr and Shaddick inside the emergency room. As the President entered the emergency room he slumped and had to be supported and carried by SAIC Parr and ATSAIC Shaddick with the assistance of additional personnel on the interior of the emergency room. As the President was being administered to and placed in the trauma room, SA Miller requested the assistance of the person he perceived to be the chief emergency room nurse. He asked her how many entrances there were to the emergency room and she responded two. SA Miller positioned himself in one of those entranceways and directed SA McIntosh to take the one on the other side.
The head nurse stayed with SA Miller to assist him in identifying persons seeking entrance to the emergency room.

Briefly after the arrival, SA Miller approached the emergency room desk and inquired whether there were additional people being administered to in the emergency room. He was informed that there was one patient already there who was a heart attack victim. Miller was asked by the hospital attendants if he wanted that patient removed from the emergency room area. He said that was a decision that should be made by the hospital personnel, not himself. He did advise them that an additional gunshot victim would probably be enroute and would possibly arrive in a very short while. This was occasioned by his observation that the initial departure from the Washington Hilton having seen Tim McCarth in an obviously wounded position. He simply assumed that McCarth would be transported to the hospital.

Miller described the situation in the emergency room as one of considerable confusion but he elaborated by providing the following information. Namely, due to the uncertainty of what the President's condition was and what the generation of that condition was, significant numbers of hospital emergency personnel had to respond in case their expertise and any of their given areas be it cardiac, be it surgical, whatever their area of expertise was, was needed. Until it was determined precisely what the President's injury was, it could not be determined what medical expertise would be required. Therefore, significant numbers of additional medical personnel were present in the emergency room until it was learned that the President had in fact received a gunshot wound to the chest. Subsequently, the emergency room began to settle down and confusion began to subside. In a very short time frame Jim Brady, Presidential Press Secretary, was brought into the emergency room and the same measure of confusion was again regenerated, and possibly increased.
Miller estimates that it was approximately five minutes subsequent to the Presidential arrival before SA Finch and other members of the began to arrive on the scene. Almost simultaneously he observed that SA and ATSAIC Pat Miller of the Washington Field Office were arriving on the scene. SA immediately relieved SA Dale McIntosh on his post on the emergency room door. Miller observed that McIntosh then proceeded to the trauma area where Tim McCarthy was being administered to. According to Miller, SAIC Parr remained in the immediate proximity of the President at all times wherein the President was in the trauma area of the emergency room. ATSAIC Shaddick proceeded to address all of those array of problems which normally might have been the province of SAIC Parr, such as requests to call AD-FO, the Director’s Office, a number of other type requests of that nature. In addition, ATSAIC Shaddick was addressing himself to the security efforts in the immediate vicinity of the President, including directions to SA Russ Miller.

ATSAIC Pat Miller, in Russ Miller’s estimation, perceived that efforts needed to be made to secure the area beyond the immediate emergency room and to provide the logistical arrangements for whatever subsequent areas the President might be moved to. He observed that ATSAIC Miller immediately undertook the appropriate action to pursue those items.

It was approximately ten minutes subsequent to the President’s arrival before Agent Miller became aware of the fact that the President had in fact been wounded by gunfire shot. He says he became aware of this by virtue of a multitude of conversations that were occurring in and around his immediate vicinity. The main recollection he has was a conversation regarding the caliber of weapon that might have been used to effect the gunshot. He recalls that ATSAIC Miller said
such items as the bullet removed from the President, the President's clothes as well as Brady and McCarthy's clothes and bullets.

Miller identified ASAIC Berger of the Field Office as the manpower coordinator. In that respect it was Miller's comment that Berger did everything he could to provide all agents available, at least those under Berger's control, to assist Miller and others at the hospital in establishing security there.

Miller identified ATSAIC Crovatto as assuming a coordination role in the command post and as a manpower coordinator on the scene at the hospital.

Miller recounted the difficulty involved with obtaining agent personnel to stand post at the hospital. Difficulty that is with Berger having been unable to provide people because there were simply none available and as a consequence Miller contacted directly DAD Bechtle in Protective Operations and requested his assistance. DAD Bechtle's response was - Tell me what you need and they will be forthcoming. Miller requested 8-2 agents and a short time later they were forthcoming at DAD Bechtle's direction. Miller assumes they were provided from an in-service training course. For the most part, those agents began arriving on the scene while the President was in the operating room.

Miller commented on the significant problems encountered with telephone and radio communications. His recollections are that the telephones available in the hospital were overburdened to an extent that they were virtually useless on many occasions. He in fact recalls having attempted to use the phone where there was no dial tone. The phones appeared to be dead as far as a dial tone is concerned.

Miller recounted verbally his observations and involvement in a problem which occurred relative to the FBI. FBI personnel on the scene at the hospital
were requesting with some degree of insistence that the agents involved in
the assault be made available for interviews. Miller discussed the situation
with ASAIC Berger at the Field Office, via telephone. At the hospital ASAIC
Miller discussed the situation with AD Simpson. Simpson responded affirmatively
that it appeared to be a proper request on the part of the FBI. Again, Miller
discussed the situation with ASAIC Berger who informed him that AD-Investigations
had directed that no such interviews occur until such time as formal requests
for them was received from FBI Headquarters to Secret Service Headquarters.
Briefly thereafter ASFA- ASAIC Miller encountered Director Knight at the
hospital and brought the situation to Director Knight's attention. Director
Knight said that it was approved that such interviews would occur. ASAIC
Miller brought the Director's approval to the attention of ASAIC Berger and
the interviews began to be conducted according the FBI desires later in the
evening at the Washington Field Office.

Miller's comments in this respect were to make known the problem as he
saw it that the Secret Service, in a Headquarters capacity, should, in his
mind, have been more aggressive in contacting the FBI rather than waiting
for the FBI Headquarters to contact the Secret Service to make these arrangements.
Obviously, according to Miller, interviews of this nature were required and
the hassle of his having been in the middle was not necessary from Miller's
standpoint.

Miller recounted a sequence of events wherein he established and arranges
arranged meetings during the course of the evening to bring together to all
parties concerned in the security at the hospital and thereby coordinate the activities at that location. He recounted that the Uniform Division had been brought into the arrangements at the hospital at the direction of DAD Bechtle and at approximately 9:00PM-10:00PM a Lieutenant 661576 of the Uniform Division assumed control of the post on the interior of the hospital that had previously been occupied by Metropolitan Police officers.

Miller assessed the problems at the hospital as being logistical problems brought about by the circumstances of requiring immediate response and a lack of available manpower to provide that immediate response. Miller suggested that in the future some form of reserve force might be on tap to provide a mass response in the event of such a need. Miller further advised that a problem relative to incoming calls received by the hospital switchboard from obvious psychotics as well as of a threatening nature began to deluge the hospital in the immediate aftermath of the President's arrival. As a consequence SA Frank O'Donnell of the Field Office established liaison with the hospital switchboard personnel and began monitoring all incoming phone calls. He also made arrangements for an immediate installation of telephone traps on the hospital lines at the switchboard.
Miller's notes and the records of his other activities taken in the immediate aftermath at the hospital are quite extensive. They will be attached to this interview for subsequent perusal and review in determining Miller and other agents' activities at the hospital.

As a final footnote, Miller advised that on April 1, 1981, when the President was moved from intensive care unit to a third floor room where he spent the duration of his stay at the hospital, it was required that a patient in that area be moved in order to accommodate the Presidential party. At least that was Miller's recollection.

BTS

Additional observations and conclusions as well as recommendations are included in ATSAIC Miller's notes and are available in the file for subsequent review. This concludes the interview with ATSAIC Miller.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of Assistant Director John Simpson, Protective Operations, at his office by Inspector Steve Garmon

The interview concentrated on AD Simpson's recollections of the activities at the GW Hospital which occurred on March 30, 1981, subsequent to AD Simpson's arrival at that location.

At approximately 2:30 PM he was contacted by Deputy Assistant Director, Protective Operations, and informed that there had been a shooting involving the President. Advised that he had become aware of this by monitoring radio transmissions in the Office of Protective Operations.

Simpson proceeded directly to the White House where he met Deputy Special Agent in Charge Bobby DeProspero and obtained a situation report relative to the President's condition from DeProspero. He was informed at that point that President had in fact been wounded and he and DEAIC DeProspero immediately proceeded to GW Hospital, walking.

On arrival at the hospital AD Simpson recalls having been informed by SA that the President was in the operating room. He further was informed by SA relative to the situation. Provided him with directions that he should obtain a surgical gown, scrub up and would then be permitted into the operating room area. Simpson recalls having been informed by news personnel on the entrance to the hospital relative to Jim Brady, Tim McCarthy and Officer condition.
Simpson recalls having been informed by SA Joe Trainor inside the operating room of the surgical situation relative to the President, Jim Brady, and Tim McCarthy. Subsequently, SAIC Parr, who was also present in the operating room, gave a rundown to Simpson on his knowledge of the event including the activities leading up to the assault, the assault itself and subsequent relocation to the hospital and what the President's condition was at that particular moment.

Simpson recalls having departed the operating room long enough to discuss the security situation with SA 66157C responded that NSAIC Pat Miller, Washington Field Office, had taken charge of security activities outside the hospital and beyond the immediate proximity of the President. 66157C informed AD Simpson that the situation was well under control both inside as well as out. Simpson inquired as to the assailant's location and any information available relative to him. 66157C informed him that the only information he had was that the assailant had in fact been taken to the Metropolitan Police Department's Central Cell Block.

Simpson then returned to the operating room and observed the activities relative to surgery on the President, SA McCarthy and Jim Brady.

Shortly thereafter AD Simpson was summoned by SA Joe Trainor and informed that Mrs. Reagan desired to speak to him. Simpson proceeded to her location and gave her a rundown as well as other staff members present on what he knew of the President's condition.

Simpson then returned to the operating room and remained there for the duration of the President's surgery. When surgery on the President was concluded, Simpson accompanied him to the recovery room. Simpson advised that he had personally witnessed the removal of the bullet from the President and had witnessed it having
been placed in an evidence container, initialed and dated and subsequently removed from the operating room by agents of this Service.

Simpson recalls having made efforts to determine the Vice President's location and any situation relative to him. He recalls having directed Joe Trainor to pass a message that the Vice President should visit the hospital, a closed and protected arrival should be arranged. Simpson was concerned that no information was as yet available to determine that no conspiracy may or may not have been a part of Hinckley's assault on President Reagan.

He also directed that any information relative to Hinckley be investigated and brought to his attention.

Simpson recalls having remained in the recovery room area with the President until approximately 2:30 AM on March 31, 1981. During the course of that time it was determined that the President would go to the intensive care unit at approximately 7:30 to 8:00 AM.

Simpson has no knowledge or recollection of any conflicts, confrontations or significant problems that may have occurred in or around the hospital in the course of the afternoon and evening of March 30, 1981. He thought the situation had been handled extremely well by all members of the Secret Service involved.

During the course of his presence at the hospital, he saw no need or at least a very limited need to offer any input into the operations and arrangements as they were being conducted at that particular time. He was satisfied that DAD Bechtel was in good control of decision-making processes at the Headquarters level and further that all parties concerned were getting the job done and would continue to do so.
This concludes the results of the interview with Assistant Director John Simpson.
April 9, 1981 - 3rd Interview of SA b6167c, FPD, at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Steve Germain

This interview concentrated on b6167c's recollections of the activities at the George Washington University Hospital in the evening hours of March 30, 1981. It is significant to note that SA b6167c had been interviewed twice previously, once by Inspectors Houlihan and b6167c on March 31, 1981, and second time by Inspectors b6167c April 7, 1981. During the course of the second interview, b6167c delineated his recollections of what occurred at the hospital and in the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan. The additional information he provided in the course of this interview was limited that will be set forth here for the record.

Subsequent to the shooting at the Washington Hilton, b6167c and others secured a cab and returned to the White House where they proceeded to b6267c. At that point they were uncertain of the President's condition and were under the impression that he in fact had returned to the White House. On arrival in b62, they were informed that the President had been wounded and were directed by ASAIC Johnny Guy to proceed to GW Hospital. SA b6167c accompanied by SA b6b167c and ASAIC Gary DePulia, obtained a shift wagon from the north grounds at the White House and proceeded directly to the GW Hospital.

b6167c estimates that their arrival at the hospital was approximately 15-20 minutes after the time of the assault on President Reagan.

b6167c's first recollections on his arrival at the hospital were that he encountered SA b62167c and inquired of b6167c if everyone was under control. b6167c responded affirmatively and directed b6167c and his associates to proceed
to Room 2500, the command post. There \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} directed them to check with \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} to see if \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} needed any assistance. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} proceeded to location where \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} directed them to continue and proceed to \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} location in the intensive care unit on the fourth floor. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} suggested they might be able to assist \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} in making arrangements at that location, since it appeared the President would be taken there at some point in the evening.

With \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} proceeded to \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} location, \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} responded that he had the situation reasonably well under control and \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} decided he could be of more use in another location. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} remained with \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} to assist him at that location and \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} returned to the operating room. At that point the President was already in surgery.

On his arrival at the operating room \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} spoke with AISAIC Shaddick. Shaddick gave him directions as to the activities he should pursue, namely, he recalls having been directed to escort Mrs. Tim McCarthy to see Mrs. Reagan in the hospital chapel. On the conclusion of that, \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} also escorted a Dr. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} to visit with Mrs. Reagan where Dr. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} gave her a rundown on the President's condition as it was known at that point.

Subsequent to these activities, Shaddick directed \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} to assist in clearing the hallway outside the operating room and to establish security in the recovery room area. At that point it was anticipated the President would be moved from the operating room to the recovery room subsequent to surgery.

With \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} of TSD and \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} was able to secure the elevators leading from the recovery room surgery area to the fourth floor and he did so. \textcolor{red}{\text{b}6\text{16}7\text{c}} obtained the assistance of a supervising nurse in the recovery room area.
who assisted him in determining who should or should not be permitted access to the recovery room area. He posted SA \textbf{66167C} and SA \textbf{661667C} at the recovery room. It is his recollection that there were only two ways into the recovery room.

Subsequent to the President being moved from the operating room to the recovery room, SA \textbf{66167C} joined a rotation of agents holding post in and around the recovery room. He was relieved for the evening at approximately 8:00-9:00 PM and proceeded to the Washington Field Office where he was interviewed by the FBI.

\textbf{66167C} has no recollection of having observed or been aware of any significant problems, conflicts or confrontations which may have occurred at the hospital during the afternoon and evening of March 30, 1981.

This concludes the interview of SA \textbf{66167C}.
April 9, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA b6167c WFO, at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and b6167c

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA b6167c stated that at approximately 10:30 AM on Monday, 3-30-81, he was told by SA b6167c to report to the Washington Hilton for a post standing assignment. He was to replace another agent whose name he cannot now remember.

He, SA b6167c and SA b6167c drove to the Hilton and arrived at the Adams Room for a Noon briefing by SA b6167c FPD.

He recalled that it was a standard Secret Service briefing in that the itinerary was discussed, the purpose of the visit explained.

He recalled the ID folder being passed and the mention of a C-S team in place.

He recalled SA D. V. McCarthy as the Intelligence Agent giving a short briefing, basically a negative type intelligence briefing. He recalled specifically that SA McCarthy indicated that Lyndon LaRouche was in the hotel and the agents should be aware of that fact.

Also covered was the route the President would take once inside the hotel and was noted that 2:20 PM was the scheduled time for the speech to be over.

SA b6167c personally posted him at the ballroom doors that lead to the Terrace 1st level. SA Bob Taylor was on a similar set of doors, one on the east and one on the west.

He estimated that he was on post prior to the sweep art starting which was approximately 12:30-12:45PM.

After the sweep the public was let in through the concourse doors which were not the doors of his post. No one came in the doors of his post and no one tried
to leave from the time he was posted through the President's departure from the
room. He recalled the room was very crowded and very warm by the time the
President spoke.

All posts were on 61-67C. He heard a transmission relative to the arrival
of the President at the hotel.

The speech ended at approximately 2:20 PM. The President left the stage
and immediately people started to leave out all doors including the door on
which he was posted.

He remained on post waiting for notification from the security room that
the President had departed. On 67C frequency he heard someone ask the security
room about a departure. He stated he thought SA Ramsey came back and verified
that there was a departure. On hindsight he now realized that SA Ramsey said
he could not verify a departure. With this transmission he walked up the
stairs to the Terrace level. When he reached the top of the stairs he heard
some people say that shots had been fired outside. A large crowd was gathered
inside the Terrace doors. He went out those doors and saw SA 61-67C trying
to control the crowd. At this time the motorcade was gone.

He noticed SA's and MPD officers putting someone into an MPD cruiser.

He said there was an incredible amount of noise with people yelling and
sirens, etc. He asked SA 61-67C what had happened and 61-67C advised him
there was a shooting and one of our agents had been hit.

He saw Mr. Brady and 61-67C thought he was dead.

He immediately assisted SA 61-67C in crowd control and while doing this
he noticed a man in a yellow sweater crying and very upset. 61-67C went to this
man and asked him if he had any information regarding the assault.
This individual identified himself to SA 66/67C as 66/67C. He indicated that he had been standing right behind the assailant when he fired the weapon. Another individual by the name of 66/67C was there who told SA 66/67C that he did not see the individual but had punched him during the scuffle.

SA 66/67C returned to 66/67C location and gave him the names of two members of the press who believed that they had footage of the attempted assassination. They were identified as 66/67C and 66/67C of NBC.

66/67C stayed with 66/67C inasmuch as he was very upset and did have information relative to the assassination attempt.

He met Detective 66/7C of the 3rd District, MPD, who was attempting to locate witnesses.

Since there were enough SA's and police on the scene to control the scene, 66/7C went with Detective 66/67C and an unknown friend of 66/67C to the 3rd District Police Precinct for an interview.

While he was in the cruiser leaving the scene, he heard on 62/67C transmission telling all agents to return to the Adams Room.

66/67C stated that he had hit the assailant in the back of the neck with both hands after the second shot was fired and that the assailant started to go down after he hit him. Then agents and police officers swarmed over the assailant.

66/67C had noticed Hinckley standing near the rope line for at least five minutes with his hands in his pockets with no movement.
stayed with the interview at the 3rd District and subsequent to the interview called the Washington Field Office two times. The first time he contacted SA to give him his location and the second time he spoke with SA R. A. Smith and advised he was still at the 3rd District with but that they were just leaving the district to go back to the hotel since the FBI would probably want to interview.

He returned to the hotel and introduced to SA and gave a copy of statement which was provided to him and Detective at the 3rd District.

then went to the Adams Room where other agents had assembled and awaited the FBI. At approximately 4:30 PM the FBI arrived and he was interviewed.

said that he estimated that the immediate crime scene was under control very rapidly. In fact, he believes that intermediate control was established by the time he exited the hotel.

He assisted other agents at that time keeping people on the sidewalk near the planter.

He recalled attempting to get an ambulance down to the scene and by the time he left to accompany , there were enough police officers and agents on the scene to control it.
SA 66 stated he was the office supervisor for the weekend of 3-28/29-81 and worked the hours 9-5 PM. He had 62 other agents at WFO with him.

He recalled a conversation with SA 66 regarding the name of 66 counterpart from WFO. He stated he recalls several telephone calls on this issue.

He recalled sometime during the weekend contacting SA 66 and advised him that SA 66 was the counterpart for SA 66.

He did not initially recall any further conversations of substance.

I asked him if 66 had asked him to make contact with MPD and SA 66 stated that 66 had in fact called him on Saturday to ask him to contact MPD relative to this visit. SA 66 stated he called the telephone number of MPD (SOD), that the line was busy. He did not call SOD again and did not notify SA 66 or anyone else in WFO that he had not made the contact with SOD. He believes that this took place on Saturday morning because Saturdays are normally very busy in WFO with phone calls, etc.
April 8, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA b6167c, at GW Hospital by
Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA b6167c advised that he had replaced SA b6167c for the assignment at the
Hilton Hotel.

He attended a briefing at the Adams Room which he considered to be the
standard Secret Service briefing for a visit with no surprises and no problems
noted.

...b2167c

...and he recalled that SA b6167c

WPO, personally posted him to that post. Nothing unusual transpired prior to
or during the speech of the President. The President then left the room.

...b2167c

...After the President left he

...b2167c

...They were

awaiting instructions from the security room to discontinue their posts.

At that time he heard on b72 frequency the term "AOP". He and b0197c
were confused by this first transmission and discussed what it might mean.

It immediately did not alert them to a problem. He believes that approximately
five second after this transmission one of the Hilton employees came in from
the Terrace doors and advised that shots had been fired at the President.

b197c...then proceeded outside to the departure site. They

exited the hotel through the Terrace doors and upon arrival on the scene they
noticed that the limousine and the follow-up car were gone, wounded persons
were on the ground, and a scuffle was taking place with an unknown person to
their right.

b0197c proceeded to the area of the scuffle and pulled a gentleman in
a yellow sweater wearing a hat and another civilian away from the scene.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA 66167C Washington Field Office, by
Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA 66167C is the No. 2 man to ATSAIC Dansereau in the Washington Field Office.

He stated the ID Squad is composed of 66167C SA's and 66167C ATSAIC.

On Thursday or Friday, March 26 or March 27, SA 66167C called SA
66167C. He asked what the normal coverage for ID teams would be and 66167C
advised him that 66167C would be his normal procedure. He stated that
66167C said okay, that he would get back to him for the names of these agents.

66167C then assigned SA McCarthy and Spring to the visit with a backup team
assignment of SA & Colle and 66167C.

SA 66167C indicated that there was always someone in the office over the
weekend from the ID Squad; however, nothing regarding ID arose during the
weekend relative to the Hilton assignment.

On Monday, March 30, he recalled 66167C giving the names as above to
SA 66167C via telephone.

Yonkus spoke with SA McCarthy on that date and was told by McCarthy that
he had called the ID agent and the lead advance agent and there were no problems
at the site. McCarthy asked 66167C if he had anything to add and 66167C advised
that the Squad had no intelligence or demonstration type activity to report.

McCarthy then left the Washington Field Office for the site.

He recalls a conversation on the same date # with SA Spring and Spring
told him that he had contacted ID and then Spring departed the office. 66167C
believes that McCarthy and Spring went separately to the Hilton Hotel.

66167C was monitoring 66167C frequency in his office when he heard the news.
of the attempted assassination.

He started making assignments such as 66167C to the Hilton to assist the FBI.

He recalled 66167C were in the ID Squad at the time that he became aware of the incident.

His information was that Spriggs and McCarthy had gone to Central Cell Block with the suspect, 66.

He assigned SA's 667C and Colo to go to the Central Cell Block and assist SA's Spriggs and McCarthy.

He recalled a telephone conversation with SA Spriggs approximately 30 minutes after the incident with Spriggs reporting from the cell block.

Spriggs had Hinckley's wallet and was giving 66667C identifying information on the subject. 66167C had previously established an open line to ID with DSAIC Jack Perdick on the line. Someone, possibly Spriggs, advised him that there was some confusion at the cell block regarding jurisdiction between the MPD, Secret Service and FBI. Spriggs asked that a supervisor be sent to the scene. ASAIC Burger sent ATSAIC Dessereau to the cell block.

He assigned SA: 66667C to assist the FBI in the search of the subject's room at the Park Central Hotel.

While they waited for the issuance of the Federal Search Warrant, 667C and 66167C interviewed maids and Hotel guests at the hotel.

As they found items of interest in his room, they called Agent 66167C who passed the information to the Intelligence Division. 66167C returned to the field office between 4:00 and 5:00 AM and wrote up their notes concerning the search. 66167C sent everything obtained by 66167C
to the Intelligence Division.

advised that he worked approximately 45 hours straight from the
time on Monday morning that he reported for work until he returned home.

The office is now staffed in the ID Squad of three shifts for 24 hour
coverage and this is still in effect.

He assigned SA to the hospital as an ID agent and provided
three additional SA's.

The Vice President was arriving on that date and he sent an ID team
to Andrews Air Force Base to cover the arrival. The Reagan children came
to town and ID teams were dispatched by SA. He sent an ID team to
remain with the First Lady Detail. He already had people committed in the ID
role with the Netherlands Detail.

attempted to put ID teams with all the principals who were in
the Washington Field Office area at that time.

A request was received for an armored car to be used by the FBI to
transport Hinckley. was assigned as the driver of this
vehicle and SA Allen Whitcher was assigned to the follow-up car sent to the
FBI to transport Hinckley to Quantico, Virginia.

said his duties include assigning the coordinator and to provide
teams for coverage of visits. A coordinator normally makes the regular contacts
with MFD and all agencies that WFO maintains contacts with in support of the
Secret Service.

He was advised sometime during the day that the interim federal presence
had passed to the FBI by ASAIC Burger.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA [redacted] (the No. 3 man on the ID Squad in the Washington Field Office) at approximately 10:00 AM at the Washington Field Office by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan (This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan).

At the outset of the interview [redacted] provided two O/M's, one written by him and another written by SA [redacted] addressed to AISAIC Dansereau.

There was no adverse adverse intelligence noted for the visit of the President to the Hilton Hotel.

On Monday, 3-30-81, SA Lucey, a member of the ID Squad in WFO, called in on sick leave.

This necessitated [redacted] to switch assignments already made in order to cover SA Lucey's absence. He assigned SA [redacted] to replace Lucey as a member of an ID team traveling with Mrs. Reagan on 3-30-81. He stated that Mrs. Reagan had an 11:00 AM lunch in the Washington area and a meeting at the National Bank & Trust Company which was over at approximately 2:30 PM.
March 30, 1981, regarding the ID agents assigned. 661676 advised him that McCarthy, Spriggs, 661676 and Keo Colo were the ID teams for his visit.

It was after this conversation that SA Lucey called in sick and required the juggling of the schedules. Because SA Lucey needed to be replaced and the other assignments pending, in the ID Squad of the Washington Field Office, SA 661676 deleted the second team for the Presidential visit to the Hilton Hotel.

He attached a sheet of assignments for the special agents assigned to the Intelligence Squad of the Washington Field Office for March 30, 1981.

We then discussed Agent 661676 dispatch to the scene subsequent to the incident.

He believes that it was approximately 15-20 minutes after the incident that NISAIC Dansereau advised he and 661676 to go to the hotel to assist the FBI with interviewees, etc. 661676 believes that Dansereau also dispatched Agent Colo to the Central Cell Block where Hinckley was being detained.

661676 took a call from SA 661676 at the hospital requesting that he look at the survey book to see which room is designated as the CP at the hospital. 661676 looked at the book and determined that no particular room was designated as the CP.

Dansereau advised 661676 that SA 661676 was holding the WFO SA's at the Hilton Hotel for possible interview by the FBI.

When he and 661676 arrived on the scene, SA 661676 told them that the SA's were in the Adams Room awaiting interview. He also observed SA 661676 with a weapon held through his handcuffs.
The FBI was on the scene when 6167C arrived, the wounded were gone. He noticed blood and noted that the area was very well pretty well controled by MFD. He did not recall any other agents being present besides 6167C and 6167C. MFD crime scene people were there and a senior agent of the FBI and 6167C had a discussion regarding the weapon in 6167C possession. 6167C told 6167C to keep the weapon until the FFl crime scene personnel arrived. It is his belief that 6167C gave the weapon to the FBI crime scene personnel.

6167C ad no recollection of ropes being up around the crime scene when he arrived. He estimated that he and 6167C remained together as a team for approximately ten-fifteen minutes after arrival on the scene. They then split to assist the FBI in interviews, etc. 6167C went to the crisis room being set up at the Hilton Hotel by the FBI and 6167C went with FBI agents to interview civilian witnesses at the scene.

After his arrival at the scene, Headquarters sent the following agents to the scene: SA Tom McLoughlin, Ed McKinney, J. B. Floyd, and Gordon May. They were sent to assist in and monitor the interviews by the FBI.

6167C then explained a situation involving a possible 627 case which arose at the site.

When 6167C left the office, he felt his job was to assist the FBI in any way possible.
April 7, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Foree

(This interview was dictated by Assistant Inspector Foree)

SA entered on duty with the Secret Service on August 26, 1974 at New York Field Office. He was transferred to PPO on January 14, 1979.

SA read his first interview and stated the information is correct.

The following paragraphs are additional information. He also reviewed the video tapes of departure from the Hilton.

Prior to leaving the White House SA read the survey report prepared by SA. SA preceded the President from the VIP entrance after his speech at the Washington Hilton Hotel. From the door he walked at an angle to the left behind the limo and stopped a few feet away from the left rear door facing in a southerly direction toward the crowd on the sidewalk or island in front of the canopy at the public entrance to the hotel.

Upon hearing the gun shots, SA looked in that direction and saw police and agents struggling with a subject at the rope line on the sidewalk against the wall between the VIP entrance and the public T Street entrance. He did not see the gun or the subject at this time. He also glanced at the Presidential limo and recalled seeing the President and SAIC Parr go into the limo. SA started for the rope line. After a few steps he stopped and took the Uzi from the briefcase. He then took up a position behind the limo and motioned for it to leave the area. He was covering the limo as it left the area. As it was departing, he ran to the area where the subject was being subdued. He took up a position with his back against the wall facing the crowd on T Street.

As he was against the wall he saw a gun, which he believed belonged to the
assailant, lying on the sidewalk next to him. He told someone to watch it. After the assailant was handcuffed, he walked with the agents/policemen to the police car. After the agents departed with the subject, he handed the Uzi to SA 6167C, while he went to the assistance of SA McCarthy who had been injured by the gunfire. After the injured were loaded into the ambulances, he received the Uzi back from SA 6167C.

SA 6167C along with SA's 6167C unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a car to go to the White House. The three of them were under the impression the President had not been injured and was returning to the White House.

They went to the intersection of T Street and Connecticut Avenue where they quickly caught a taxi en route the White House. At 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue the taxi got caught in traffic so they got out at that location and ran to 6167C. Upon entering 62167E they learned the President had gone to George Washington Hospital instead of the White House. It was not until a few minutes later while 6167E they learned the President had been injured and had not gone to the hospital to visit the injured persons at the scene of the attempted assassination.

SA 6167C advised that he, SA's: 6167C; 62167E, and possibly other agents took a station wagon from the north grounds and went to the hospital to effect security.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA 66157C at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview pertains to SA 66157C: recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

66157C account began with the President's arrival at the emergency room at the George Washington University Hospital. He recalls immediately dismounting the follow-up car and proceeding directly inside the emergency room. He has a faint recollection of an orderly group of people positioned both inside and outside the emergency room.

At the time of President's arrival, 66167C was not aware of the President's condition. 66167C said he led the President into the emergency room and as he did so he glanced back over his shoulder and observed blood on the President's hand. He thought that that was the reason for their having gone to the hospital.

As 66167C proceeded into the emergency room, he yelled for a stretcher or a wheel chair but none was available. He again looked back and observed President Reagan begin to collapse and heard what he perceived to be a sigh or gasp from the President. He recalls that Jerry Parr and Ray Shaddick with assistance from unknown persons then carried the President the remainder of the way into the trauma area of the emergency room. As they did so they passed 66157C and Ray Shaddick advised 66157C to take a checkpoint. 66157C began screening people entering the area as best he could. A short time later the chief of hospital security came to his assistance. A few minutes later another agent relieved him at that checkpoint.
After being relieved from that post, he conferred with NSAIC Shaddick and requested that he be allowed to remain with SA Tim McCarthy. It was recollection that McCarthy and Press Secretary Jim Brady were brought into the emergency room a short time after the President's arrival there. Shaddick approved of request to remain with McCarthy and did so until such time that McCarthy was taken into the operating room.

During the time he attended to SA McCarthy, the attending hospital personnel removed McCarthy's clothes and personal property and turned it over to SA. Placed it in a plastic bag and turned it over to SA of the Washington Field Office. recalls that was accompanied by a Lieutenant of the Metropolitan Police Department.

In recollections he perceives that the hospital staff were anticipating President Reagan's arrival at the emergency room. In view of that perception he cannot understand why no stretcher or wheel chair was available.

It is impression that there may have been as many as 30-40 persons in the emergency room in the minutes immediately following the President's arrival. Those persons consisted of hospital staff, both administrative and medical, of White House staff persons, of Secret Service Agents, additional police officers, other patients who were in the emergency room at the time of the arrival, and persons accompanying those patients.

He estimates that it was 5-10 minutes before Tim McCarthy and Jim Brady were brought into the emergency room. He further estimates that it was approximately one hour before Tim McCarthy was taken from the trauma area to the operating room.
He is not certain but he does have the impression that McCarthy was taken to the operating room just prior to President Reagan.

When the President was moved to the operating room, dressed in surgical gown and moved to a post at the operating room. He remained at that post for the duration of the operation. At the conclusion of the operation on President Reagan, terminated and went to the Washington Field Office to be interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Recollections are that he took his orders primarily from W.S. Shadick. There may have been occasions when W.S. Shadick directed that he do some particular thing but generally W.S. Shadick maintained his control over activities.

As a final note, had no recollection of when he may have been informed or learned that the President had in fact been wounded by gunshot. He was aware at some point during the afternoon that that in fact had occurred. How he came to be aware he has no recollection.

This concludes the interview with Special Agent.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent PPD at
of the White House by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview pertains to recollections of the aftermath of the
assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington
Hilton Hotel.

advised that at the time of the assault on President Reagan, he,
with other shift members, was enroute to the normal shift relief at the White
House for the . At a point on GW Parkway the personnel
in his car monitored by radio transmissions to the effect that shots
had been fired. Additional transmissions were monitored that Rawhide
is okay - we're returning to the White House. Shortly thereafter more trans-
missions were monitored that - we are proceeding to GW Hospital. Reaction
of and other shift personnel accompanying him were to proceed directly
to GW Hospital with lights and sirens. assumes they arrived at the
hospital approximately 30 seconds behind the arrival of the President. He
specifically recalls an arrival transmission being given by as the President arrived at the hospital. said at that point he and
his fellow shift members were approaching the Washington Circle from an eastbound
direction on K Street.

On arrival at the hospital immediately entered the emergency room
and proceeded to the area wherein he observed the most significant activity.
observed SAIC Parr and asked Parr if he was okay. Parr responded in the affirmative.
At that point realized that the person being administered to was in fact the
President; however, he had no awareness of what the President's condition may or
may not have been, or what the circumstances that may have led to his being there.

advised that he immediately took up a position adjacent to the trauma cubicle where the President was located. He observed SA Russ Miller located approximately 5-6 feet between him and the doorway into the emergency trauma area. At Parr's direction, took the President's clothes and personal belongings as given to him by Parr and exited the emergency room. He advised Ray Shaddick as he was doing so and proceeded outside to the Presidential limousine. As he exited the emergency room, Press Secretary Jim Brady was being rolled in to that area on a stretcher. at that point was unaware that it was in fact Brady. When he stopped outside, observed Mary Ann Gordon and asked that she take the President's clothes and place them in the back seat of the limousine. He then returned to the inside of the emergency room. Shortly thereafter SA directed to locate and establish a command post. went out to the lead and tail car and obtained the PT-400's from them for subsequent use in a command post. He doesn't recall from who he obtained the information that Room 2500 was available for a command post. Nevertheless, then he proceeded to that location and en route he observed SA Tim McCarthy's arrival at the emergency room.

When arrived at Room 2500, he observed that White House Communications Agents—Agency personnel were already present and were in the process of establishing phone and radio service to that room. He advised that he took the preliminary steps to establish radio intelligence and telephone communications and immediately called and provided the phone numbers to personnel there.
He then called Protective Operations and provided the telephone numbers to Deputy Assistant Director Bechtle. Bechtle was already aware of the incident and asked the extent of the injuries to the President. At that point, Bechtle knew the President was being attended to but did not know why. He suspected that it may be a rib injury or a heart attack but had no confirmation as to what it may have been. Bechtle remained in the command post throughout the shift and was relieved at approximately.

Initially, very limited information was passed to him in the command post by others present throughout the hospital. As a consequence, he had little or no ability to deal with incoming inquiries. He has little or no recollection of time but does recall additional personnel taking up position in the command post. Those persons included Metropolitan Police Department officers, the Office of the Special Agent in Charge Robert Crovatto of the Washington Field Office, WHCA personnel, hospital security personnel and intermittently other agents of the Secret Service, both from PPD and Washington Field Office.

At a point considerably later in the evening officers of the Uniform Division, Secret Service, were in the process of establishing themselves in the command post. The assessment of the initial performance of the command post was that it served as an information center. He attempted to gather and disseminate information as was best possible but as has been previously been mentioned, little information was in fact flowing to him.

He recalled that at some point in the evening Mrs. Reagan was escorted into the command post suite area where she remained in a holding room adjacent to the conference room in which the actual command post was located.
To 66167c's recollection Pat Miller was coordinating overall security at the hospital. He, Pat Miller that is, and several others arrived at the hospital only a few minutes after the President's arrival. 66167c specifically commented that the Federal Bureau of Investigation came in and out of the command post during the evening seeking directions and information. Their positions and attitude were very cooperative throughout all contacts with 66167c.

This 66167c Al described the White House Communications Agency personnel as being super responsive in their efforts to install phones and radios in the command post.

66167c advised that during the course of the evening there were periodic drop-ins by members of the D.C. Fire Department, mainly personnel from their paramedic units. Additionally, Uniform Division Counter-Sniper units visited the command post as g3 was required as well as agents directed to that location to await post standing assignments.

66167c has no recollection of any radio transmissions regarding the protectees or a protectee's locations in the hospital or movements within the hospital. He advised that he understood that 67c was charged with maintaining the normal movement logs relative to Presidential activities.

Hino said he requested a copy of the hospital survey from Special Agent 66167c in the PPD Transportation Section. Subsequent to that request, a copy of the survey form was delivered to him in the command post by Agents of the Washington Field Office.
advised that at some point during the evening, he had received a call from Special Agent wherein he relayed information that the assailant John Hinckley had purchased a .22 caliber devastator ammunition. said he did nothing with the information since it was provided to him subsequent to the conclusion of surgery on President Reagan. At some point later, several days, advised Deputy Special Agent in Charge DeProspero of the fact that this information had come to his attention and further what his actions had been and the reasons for them in doing nothing with the information. Prior to informing DeProspero, he additionally informed Assistant Director Simpson during a brief encounter with Simpson at the hospital. Neither DeProspero nor Simpson saw a reason to fault according to .

This concludes the results of the interview with Special Agent .
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA b61b7c, PPD, at the White House,
Room 62, by Inspector Steve Garmon

This interview deals with SA b61b7c recollections of the aftermath of the
assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington
Hilton Hotel.

b61b7c advised that on that date at approximately 2:30 PM he, with SA
b61b7c were enroute for
their normal b2107c at the N White House. They were traveling N7 southbound
on the George Washington Memorial Parkway in a shift wagon and monitored a
transmission to the effect that shots had been fired. His recollection is that
that transmission came from shift leader Ray Shaddick. He recalls having heard
a subsequent transmission from Jerry Parr that Reashide is okay, we're going to
b7c B7c
A short time later he recalls a transmission from b6107c to Mary Ann
Gordon to the effect-Mary Ann, we're going to GW Hospital.

With lights and sirens, b61b7c and the accompanying agents proceeded
directly to the George Washington Hospital emergency room. Only seconds
before their arrival at that location, they monitored another radio transmission
from Ray Shaddick of an arrival by the President at GW Hospital.

When b8c & his shift arrived at the hospital, the President was
already inside the emergency room. b61b7c immediately proceeded inside the
exterior doors of the emergency room and after immediately assessing the situation,
he requested the assistance of a person he determined to be b61b7c (the
GW Hospital administrator, a Doctor b61b7c and a supervising nurse on duty.
b61b7c does not recall the nurse's name. b61b7c & said he told them that access
to the emergency room had to be controlled even to those people who normally
would have access to it. with the assistance of and the previously mentioned nurse, began screening all persons attempting to gain access to the emergency room where President Reagan was located. At some point recalling assisting him in his endeavors at that checkpoint and in clearing a hallway immediately adjacent to the area wherein his checkpoint was located. recalls being quite aggressive in his efforts to control the area even to the extent that he blocked the admission of persons such as Mike Deaver, Presidential Assistant, from entering the area.

He recalls that a situation which was extremely confused was under reasonable control within 5-10 minutes subsequent to his and his shift's arrival. He said that an additional 3 or 4 minutes passed subsequent to his arrival before Jim Brady, Presidential Press Secretary, was wheeled into the emergency room and an additional 2 or 3 minutes later, Tim McCarthy was brought in.

He has no recollection nor would he make an estimate of how long the President remained in the emergency room.

recalls directing to locate a security room or the security room and find our phone.

When President Reagan was taken from the emergency room to the operating room, moved to that location as well. He recalls taking a post at the side door of the operating room.

does not recall when or by what means he became aware that President Reagan had in fact been wounded by a gunshot.
...recalls that it was only a matter of minutes after his arrival that additional SA's from the Washington Field Office began to arrive on the scene. He advised that very shortly after his arrival, telephone calls of a threatening nature began to be received by the hospital. One such phone call was related to him by a nurse on duty. In conjunction with that, asked SA if the Washington Field Office to respond to it as was appropriate.

From the operating room, the President was removed to the recovery room and at that time SA proceeded to the intensive care unit for briefing by SA. He was directed to go to that location by SA. After his briefing at the intensive care unit, returned to the recovery room where he was posted again and remained there until his relief by the sometime around Midnight that evening.

During the course of his duties at the hospital that afternoon and evening, recalls having witnessed no significant conflicts or confrontation by any of the parties present.

This concludes the interview conducted with
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA b6167c, PPD, in Room b12 at the White House by Inspector Steve Garmon.

The interview pertains to recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Recounted that on that date, March 30, he accompanied by SA b6167c, were enroute to their normal duties on the b21 b22 at the White House via shift wagon. It was approximately 2:30 PM in the afternoon and they were somewhere in the area of Spout Run on the George Washington Memorial Parkway when they monitored radio transmissions from Shift Leader Ray Shaddick that shots had been fired. Subsequent transmissions were also monitored from SAIC Parr that Rawhide was okay and they were enroute to the White House. Very briefly thereafter a subsequent transmission from b6 b7c to Mary Ann Gordon came over the air to the affect that - we're going to GW Hospital. b6 b7c and his associates immediately headed in the direction of the GW Hospital and it is b7c estimate that they arrived at that location approximately 2-3 minutes after the President's arrival.

b7c immediately proceeded to the inside of the emergency room at GW Hospital and located Ray Shaddick. He was able to do this by virtue of the activity he observed in the inner recesses of the emergency room. At Shaddick's direction b7c began to screen people attempting to enter the trauma area occupied by the President. In a short while b7c was able to obtain the assistance of a hospital security official to assist him in screening persons seeking admission to the President's vicinity. b7c recalls that he was in what he defined as the inner
area of the emergency room. He was not aware of the President's condition at that time and only presumed that he had somehow or other been injured.

He observed SA and SA take up positions in the outer emergency room in a checkpoint capacity. He determined in conjunction with and of the Washington Field Office that Room 2500 of the hospital was designated as a security room or command post. proceeded to that room where he found that NHLA personnel was already checking phones and making arrangements to install signal lines and radios in that room. Thereafter he returned to the emergency room and located He advised that they needed radios and could obtain them from the lead car and tail car of the Presidential motorcade. Those radios would be used to equip the command post in room 2500. At that point it appeared that the confusion in the emergency room was beginning to settle down. Other emergency patients were being evacuated from the area to other locations within the hospital.

went outside to observe the situation there and with others present directed the press to move back to the sidewalk area out of the emergency room arrival vicinity. To inquiries from the press, responded "Someone will be out to talk to you".

assessment of the situation on his initial arrival was that it was reasonably well controlled. The initial problem was the large influx of hospital emergency personnel attempting to gain access to the emergency room and trauma areas.
returned to the emergency room area and briefly thereafter observed press secretary Jim Brady Brady and Agent Tim McCarthy being admitted to the emergency room area. He then called by phone to BR and advised that location of the situation in the hospital and of the situation reference Tim McCarthy. He asked Shift Leader b6tie to call SARG Richard Griffin and request that Griffin respond to Tim McCarthy's residence to assist McCarthy's wife.

SA b6tie then directed b7c and SA b6tie to check with whatever sources were available and determine the next area to which the President might be taken within the hospital. At this time b6t recounts he still did not know that the President had been wounded. He does not recall how long it may have been before he learned that nor from what means he was able to determine that the President had been wounded by the gunfighter's shot.

SA b6tie passed a message to b7c from Shift Leader Shaddin directing b7c to proceed to the operating room, scrub up, and put on a surgical gown. These directions came approximately 20 minutes after b6tie's arrival at the hospital.

As soon as b7c had donned the gown, he observed the President being taken into surgery. b6tie escorted him into operating room No. 2 and took up a post inside the operating room door. A Washington Field Office Agent was posted on the other door into the operating room. That agent was SA b7c b6tie, as best he recalls. Initially there were a large number of staff people in the operating room attending to the President. As time progressed, with the directions of the attending physicians as well as SA b7c and the other SA's in the room, those persons were extracted who did not have a specific need to be there.
It is recollection that the following Secret Service personnel were present in the operating room during the course of surgery conducted on President Reagan: SA 87C. SA 66/67C SAIC Parr (it is noted that Parr was not present immediately inasmuch as he was required to don a surgical gown and scrub up before he could be admitted into the operating room); Assistant Director Simpson arrived approximately 1/2 hour into the President's operation; SA 66/67C of the Washington Field Office continued to pass in and out of the operating room during the course of the President's surgery as did SA Joe Trainor, FBI.

When the bullet was extracted from the President, the surgeon, Dr. 66/67C placed it in a paper cup provided by SA 66/67C. The cup in the following fashion "Taken from President Reagan on 3-30-81 by Dr. 66/67C at 5:40 PM". 67C then gave the cup containing the bullet to SA Joe Trainor who departed the operating room. 67C presumes that Trainor turned it over to the FBI or other police officials.

The President came out of the surgery room at approximately 7:00 PM. At that time he was moved into a recovery room, down the hallway and to the left from the operating room. SA 67C accompanied him to the recovery room. At the recovery room it is recollection that SA 67C had established security and post for the President's arrival and stay in that vicinity. Initially SA 67C alternated with SAIC Parr in maintaining a post inside the recovery room area. Later during the course of the evening 66/67C and DeProspero alternated in maintaining a close proximity post with the President. During the entirety of his time in the recovery room prior to
relief that evening, two nurses remained on constant duty with the
President and doctors continued to pass in and out of the recovery area
checking on the President.

remained on duty until approximately 11:30 PM at which time he
was relieved by the 774 PPD personnel, coming on duty.

It is recollections that he initially cued on MED Shaddick
for directions. Subsequently, he took his directions from MED Parr or
AD Simpson, particularly while the President was in the operating room,
and during the time frame the President was in the recovery room, 676 took
directions primarily from SA 676 676
was impressed with the cooperativeness of the hospital staff, parti-
cularly the administrator. He advised that he observed nor had any knowledge
of any confrontations or conflicts that may have occurred at the hospital
during that initial shift.

This concludes the interview with SA 676 676
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview with SA b61b7c at 1310 L Street by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

SA b61b7c first realized something was happening when she heard a call she thought was "BOF". She was on post inside the ballroom at the time.

She next heard someone ask if the principal had departed. Then there was a call to all posts on b81b7c that there had been an attack on the principal.

She talked to SA b61b7c, who had an adjoining post, and they decided that one of them should go to the security room to assist SA Ramsey. b61b7c covered both posts and b61b7c went to the security room.

Ramsey asked her to notify all posts to return to the briefing room. b61b7c then came into the security room. Ramsey sent b7c4 to the crime scene and b61b7c went to the briefing room to see if anyone had any information as to who and how many had been injured.

There were approximately eight agents in the briefing room. One agent, who was later found not to be an eyewitness, said two agents were hit and one policeman. He described their wounds. Some of the other agents then went up to the crime scene.

b61b7c then returned to the security room and advised Ramsey. Some other agent was there who corrected her that only one agent was wounded.

She took some phone calls and then was sent outside to determine the caliber of the assailant's gun for b12. She contacted SA's b61b7c who had the gun. b61b7c advised that it was a .22. She then returned to the security room and called b7.67c.

She also called WFO to determine the name of the case agents: b61b7c.
called to provide additional information.

She recalls hearing the crime scene was under control in a short period of time.

She thinks someone went to the crime scene within five minutes after the shooting.

She also recalls hearing a call about ambulances while she was still on post.
Mr. [Redacted] advised that he made three separate trips outside his hotel prior to the President’s departure.

On trip No. 1 he recalled overhearing two plainclothesmen officers talking to each other and saying words to the effect that it was thirty minutes for the departure. He then returned to the hotel and to his office.

The second time he went out he noticed a roped off area for the general public. He noticed a couple of newspaper camera people on the line and heard a man gibbering about Mr. Burger went for a hamburger and the President cannot speak. Mr. [Redacted] then returned to the hotel.

On his third trip he positioned himself at the pillar of the Terrace overhang nearest the departure point. He stepped up on the lift of this pillar in order to observe the departure. He noticed a woman being removed from the area of the limousine and placed into the general public area behind the roped area. He saw Sam Donaldson in this crowd of 15-20 people waiting for the President’s departure. About five minutes prior to the departure of the President, he noticed press coming out of the Terrace door and proceeding to the vicinity of the motorcade. He recalled that when the press was leaving the Terrace entrance, the scene became a little more confused and his next recollection was of the shots going off and noticing that there were press between the limousine and the follow-up car. He observed the limousine leaving the scene and a few seconds later the follow-up car left the scene. His opinion was the stanchion was approximately 6-8 inches passed the grate.
I passed above information to Dick Hartwig, Public Affairs, 4/18.

We got it from 661676, PPD.

661676 is one of the men who arrested SA Timothy McCarthy on the scene on 3/30/81.

Kevin.
April 7, 1981 - 1st Interview of DSAIC Robert DeProspero, PPD, at Room 622.
Old Executive Office Building, by Inspector Steve Carson.

The interview pertains to the aftermath in the shooting of President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981, at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

The first notification that Deputy SAIC DeProspero recalls was by Special Agent of PPD who informed him that ASAIC Johnny Guy requested that he come immediately to Room 612 to respond to an emergency. On his arrival at 612, ASAIC Guy informed DeProspero that shots had been fired at the President. At that time the television set in 612 was on and news reports were being broadcast with film footage reflecting the shooting at the hotel.

DeProspero recalls that ASAIC Wayne Welch, Vice Presidential Protective Division, was present in 612 at the time. DeProspero discussed the situation with Welch who in turn advised that the situation was well in hand reference the Vice President.

Shortly thereafter shift personnel, SA 66.072, SA 66.072-1, and SA 66.072 appeared in 612. They advised that they had missed the follow-up car at the hotel. DeProspero directed that they proceed immediately to the George Washington Hospital.

DeProspero directed ASAIC Guy to advise the 612 that the entire shift would be required to work that night.

DeProspero was notified by someone that the First Lady desired to go to the George Washington Hospital. Her detail leader, George Opfer, wanted to talk to DeProspero and DeProspero wanted to discuss the situation with Mrs. Reagan requesting that she delay her trip to the hospital. She ignored his desires, chose not to speak to him, and proceeded immediately to the hospital.
ASAIC Guy at the direction of DeProspero began with assistance from other agents present to inform telephonically the wives of the entire relative to their conditions, namely that all were in good shape except for SA Tim McCarthy.

DeProspero communicated by radio to the Presidential follow-up with a request that shift leader Ray Shaddick contact with a status report on the President's condition. Shortly thereafter Shaddick called by phone to and provided information that the President had in fact been shot and that an operation on him to remove the bullet was currently under consideration. DeProspero inquired of agents present whether Public Affairs and Protective Operations had been advised. They informed him in the affirmative that that action had been taken. Shortly thereafter Special Agent contacted by phone and requested from DeProspero a situation report in order that Ronnie Reagan, Jr. could be informed. According to Ronnie was asking or his detail what the situation was. DeProspero responded to that at that point it was not yet known what the President's condition was.

DeProspero talked with shortly thereafter with SA Dick Griffin by phone, who was with Mrs. McCarthy, SA McCarthy's wife. Griffin was advised by DeProspero that shift agent would be at the hospital and perform as an advance man for Mrs. McCarthy when she and Griffin arrived at the hospital.

DeProspero advised that was manned primarily by ASAIC Guy, SA SA Joe Trainor and himself with ASAIC Welch of the VP Detail present.

DeProspero advised that he contacted SA Steve Ramsey in the security room
at the Washington Hilton Hotel and directed him to preserve the crime scene there. Ramsey responded that that action was already being taken.

Special Agent appeared in and asked DeProspero to come with him and brief Treasury Secretary Regan as to the situation as DeProspero knew it at that time. Secretary Regan was upstairs in the west wing of the White House and DeProspero proceeded to his location. There he informed Secretary Regan that the President had in fact been wounded by gun shot but it was not considered serious. He drew this conclusion since the President had been unaware that he had in fact been wounded. He informed Secretary Regan that the doctors were at that point considering an operation to remove the bullet. Regan asked DeProspero what the situation was relative to SA McCarthy and Press Secretary Jim Brady. DeProspero provided what information he had relative to McCarthy’s condition, namely that he had been wounded but at that point DeProspero was unaware of Brady’s condition.

Shortly thereafter Assistant Director Simpson arrived in 672. According to DeProspero Simpson had been undergoing an annual physical examination at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Enroute to the office he overheard by commercial radio about the assault on President Reagan and had proceeded directly to Simpson requested a situation report. DeProspero provided the information as he had it at that point. The two, DeProspero and Simpson, then proceeded to Room 672 picked up their Secret Service identification pins, and walked to GW Hospital arriving there at some point between 3:30 PM and 4:00 PM.

On arrival at the GW Hospital DeProspero proceeded into the emergency entrance where he observed Special Agent Russ Miller at the entrance to the operating room. He also observed SA Pat Miller, Washington Field Office.
He approached Pat Miller and inquired as to whether or not the hospital was secure. Pat Miller responded affirmatively. He further responded that the hospital staff as well as Special Agents were manning checkpoints at strategic locations. Further, that SAIC Parr, SA Joe Trainor and SA were inside the operating room with the President. Parr could not recall the identity of the agent who came out of the operating room at that point and asked if he or AD Simpson wanted to come inside. DeProspero responded that he felt he could better serve on the outside. AD Simpson chose to go inside.

DeProspero had a further dialog with NTSAIC Pat Miller to assure that appropriate measures for security were intact on the outside, that clearances inside the hospital were being provided, that a command post had been set up. In all matters Pat Miller responded affirmatively that actions of an appropriate nature were being taken.

Agent Joe Trainor came out of the operating room several times in an effort to deliver messages for Assistant Director Simpson. One message was to the effect that should the Vice President arrive at the hospital, appropriate measures for a covered or underground arrival were to be taken. This was per direction of AD Simpson. According to DeProspero a Vice Presidential Detail Agent was on hand to do any advance required for the Vice President should such be necessary. DeProspero could not recall the identity of that particular agent but the information from Simpson was provided to him by DeProspero.

DeProspero advised that he remained in the general area outside the operating room, responding to problems and inquiries as they arose. At some point he was
approached by a hospital nurse who briefed him on the condition of SA Tim McCarthy. She informed DeProspero that she was not allowed to advise Mrs. McCarthy, Tim's wife, of Tim's condition, that a doctor would have to provide that information to her. DeProspero informed Mrs. McCarthy of the foregoing and that a doctor would soon give her a full rundown on Tim's condition. At a point shortly thereafter this in fact did occur, according to DeProspero.

Shortly thereafter in response to a request from Mrs. Reagan, DeProspero and SA Dick Griffin escorted Mrs. McCarthy to the hospital chapel where she met with Mrs. Reagan for a period. DeProspero then returned to his position outside the operating room again to deal with queries and problems as they arose. At some point he proceeded to Room 2500, the command post, where he dealt with a number of questions posed by SA  b6157c  He does not recall the specifics of those questions and inquiries from  b616b  but is quite certain he gave  b616b  the appropriate directions on which  b61ab5  could take action. He recalls that one agent was monitoring an open phone line with Intelligence Division, that agent requested DeProspero to inform the ID Agent, Rick Burt on the other end of the line, as to the situation as DeProspero knew it. DeProspero took the line and gave Burt a rundown on the situation relative to the President's injuries. At that point the President was still in surgery, according to DeProspero. DeProspero then spoke with WHCA representatives in the command post relative to a need for additional communications. He was assured more were on the way in the very near future.

At approximately 6:30 PM he contacted Johnny Guy in  b71c  and directed that Guy should terminate, proceed home, in order that he (Guy) could return to the hospital and perform as the  b2157c  Supervisor that evening.
Thereafter DeProspero returned to his position downstairs outside the operating room. He received another message from AD Simpson relative to the Vice President shortly thereafter. He took that message, went back upstairs to the 2500 area where he discussed the situation with the Presidential staff relative to a potential visit at the Hospital by the Vice President. DeProspero spoke to Presidential Assistant Ed Meese who suggested he saw no reason that the VP should come to the hospital at all. DeProspero agreed. Meese then got on the phone and approximately five minutes later informed DeProspero that the Vice President would remain at the situation room and not visit the hospital.

As DeProspero was departing the 2500 area, UD Assistant Chief Banocy approached him and asked DeProspero where the Uniform Division personnel were to be assigned. DeProspero told him he would have to await further direction and that he or someone would get back to him as soon as they had an answer to his question. DeProspero returned to his position downstairs outside the operating room where he consulted with ATSAIC Pat Miller. Pat informed DeProspero that he was aware of the situation relative to the use of Uniform Division personnel and had determined the appropriate locations for posting of Uniform Division personnel.

At some point DeProspero recalls the request from members of the FBI that the President's clothes and the Presidential limousine be turned over to them for their investigative actions. DeProspero was able to trace the President's clothes to Special Agent Gordon and determined that the limousine had been returned to the garage at 1310 L Street and replaced by another limousine. DeProspero advised by phone he coordinated the release of the President's clothes and access to the Presidential limousine with Deputy Assistant Director Dechtle, Protective Operations. He subsequently informed SA of the need of the Secret Service to comply with both requests by the FBI.
At a later point DeProspero directed NSAIC Pat Miller to pursue a meeting of all elements involved in security at the hospital in order to get everyone on the same wave length and operating in conjunction with one another in a coordinated approach. Miller agreed to do so and immediately began pursuing such a meeting by notifying appropriate persons.

DeProspero became concerned about the hallway immediately adjacent to the operating room and directed that appropriate actions to assure that it was cleared for that time when the President would conclude surgery and be moved to a recovery room. He directed that Pat Miller assure that this was the circumstance and Miller took the appropriate action to see that it in fact was done.

DeProspero then commenced actions to determine precisely where the President would be taken at the conclusion of surgery. He determined that SA 66,57C was already on the 4th floor handling arrangements at the intensive care unit should the President go there.

At the conclusion of the surgery on the President, he was in fact relocated to a recovery room in the area adjacent to the operating room. DeProspero advised that he took up a position outside the main entrance to that recovery room. He directed SA Russ Miller to remain at the operating room in the event the President might need to return to the operating room. A short time later when he was satisfied that this would not be the case, he repositioned SA Russ Miller with himself outside the recovery room. He did this in view of the fact that SA Russ Miller had become familiar with most of the hospital personnel working in the immediate area of the President.
DeProspero advised that SAIC Parr, AD Simpson and SA were inside the recovery room in the immediate proximity to the President. DeProspero remained at the checkpoint outside the recovery room until SAIC Parr departed.

At some point DeProspero recalls having observed the presence of the Director and the Deputy Director in Suite 2500 area and having had a brief conversation with the Deputy Director relative to any service they could render at the hospital.

DeProspero relieved SAIC Parr and remained inside with the President in the recovery room with Assistant Director Simpson and other shift SA's. At one point he was directed by AD Simpson to get all the information he could on the assailant John Hinckley. DeProspero left the recovery room long enough to talk to SAIC Walsh, Intelligence Division, to get an update on Hinckley's background and all the information that he had obtained at that point relative to him. He returned to the President's location where he remained until relieved by AGAIC Gey at approximately 12:30 AM on March 31, 1981. At that point he returned to Room 102 of the Old Executive Office Building and terminated for the evening.

DeProspero advised that all parties and persons at the hospital had impressed him as being extremely cooperative throughout this ordeal. He was aware of no problems, confrontations or conflicts which may have occurred during that initial day at the hospital. It was DeProspero's impression that Pat Miller ATSAIC Pat Miller was in charge at the hospital when DeProspero arrived on the scene. He knows of no direction to Miller to take charge nor does he know of any direction to the contrary. DeProspero cannot recall when SA , PPD, may have bese
been assigned formally to the advance at the hospital. Until that occurred, he
presumes no one formally was assigned that task. His assessment of the situation
was that it was one where all parties concerned simply recognized the needs of
what had to be done and did it.

This concludes the interview of Deputy Special Agent in Charge DeProspero.
April 6, 1981 - 1st Interview of Metropolitan Police Department, 3rd District, at the Hilton Hotel by Inspectors Roger Counts and Kevin R. Houlihan

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

On 4-6-81 Inspector Counts and I interviewed Sergeant 661670 at the Hilton Hotel. He stated that he received the assignment to be the Officer in Charge of the arrival/departure site at approximately 7:30 AM on 3-30-81. He put together a detail of himself and seven other police officers from the 3rd District. He was not informed of a briefing at the hotel by the Secret Service. He stated if he had known there was a briefing, he would have attended. In the past he has worked several of these movements during his 3½ years' assignment to the 3rd District.

To his recollection nothing was significantly different as far as police protection at that site. He stated he has done arrivals and departures at the Hilton Hotel with as few as seven police officers and as many as ten.

I provided a schematic drawing of the site and Sgt. 661670 indicated by numbering his people including himself 1 through 7 for their posts at the arrival and departure. These drawings are attached to this interview.

He stated that he and his detail arrived at the hotel at approximately 1:00 or 1:10 PM on 3-30-81. They immediately set up their perimeter of security as noted in the arrival diagram.

He stated that an individual was noticed in the crowd acting suspicious,
This individual was subsequently identified as Mr. He informed the officers working the rope line, of the presence of and advised them to watch him.

He had a conversation with SA , PPD, lead advance, prior to the arrival. He explained to SA the normal posting of his men and did not object to the normal posting procedure.

He noticed a small crowd for the arrival near the rope line set up near the arrival point near a grate on the sidewalk. There were a couple of camera crews mixed up with the crowd for the arrival. The arrival was uneventful.

He was aware of certain other police officers and hotel security present for the arrival and departure who were not under his control.

An MPD police cruiser was parked at the top of the ramp leading to the hotel general entrance area. The car was not marked as it belonged to Police Officer who had the post of intersection control at Connecticut Avenue and T Street.

He knew that Officer put out the traffic patrol control cones at the taxi stand to ensure adequate parking for certain cars in the motorcade.

There was another SDD police officer at the intersection of Florida and T Street for traffic control; however, Sgt. did not know his name.

He also noticed a U.S. Secret Service Uniform Division Canine Officer near the rope line upon arrival. He does not recall that this officer had a dog with him. He did recall that this officer was speaking with Officer Delahanty of his detail prior to the arrival.

After the President arrived and entered the hotel, Sgt. recalls that the motorcade was repositioned. Either during the repositioning or a short time later the rope line was moved by Officer and Officer.
(he believes) from in front of the grate to a position somewhat to the rear of the grate, perhaps three feet past the grate. His recollection is that a Secret Service Agent assisted in the moving of these ropes; however, he does not recall the Agent's name.

Sgt. 66167C stated his complete detail remained on their posts from prior to the arrival through the arrival to the President's departure.

Sgt. 66167C stated that his experience has been if you do not hold these posts, the general public will filter into the arrival area and not provide a sterile departure site for the protectee.

Sgt. 66167C then sketched the positions of his officers at approximately the time the shots were fired at the President. He sketched himself and the other 578 officers from his detail as far as he could recollect.

The crowd was not large prior to the departure. He recalled that when the press pool exited from the Terrace Room, the area became a bit more congested and a little more confused because of the movement of the press pool. His recollection was the press pool left the Terrace door, went through some cars in the motorcade and lined up somewhat near on the left side of the limousine and some of the press pool actually went to the general public area behind the rope to take positions held for them by other news media personnel.

When the shots were fired, Sgt. 66167C was in the position to assist in the apprehension of the assailant. When the assailant was under control, he left and got his marked MPD cruiser, brought it to the scene for transportation of the suspect. They had some difficulty opening the left rear door and the suspect was placed in another marked MPD vehicle and taken from the scene.
Sgt. moved his vehicle out of the arrival area, up the ramp, and immediately began to issue orders to his officers and others arriving on the scene to keep the area clear of unauthorized personnel and to assist in the evacuation of the wounded at the site.

He recalled that Lieutenant of the hotel security force was positioned outside the Terrace Room entrance on the driveway at approximately the time the first shots were fired.
April 6, 1981 - 2nd Interview of NSAIC Ray Shaddick, PPD, at George Washington University Hospital, by Inspector Steve Garmon

NSAIC Shaddick's interview focused on his recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981, at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Shaddick recalls having transmitted a departure from the Washington Hilton Hotel and subsequently transmitting by radio that they had undergone gunshot wounds and men were down. He said he observed and knew that one of the agents who had been wounded was Tim McCarthy and he suspected the other was Special Agent 661576.

He further recounted a transmission by SAIC Parr to the effect that Rawhide is okay and that they were proceeding to the White House. Shaddick, in turn, transmitted to Crown that they were en route to Crown or the White House. A short time later Shaddick does not recall precisely how long but he presumes approximately a minute, Parr advised - We're going to GW Hospital. Subsequently were additional transmissions from presumably from 661576 to Mary Ann Gordon to that effect.

Shaddick advised Honeypower to make the appropriate notifications to the George Washington University Hospital that they were en route that location. 661576 responded that it had already been done.

On arrival at GW Hospital Shaddick advised that himself, 661576 and Russ Miller responded directly to the President's limousine in order to render any necessary assistance as well as security. Shaddick recalls the President exiting the limousine on his own power and proceeding into
the emergency room on his own power. Almost immediately as the President entered the emergency room outer doors, his knees began to buckle and it was necessary to carry him the remainder of the way into the emergency room trauma room 5-A area. To the best of Shaddick's recollection, he and Special Agent Russ Miller remained immediately outside the curtained area separating trauma room 5-A from other trauma areas and SA \textsuperscript{66} \textsuperscript{b7c} picked up a position approximately 25 feet nearer the emergency room exit.

Shaddick recalls that approximately 5-10 minutes after the President's arrival at GW Hospital, additional agent personnel began arriving. His specific recollections are that Agent \textsuperscript{66} \textsuperscript{b7c} of the \textsuperscript{62} \textsuperscript{b7c} and NISAIC Pat Miller and SA \textsuperscript{56} \textsuperscript{b7c} of the Washington Field Office were the first agents to arrive on the scene in a position of rendering assistance.

Shaddick says that in the same time frame, approximately 10-15 staff and medical personnel from the hospital were attending to the President and in the very short time frame thereafter, SA Tim McCarthy and Mr. Jim Brady, White House Press Secretary, were brought into the emergency room at the hospital. In order to contend with the numbers of hospital personnel, attempting to enter the emergency area occupied by the President, Shaddick and Russ Miller requested the assistance of a female hospital employee to assist them in identifying persons with legitimate access to that area.

Briefly thereafter Shaddick directed SA \textsuperscript{56} \textsuperscript{b7c} to make efforts to locate a command post somewhere in the hospital and establish appropriate communications with the various White House elements.
Shaddick has few specific recollections of any further action on his part other than to say that he generally directed the actions of the agents in the immediate proximity of the President.

Shaddick was specifically questioned regarding any problems which may have been encountered and responded that none were generated by hospital staff, White House staff, other agents, police, public at large, or hospital patients to his knowledge.

Shaddick remained in close proximity to the President until such time as he was moved into the operating room.

This concludes the account of the interview of ATSAIC Ray Shaddick.
April 6, 1981 - 1st Interview of Special Agent Timothy J. McCarthy in his hospital room at George Washington Hospital at approximately 8:30 PM by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forre (This interview was dictated by Inspector Foushee)

Agent McCarthy was appointed as a Special Agent on February 7, 1972 with a post of duty in Chicago.

Agent McCarthy was transferred to PPD February 11, 1979.

Agent McCarthy advised that on March 30, 1981, prior to departing the White House for the Hilton visit of the President, he reviewed the survey report that had been prepared by Special Agent [redacted]. On March 30, 1981, Agent McCarthy's assignment on the follow-up car was [redacted]. He advised upon arrival #1 at the Hilton Hotel, the limousine pulled up to the VIP entrance. He exited the follow-up vehicle and went to the right rear door of the limousine. He stayed at that position until SAIC Parr got out of the limo and came to the back door. At this time McCarthy advised he looked at the area from the limo to the VIP entrance and the area was clear. The President got out of the limo and proceeded directly to the VIP entrance. Once inside, McCarthy assumed a post by the elevator until the President had got on the elevator.

When the elevator door closed, McCarthy and the rest of the shift went down the stairs beside the elevator to the holding room and the President got off the elevator into a lobby-like area and was accompanied by SAIC Parr and Shift Leader Shaddick.

At this point McCarthy advised that he and Agent [redacted] were pre-posted. He could not remember for sure but he believes he was posted by either Agent [redacted] or Washington Field Office advance agent [redacted]. Agent McCarthy's post
was to the 15th floor from where the President was going to speak.

McCarthy advised he was at this post for approximately 10-12 minutes before the President came out for his introduction. The speech lasted approximately 15 minutes and after the remarks concluded, he followed the President off of the stage and to the elevator. Once the President got on the elevator, McCarthy and the rest of the shift 36 went back up the stairs and waited by the elevator door until the President got off the elevator.

At this point McCarthy advised he went towards the VIP doors leading on to the street and he believes at this point the President was approximately ten feet behind him. He remembers looking outside, the area appeared to be clean. He noticed a crowd was building up around and behind the follow-up vehicle but upon exiting the VIP doors, McCarthy veered off to the left going in the direction of the limousine. He advised he was walking quite fast at this point because the President was only 7-8 feet behind him. The crowd appeared to be normal and he did not see at that time any situation that posed a threat to the President.

McCarthy advised that when he reached the limo the President was approximately ten feet behind him. McCarthy remembers looking to his left at the crowd and a few press and he then opened the back door of the limousine.

At this point McCarthy thought that the President was just off to his right and he began turning clockwise and at the point when he was almost face to face with the President as he was turning, he heard the first shot. McCarthy advised he thought the shot came from the roped off area and as soon as he heard the first shot, he turned as quickly as he could facing the crowd and directed his
attention to that area. He did not see anyone firing the shots or anyone with a gun. He then spread his body and remembers spreading out his arms.

McCarty advised he remembers hearing the first two shots and then he got hit and as he was falling backwards, he heard several more shots.

McCarty advised throughout the entire ordeal after being shot, he remained totally conscious and remembers lying on the sidewalk and remembers looking up and seeing the limousine pull away. He heard all of the commotion going on. He still had his earpiece in and he heard Parr over the radio saying they were going to the White House and then shortly thereafter heard Parr saying they were going to George Washington Hospital.

McCarty advised he never did draw his gun.

McCarty advised that his feeling at the time was that there was only one person involved in the shooting and he remembers someone coming over to him, that this person told McCarty his name. It was something like 1276 and the last name seemed to be a German name, that this person said - I'm an emergency medical technician. McCarty advised that this subject got into the ambulance with him and rode to the hospital with him and was of great assistance in calming him down.

McCarty advised that at first he thought he had been hit twice because he was having pain from two areas of the lower chest and stomach areas and as he explained later, the doctors later told him that the bullet had gone in the lower chest and gone down into the stomach area.

McCarty advised that he has not done any advances at the Hilton Hotel but has been there on many occasions since being on PPD and he saw nothing different on March 30 as far as security goes that he has not seen on previous occasions.
April 6, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SAIC Jerry S. Parr, PPD, at George Washington University Hospital, by Inspector Steve Garmon.

This interview focused on SAIC Parr's recollections and actions in the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981. SAIC Parr recalled that after the departure from the Washington Hilton Hotel, his initial observations of President Reagan were that he was physically in good enough condition that they could return to the White House. Shortly after his initial observations, SAIC Parr witnessed President Reagan begin to spit up oxygenated blood. Parr concluded that the appropriate action was to proceed to the nearest hospital which in this case was George Washington University Hospital. He directed driver, SA b6167c, to proceed in that direction. A brief radio transmission to that effect was made by Parr something to the effect "GW Hospital". Parr thinks that b6167c repeated his transmission.

Parr's next recollection is his arrival at the emergency room of GW Hospital. He recounted that he had observed Special Agent b6167c proceed him into the emergency room.

Parr advised that President Reagan exited the limousine on his own power and proceeded directly into the emergency room. The emergency room entrance, it should be noted, was approximately five feet from the door of the limousine at the arrival point at the hospital. The President was not supported by Parr or other agents from the follow-up car at that particular moment; however, once the party had moved inside the emergency room approximately 20 feet, the President's knees began to buckle and it was necessary for SAIC Parr, ATSAIC Shadick and others present to physically carry the President the remainder of the way into the trauma room.
SAIC Parr further recalled that on the initial arrival at the hospital, the emergency room doors were open. He does not recall whether any attendants were immediately at the arrival point; however, he is certain there was no stretcher available immediately at the arrival point.

Parr further advised that in the course of assisting President Reagan into the trauma room, he informed or directed ATSAIC Shaddick to "secure a perimeter". He presumes that Shaddick responded and did as he was directed.

Parr further recounts that the emergency staff of the hospital immediately began to administer first aid to the President. He was placed on a bed in trauma room 5-A which is a portion of the emergency room at the hospital. A Doctor was the primary attending physician according to Parr's recollections. He also noted that Doctor the Presidential physician arrived simultaneously at the hospital in view of the fact that he was riding in the spare car in the Presidential motorcade. Within 3-5 minutes Parr observed additional agent personal from the and the Washington Field Office arriving on this scene and assisting in arranging and instituting security measures at the hospital.

Parr advised that at the initial arrival, there was only himself, ATSAIC Shaddick, SA , SA Russ Miller and the driver personnel who accompanied the motorcade. Those driver personnel included SA in the limousine; SA follow-up car driver; SA Mary Ann Gordon, who rode in the spare limo with PST driving that vehicle.

Parr advised that he remained in the immediate proximity with President Reagan for the duration of the time the President was in the trauma room 5-A and during the period which the President was in surgery. Initially the
President's clothes were retrieved by SAIC Parr with the exception of his suit coat and shirt. Parr has no recollection of what may have happened to those items but he does recall taking the President's trousers, undershorts, socks and shoes and giving them to Special Agent 66187C with instructions that 66187C should place them in the limousine.

Parr estimates that the President was in trauma room 5-A for approximately 40-45 minutes. Thereafter, he was moved into the operating room to undergo surgery for the removal of the bullet. He further advised that it was approximately five minutes before it was determined that the President had, in fact, been wounded by gunshot. Until that time it was uncertain as to whether or not the President may have suffered a rib injury by Parr having landed on top of him when he pushed him into the limousine or exactly what the generation of his condition might have been.

Parr advised that the only time he left the President's immediate proximity was for a very brief period wherein he was forced to don a surgical gown and scrub up in order to be admitted into the operating room. His recollections are that he was relieved very briefly by SA 66187C of the Washington Field Office during which time he was able to take that action.

Parr advised that during the time frame that the President was in surgery, the following Secret Service personnel were immediately present in the operating room: himself, SA 66187C, SA Joe Trainor, AD John Simpson and for a brief period, SA 66187C and another agent currently unknown to Parr. Parr thought it was a Washington Field Office agent by the name of 66187C.
Parr advised that in the best of his recollection, surgery began at approximately 5:00 PM and after a considerable difficulty, the bullet was located in the President's chest and removed at approximately 5:45 PM. The physician who removed the bullet placed it in a paper cup. The cup was taken by SA Bob Tie and initialed it and turned it over to SA Joe Trainor who did the same thing. According to Parr, Trainor then departed the operating room and he presumed gave the bullet to the appropriate FBI officials.

At approximately 6:00 PM the operation was completed and the President was moved into the recovery room area. Parr remained in the area for some time thereafter, moving in and out of the recovery room as was dictated by the circumstance.

At approximately 9:00 PM he departed the hospital, proceeded to the Washington Field Office where he was interviewed by a homicide detective from Metropolitan Police Department and officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He then went to the White House to where he continued conversations with Ed Hickey at the White House and others and shortly thereafter terminated his duties for the night and went home.

Parr was specifically questioned as to whether or not there were any problems encountered at the hospital from members of the hospital staff, members of the White House staff, Members of the media, other agent personnel, the public at large or other patient personnel. He recalled no incident of any nature that he would term a problem. He did comment that there was obvious confusion in the trauma room, that confusion was generated by the numbers of
people present, both hospital staff, doctors, medical emergency personnel, as well as agents, White House staff, and members of the Metropolitan Police Department. As time progressed, the number of persons involved and demanding involvement grew as well and only in that respect was there any sort of problem that he was witnessed at the hospital.

It should be noted in addition that Mr. Jim Brady, Presidential Press Secretary, as well as Special Agent Tim McCarthy, who were also wounded during the assault on President Reagan, were transported to GW Hospital, arrived only a few minutes after President Reagan's arrival. They were placed in the same area of the emergency room. Mr. Brady was placed in a position immediately adjacent to the President, S. McCarthy in a trauma area approximately 25 feet from the President's location. That, in addition to the circumstances delineated previously, was the occasion for significantly more numbers of people to demand access to the emergency room trauma area and, thereby, contributed to the confusion in that location.

It is further noted that Brady and McCarthy underwent surgery in essentially the same time frame and essentially the same area as that occupied by the President.

Parr's knowledge or recollection of precisely what the actions were to secure the hospital were limited, obviously in view of the fact that he remained immediately with the President while he was in the trauma room and the emergency room, as well as in the operating room and for a portion of the time that he was in the recovery room. Parr's presumption is that all appropriate and possible measures to secure the area were undertaken immediately upon the arrival of additional Secret Service personnel at the hospital.
This concludes the account of the interview with SAIC Jerry S. Parr.
April 6, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA: [Redacted], PPD at George Washington University Hospital by Inspector Steve Gannon

This interview is the account of SA [Redacted] relative to the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

[Redacted] has been performing as the Acting Shift Leader or ATSAIC since the departure of ATSAIC Dan Miller from PPD in early January, 1981. [Redacted] recalled that he and four other members of the PPD, were enroute to work at the White House via Shift Wagon. They were traveling southbound on the George Washington Memorial Parkway at approximately 11:00 when they monitored radio transmissions over the shift wagon radio that shots had been fired. According to [Redacted]'s recollections the transmission to that effect was given by ATSAIC Ray Shaddick of PPD. They continued to monitor radio transmissions and shortly thereafter heard the comment by SAIC Parr that Rawhide is okay.

A short time thereafter they heard a subsequent transmission that - We're going to GW Hospital. [Redacted] and others immediately began with lights and sirens to head for GW Hospital. According to [Redacted]'s calculations, he assumes he and his shift arrived at the hospital at approximately 30 seconds to a minute after President Reagan arrived. [Redacted] and his fellow shift members immediately entered the emergency room.

[Redacted] assigned SA [Redacted] to take a post at the entrance of the emergency room and he directed [Redacted] to locate a hospital employee who could assist him in controlling access into the emergency room. [Redacted] then directed SA [Redacted] to find out from the hospital what area was designated as a command post and
...other case was able to find that information in time. With that in mind, he was necessary to set up a command post. On further direction, he directed Shaddick to locate a copy of the hospital survey and directed Shaddick to obtain the K-400's from the lineworker to be utilized in the command post.

Shaddick located K-400's and based on the conversation and information relayed to him by Shaddick and others that the President would go from the trauma room there he was at that time to a fourth floor intensive care unit. He sent CA to that location with directions that he should make advance preparations for the President to occupy space there. He told that as soon as any additional special agents arrived at the hospital he could send them to K-400's for posting.

Simultaneously, it is Shaddick recollection that Shaddick received information that the President was going to be taken to the operating room. He proceeded to the operating room where he donned a surgical gown and scrubbed up in order that he could remain in close proximity to the President during the operation.

Shaddick then began to observe arrival of additional agents from the Washington Field Office. He directed CA from that office to go outside and assist Metropolitan Police in setting up exterior security.

An arrived on the scene very shortly thereafter and he directed him to proceed to Shaddick location on the fourth floor to assist Shaddick at that location.

Shaddick then began disseminating information that any agent arriving on the scene should report to room 2300 in order to form a pool of agents for subsequent dispatch...
and use as needed within the hospital.

Shortly thereafter the President was taken to the operating room rather
than to the fourth floor. It was recollections that NSAIC Shaddick
continued to direct the activities of agents and other persons immediately
around the President until he was taken into the operating room.

At the conclusion of the operation on the President, the President was
removed to the recovery room adjacent to the operating room and and his
shift effectively relieved Shaddick and his shift personnel. The President
stayed in the recovery room for the duration of the night. and his
shift remained on post in the recovery room area until the normal relief
affected by the Midnighters during the evening hours.

According to the post which had been established at the intensive
care unit on the fourth floor under the direction of SA were dis-
continued or at least cut back at approximately 9:30 PM when it was determined
that the President would not be moved to the intensive care unit that night.

At a subsequent point, does not recall precisely when, Deputy
Special Agent in Charge DeProspero, PPD, directed that SA should
be charged with the advance at the hospital.

recalls no specific problems from any directions except the possibility
that the general public may have been distressed as a result of not being able
to get into the hospital for their regular visits with patients who were already
in position at the hospital at the time the President was admitted. He further
added that crank calls began to flood the hospital almost immediately on the
arrival of the President. It is his recollection that at least two such calls
came in while the President was in the trauma area of the emergency room.
This concludes the interview of SA.
April 5, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Steven Parsley at OD-PO's Office by
Inspectors Kevin J. Moulihan and Roger Counts

This interview was dictated by Inspector Moulihan.

SA Parsley was assigned as the security room agent for the visit. At
approximately 10:30 AM on 3-30-81 he was advised to proceed to a noon
briefing at the Hilton Hotel to be conducted by SA [blurred]. At the briefing
Parsley was advised that he would be the security room agent. He was provided
the appropriate paperwork by SA [blurred] include a copy of the survey, the
post assignment log, protectee log (even though the CP was in [blurred], and
the ID book.

He recalled an ID briefing by SA McCarthy wherein he was advised that
there was narrative intelligence information for this visit. OD was not
present at this briefing. Counter-sniper team was there at the briefing
by Agent [blurred]. He was provided a post diagram by SA [blurred] and was advised
of [blurred] preference to use agents names for the posts instead of numbers.

SA personally posted some of the SA's to include SA Parsley. The
security room was in Convention Room No. 1. There were two radio consoles,
two signal drops and a hotel phone in the room. The detail was to be on
[blurred] frequency, [blurred] frequency for the posts, and [blurred] frequency to
serve as a backup frequency for the detail.

SA [blurred] was to be on [blurred] frequency, SA [blurred] on [blurred] frequency,
and the Counter-sniper team on [blurred] monitoring [blurred] frequency.

Then he established the posts had been posted, SA Parsley conducted
radio checks with SA [blurred] SA [blurred] counter-sniper team, the C-S response
team and SA Russ Miller who was posted at the VIP entrance to the hotel. Then
he copied the departure, he advised SA [blurred] and then relayed the situation report.
from SA 1H to the detail. His recollection of this situation report was 10-12 press, 30 public, all contained, everything clear, come on in.

SA Ramsey estimates that it was approximately 2:25 when he first knew anything was wrong. He heard on one of the frequencies "AOP AOP". He believes SA 1H was transmitting but he could not be sure. At that point he marked down the time from his watch as being 2:27 PM. He then heard another voice, perhaps SA 1H, saying "AOP AOP".

He made a conscious effort to stay off the air and monitor the transmissions. He recalled SA 1H frequency requesting ambulances. He directed SA 1H, frequency where he repeated his request but by the time this happened 1H advised to disregard the request as they were arriving at that time.

He then called DAD Bechtle and advised him that it was his information that shots had been fired, that the President was all right, that an agent, a police officer and some other person were allegedly shot.

He called SA 1H on the air and asked him to landline the security room or come to the room whenever possible.

He then got on the air and advised all agents on indoor posts to hold until further notice.

He received a telephone call from ASAIC DeProspero, FPD, asking for a situation report.

SA 1H entered the security room during this conversation and confirmed that one SA, a cop, and a staff man had been shot and there was a possibility that two agents were down. He passed this information to DeProspero.
SA entered the security room and Ramsey sent him to the departure area to be sure that the crime scene was being preserved.

He got back on the air and advised all indoor posts once again to report to the briefing room. He monitored the transmissions of the detail on frequency and then called ASAIC Burger, WFO, and asked that he dispatch case agents to the scene.

He advised DAD Bechtle that in fact bodies were down at the site and he advised Bechtle at that time that one agent was down, one police officer and one staff person.

SA went to the briefing room and asked agents if they had information to give. The ones who had no information were checked off on the list.

It then became a concern to establish a location of SA's Russ Miller, and as much as the original information had two agents being shot. It was later ascertained that SA Miller made the follow-up car as it departed the T street area and SA who was in one of the ambulances with one of the personnel removed from the scene.

SA returned to the security room and advised that the crime scene was totally under control. SA Ramsey estimates that this was 8-10 minutes after he sent to the crime scene. This would establish the time of total control of the crime scene at approximately 2:45 PM.

When he monitored the traffic regarding the Presidential motorcade going to the hospital, he picked up the house phone to dial the hospital number contained in the survey report. Prior to completing the dialing of this call, he was advised by someone that the call to the hospital had been made.
He used the house phone because he did not wish to tie up the signal lines coming into the security room.

He stayed in the security room in the hotel until he returned to
AD-PO's office at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 PM that evening. He returned
home at 8:00 PM, changed clothes and ate and returned to Headquarters to
man the crisis desk.

Agents b7c and b6 arrived at the hotel at an unknown time.

He briefed them upon their arrival. SA b61b7c had told him that the
weapon used was a .22 caliber weapon. He then heard a news report indicating
the Secret Service had released the information that the assailant used a
.38 caliber weapon. He then called DAD Bechtle to advise him that that
information was incorrect and that a .22 caliber weapon was used.

DeProspero called again and wanted to know the caliber so that he could
pass that information to the hospital personnel. Ramsey advised DeProspero
that a .22 caliber weapon was used by the assailant.
April 6, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA 661672, at the Office of Inspection
by Inspector Jonathan Foushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Force
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Foushee)

Agent 661672 entered on duty with the Secret Service October 4, 1971 at the
Norfolk Field Office. On July 1, 1975 he was transferred to PSD. On March 11,
1978 he was transferred to the Office of Protective Operations and on July 1,
1979 he was transferred to the Presidential Protective division.

Agent 661672 advised that he was assigned as the 621672 in the follow-up
on on March 30, 1981 and that upon arrival #1 at the Hilton Hotel he exited the
follow-up and he assumed the front right fender of the limousine. They went
into the VIP entrance. He worked the President to the elevator. After the
President got on the elevator and the doors were closed, he and the remainder
of the shift went down the stairs to the next level which is actually the
ballroom level and at the elevator landing there is a small lobby which is
beside the President's holding room.

Agent 661672 advised that the White House advance agent took him and 661672 to be pre-posted. 661672 advised that when you face the audience from the stage,

661672 advised that he assumed this post only a few minutes before the President came
out for his introduction.

661672 advised that while standing at this post he did observe some of the
people from the audience coming out and getting into the press pool area and
taking photographs. He also saw one person who got under the rope to take
pictures; however, an agent responded to the subject and made him get back behind the rope.

After the President's speech, the President moved out on to the stage area and worked the President off the stage to the VIP holding room area. As best that he could remember the President did not go into the holding room. The host had other people there that wanted to meet the President.

After the President got on the elevator, and the rest of the shift went back up the stairs to the next level and were there waiting when the President exited the elevator.

then moved to the VIP door leading out on to the street. advised that he went outside to take up the on the limousine and for crowd surveillance. He was out there maybe 30 seconds or less before the President came out of the VIP door.

Prior to the first shot being fired, advised he was looking out across T Street to the crowd. As soon as he heard the first shot fired, he turned to his right and proceeded back towards the rear door to the limousine. That's when he saw Parr and Shaddick pushing the President inside the limousine. A second or two later he saw Shaddick pushing Parr's feet into the limousine and Shaddick shut the door. At the point that Shaddick was closing and locking the rear door, was standing right next to Shaddick. advised at this point he had already seen agents grabbing a subject in the crowd by the roped off area. At this point advised he was on the sidewalk looking over the limo to see if there was anyone else involved.

The limo began pulling away and again looked out over T Street and again in the direction of where this suspect was being subdued. He saw at this point that the agents needed no help with this subject. He remembers at the time
thinking the guy being subdued was probably in his 20's and had blonde hair.

He advised that he then stepped upon the sidewalk and at his feet was the body of Jim Brady. He knelt by Brady and asked Brady - Can you hear me? and Brady said - Yes, in a gurgling sound.

He advised at this time he caught a glimpse of the follow-up leaving and realized he would not be able to catch the follow-up and he had committed himself to Brady.

He remembers a medic came over and assisted him with Brady. He remembers telling the medic that Brady had been shot in the head, taking it right in the face, appeared to have been hit in the eye. He was bleeding from his eye, nose, mouth and had been placing handkerchiefs handkerchiefs over the wound. At some point in time the medic got a compress and he rolled Brady over on his back and the medic applied the compress to the wound. At this point, he remembers getting up to get an ambulance and he saw a stretcher only a few feet away. He asked some other subject standing there to help him move the stretcher and they moved it over next to Brady's body. They put Brady on the stretcher. He remembers that the medic, himself, and some other individuals helped carry Brady out to the ambulance and he told to ride in the ambulance with Brady to the hospital.

He recalls then going back to the police officer and he remembers that someone had torn the shirt off the police officer and since it appeared there was plenty of help with the officer, he then looked around for what shift agents were still left. He found and they decided they better get back to the White House. He remembers seeing , by the VIP entrance and asked to stay at the scene, be sure the scene was secure,
that there was a police inspector there on the scene, and that for coordinate with the inspector in order to secure the crime scene. He also told that the three of them were on their way to the White House.

advised he asked several agents if they had a car that they could use but the agents said they were in car pools and, therefore, did not have a car. At this point advised that they decided to take a cab to the White House and they walked up to Connecticut Avenue and caught a cab. They got as far as 17th and Pennsylvania and because of the heavy traffic, they got out of the cab and ran to

At this point advised he still thought the President had gone directly to the White House; however, when he reached there were no shift agents there and the locator board read "GW". His first thought was that maybe the President had gone to the hospital to see McCarthy and Brady. Then he heard Bobby DeProspero say the President had been injured and for them to get a car from the north grounds and to go to GW Hospital.

He does recall taking a station wagon from the north grounds and some of the iso rode with him.

Upon arrival at GW Hospital he went to the emergency room and reported to their shift leader Shaddick. Shaddick told them that the President had been hit and for them to make sure that the hall leading to the emergency room was clear and not let anyone in.

advised he then went to the rear front door of the emergency room which actually leads onto the street area in order to secure the door but a nurse came to him and said there was a man using a phone at the nurses' station and she did not think he belonged in there. This was only a few feet away
and, therefore, he went to the nurses' station, saw the subject talking on
the phone, and asked him if he worked at the hospital. The subject just
kept on talking and ignored [REDACTED]. He asked the subject for identification
and while continuing to talk on the phone, he pulled out his wallet and
began showing some identification. He remembers the subject saying something
to the effect - I'm so and so - but he does not remember what the fellow actually
said his name was, something to the effect he was with ABC or CBS. At this
point the subject continued to talk on the phone and [REDACTED] took the phone
out of his hand and told him the hospital wanted him out and at the same time
a hospital administrator of some sort was saying the same thing, that the man
would have to leave.

At this point the subject told [REDACTED] he had every right to be there and
he should not be treated this way. The administration official stepped between
the subject and [REDACTED] and escorted the subject out the front entrance.

At this point [REDACTED] advised he went back to the door of the emergency
room.

Within a few minutes other law enforcement officers and agents had secured
the front entrance and he went to the command post, Room 2500, where he saw
[REDACTED] operating the radio. He asked [REDACTED] if he could be of any assistance
and [REDACTED] advised him that he had things in hand at that location. [REDACTED] then
remembers going out into the lobby of the administration suite and [REDACTED] asked
one of the hospital administrators what rooms they had available for the
President after surgery and also told them that the Secret Service would need
a room for the Secret Service in close proximity to the President. He was
told by one of the hospital officials that they had three rooms in intensive
care section on the 4th floor. 

at this point told he was going to the 4th floor and make
the necessary security arrangements.

went to the 4th floor and when he got there, Special Agent was already there. remembers telling the room numbers that
would be used after the surgery, and he told to go ahead with the security
arrangements and that he, would get started with identification of the
persons on the floor and prepare an access list. He then told one of the nurses
on the floor that he would need the names, dates of birth, etc. of the people
who had access and should be working on the 4th floor.

then called Room 39 and requested an ID kit and he advised that
within ten minutes or so, the ID kit was brought to him, and along
with the hospital staff began putting together an access list.

that advised that at approximately 9:00 PM he was told that the
entire shift had to go to the Washington Field Office for an interview and
at this point he gave the ID kit and list to Agent and as far as he
was concerned he then became the site agent. then proceeded to
WFO where he was interviewed by the FBI.

also recalled that when he knelt down by James Brady, he saw
a .38 caliber pistol lying by Brady's head, that he recalls telling Agent
to watch the gun by Brady's head, don't let anybody have it.
Sometime later advised him that a police officer said that the gun belonged to him and had checked the police officer was in uniform, did not have a gun in his holster and : okay, give the .38 back to him.

also advised that as far as he is concerned the only shots fired came from the subject that was being subdued in the crowd by the roped off area, no other place.
April 6, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA 60157c PPD, at the George Washington University Hospital, by Inspector Steve Gunson.

This interview is the account of 60157c's recollections of the aftermath of the assault on President Reagan which occurred on March 30, 1981 at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

60157c began his account by stating that he as well as other members of his shift (60157c), those members including 60157c were enroute to the White House for their normal shift relief. They were on the George Washington Memorial Parkway heading in a southbound direction when they overheard transmissions from Ray Shaddick in the Presidential follow-up car to the effect that shots had been fired. They heard subsequent comments in transmission that they were enroute to GW Hospital, they being the Presidential motorcade, and subsequent transmissions again from Shaddick that they, meaning Shaddick et al, "needed people."

60157c estimates that approximately 2-3 minutes after the President's arrival at the George Washington Hospital, he and his colleagues arrived at the same location. On arrival they immediately entered the emergency room of the hospital. They observed NSAIC Shaddick and others in the back area of the emergency room and 60157c, on his own volition, stopped at a point and took up a post in conjunction with 60157c and began to screen people seeking access into the trauma area of the emergency room. The trauma is—that area is that point where the President was at that particular time.

It should be noted that 60157c or any others knew specifically what the President's problem might or might not be, whether he was in fact injured.

60157c does not recall with certainty but thinks that 60157c
proceeded on into the area of the emergency room immediately occupied by the President.

His recollections are that very shortly after entering the emergency room approached Ray Shaddick, conferred with him, returned to area, and directed to assist in the arrival of the First Lady. went outside and complied with directions, escorted the First Lady into the emergency room and into a holding area where she remained briefly before being admitted to the area occupied by the President.

then rejoined and continued to assist him in screening people seeking access to the emergency area occupied by the President.

then directed to accompany a hospital employee to the intensive care unit. indicated that his information was to the effect that the President would be taken to the intensive care unit at some point not too far in the future. The female hospital employee escorted to the intensive care unit on the fourth floor and introduced him to a Doctor.

made quick visual observations of the situation and had a quick conference with during which a room was designated for use of the President. Subsequently was joined by. began to make efforts to establish an access list of persons who would need access or who would be admitted into the emergency-intensive care unit. determined where the appropriate posts should be for the area in which the President was anticipated to occupy and as agents arrived on the scene, he assigned them to those posts. His recollections are that
and SA were the initial ones to report to him and occupy the post he had established.

At approximately 8:30 and others, both Secret Service Agents and hospital personnel, met and conferred as to what the arrangements should be relative to the intensive care unit. During the course of that meeting general rundown was given to Pat Miller as to what had done up to that point.

In a subsequent meeting occurring at approximately 9:30, it was determined that the President would not spend that evening in the intensive care unit and as a consequence the posting at the intensive care unit was downgraded significantly.

does not recall precisely but thinks he was not directed to be the hospital advance agent from PPD until sometime on Tuesday, March 31.

was directed by ASAIC Johnny Guy and Deputy ASAIC DeProspero at approximately 2:00 AM on the morning of March 31 that he should discontinue and return in time to handle the arrangements and activities for the President's move from the recovery room to the intensive care unit. complied with their directions and returned to the hospital at approximately 5:00 AM. Sometime between 6:00 and 8:00 AM the President was moved from the recovery room to the intensive care unit. The measures taken by the previous day and posts established by him at that time were instituted in the early morning hours prior to that movement. The President remained in the intensive care unit for the duration of Tuesday, March 31, and on mid-day, Wednesday, April 1, the President was moved from the intensive care
unit to a room on the third floor of the hospital.

This concludes the interview with SA b76. But an additional interview is anticipated with SA b70 wherein further elaboration as to his specific activities and security arrangements in the intensive care unit will be determined.
April 6, 1981 - 2nd Interview of SA 661674 FPD, at the Office of Inspection by Inspector Jonathan Poushee and Assistant Inspector Richard Forcee

(This interview was dictated by Assistant Inspector Forcee)

On March 30, 1981, while at the White House and prior the movement at the Washington Hilton Hotel, he was assigned as the 621674 by Shift Leader Ray Shaddick. Prior to leaving the White House, he learned of his assigned duties as 621674 and his specific duties upon arriving at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Upon arriving at the Washington Hilton Hotel, the vans stopped at the curbside on T Street where they were met by the White House press office advance man 661674. The press pool immediately went to the area of the rope line which was located between the VIP entrance and the public T Street entrance and observed
that the President had already entered the VIP entrance. Then directed them to the public T Street entrance, into the lobby, down a flight of stairs, in through a public entrance into the ballroom. Agent did not notice any agents at the door; however, he stated there could have been an agent at the door. They walked around the outer edge of the ballroom to a position near stage right, then down three steps and across to a position near the center of the room. Seated at the tables in the area that they walked across was the writing press. In front of the press pool was a rope line at the stage or dais area where the President was located. The public was seated behind them and were separated by a rope across the room. There was an aisle approximately 15 feet wide stretching from the press area to the rear of the ballroom. A problem which the staff encountered was the public coming up the aisle to the press area taking pictures; however, it did not effect the security in the ballroom. Approximately ten minutes prior to the ending of the President's speech, the press pool moved back to the area of stage right from the center of the room.

After the President's speech and the crowd began their applause, the press pool along with Agent began leaving the ballroom. They walked upstairs and exited the same T Street entrance which was difficult to do because the convention people were also trying to exit the ballroom and go outside to see the President. Once outside, Agent turned to the right and walked on the driveway next to the curb up to the rope line which was located between the T Street public entrance and the VIP entrance. During this time the press pool were also attempting to get into the same area.

Agent stated that when he was within two or three steps of the rope line, he heard the first shot immediately followed by a second shot, a pause, then a series of additional shots. He immediately looked to the right and saw a gun being
held in a hand out from the crowd in the rope line area next to the wall. He could not say whether the gun was being held with one or two hands. SA B7C immediately ran around the corner of the crowd and observed a blonde haired man being grabbed by agent Dennis McCarthy and police. Agent B7C immediately went to assist Agent McCarthy in subduing the subject. Agent B7C, WFO Coordinator, got to the group just ahead of Agent B7C. Once there, Agent B7C noticed that Agent McCarthy already had one handcuff on the left wrist of the subject and was attempting to get the cuff on the other wrist. Also during this time Agent B7C noticed that the subject held his head down in a very low position. Agent B7C grabbed his head and attempted to hold it up. Someone in the group kept shouting "Get the gun, get the gun". Agent heard the suspect say "I don't have the gun, I don't have the gun". Agent did not observe the gun during the struggle. Also during this time he noticed the Presidential Limousine pulling away from the Hilton. He also suggested that they handcuff the subject in the front inasmuch as they were having trouble getting his hands behind him. Agent B7C also remembered an older man to the rear of the subject attempting to hit him. After the subject was handcuffed, Agent B7C assisted in taking him to a police cruiser whose door would not open. They went to a second police cruiser, however, Agent B7C got separated from the group while enroute to it.

After the subject was being transported to the police station, Agent B7C went to Mr. Brady to see if he could be of any assistance. During this time a person from the crowd showed him a card stating that he was a medic. This person also assisted in rendering first aid to the injured.

Agent B7C then assisted in clearing the area so that the ambulances could load the injured people. One ambulance arrived but stayed on T Street.
A second ambulance arrived and drove into the driveway between the VIP entrance and the public T Street entrance of the hotel. He believed that Agent McCarthy was loaded first into the ambulance in the driveway, however, when it drove straight toward the public entrance under the canopy it became involved in a traffic jam and was held up. In the meantime the first ambulance which had arrived on the scene loaded Mr. Brady and had departed for the hospital.

After the ambulances had departed Agent b7c got in touch on the radio with agents b2167c. The three of them attempted to secure transportation from other post standers at the Hilton; however, they were unsuccessful. They walked up T Street to Connecticut Avenue where they took a taxi to the White House. They were still under the impression that the President was not injured and had returned to the White House. When the cab got to 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, it was stalled in traffic so the three of them ran to b7c.

Upon arriving at b7c, they learned that the President had gone to the hospital and a few minutes later learned that he had been injured as a result of the gunfire at the Hilton Hotel. The three of them along with Shift Leader b616x, b2167c, and possibly another b2167c agent, drove to the George Washington Hospital in one of the Marquis Station Wagons parked on the north grounds.

On arriving at the hospital they established contact with Shift Leader Shaddick. Agent b12167c b2107c had him and himself went to the outside entrance of the hotel to secure that area.

Agent b7c advised that prior to the movement to the Hilton Hotel he was never told there would be or was a press area on the outside. He also stated that none of the press complained to him about anything prior, during, or after the movement to the hotel.
His last contact with the White House press office advance man was inside the ballroom when advised them that they should leave to go outside for the departure. He has not seen since that time and has received no complaints from him.

Agent advised that all the gunfire he heard at the Hilton Hotel came from the rope area on the sidewalk between the VIP entrance and the public T Street entrance.

Agent advised that he has been the lead advance agent or a counterpart from WFO approximately ten to fifteen occasions at the Hilton Hotel while assigned to PPD and the Washington Field Office. On all occasions the limo has been parked at an angle as it was on Monday, March 30, 1981. He never recalled the limo being parked immediately outside the VIP entrance. On most of the visits the rope barrier was placed as it was on Monday; however, he remembered on one foreign dignitary visit which he thought to involve a dignitary from China, that he placed the rope barrier to the right of the public T Street entrance. It was done on that occasion due to the size of the crowd.

Agent stated that approximately ten minutes past from the time of the gun shots until the three of them caught a cab to the White House. From the time they caught the cab from Connecticut Avenue and T Street to the White House to George Washington Hospital approximately 15-20 minutes had elapsed. He also stated that Agent  secured the left side of the emergency entrance driveway at the hospital while he secured the right side of the driveway.
April 4, 1981 - 1st Interview with Officer 66, Uniform Division,
at George Washington Hospital by Inspector Roger Counts and Assistant Inspector
Richard Force
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

Officer 66 received a work sheet advising of the Hilton assignment
sometime on Friday (3-27-81) afternoon.

On Saturday he started to write his preliminary report while on stand-by
at Room 10, DOB. He tried to contact SA 67 but couldn't locate him.

On Sunday he was on a day off.

On Monday he reported to 1310 L Street at 7:00 AM. There were no supervisors
available. He received a call from 67 and was told to contact AD-PO
for official notification. He then called Gary Yauger and determined the
assignment was firm.

At about 9:00 AM he talked to SA 67 about the details of the visit which
he needed for his survey. They have a "Black Book" with copies of general
surveys for frequent stops.

At 11:30 AM he and Officer 66 departed 1310 L Street. They reported
at about 12:00 Noon to the Adams Room for a briefing. He provided copies of
his survey to the C/S Response Team and to SA 66.

He and his partner went to the hotel security office for an escort to the
Upon arriving at the 62, they found the door unlocked.

He has worked this same assignment on three or four previous occasions.

They were in position by 12:50 PM, on the 62 of the
62 of the hotel above the VIP entrance. This is about ten
stories up.
They contacted the security room and the C-S Response Team by radio and began to observe the surrounding buildings. They are unable to see view the actual arrival and departure area without lying down and peering over the edge, which they did not do. They monitor both frequencies.

He saw nothing unusual. He remembers seeing the lead motorcycles turn from Florida Avenue on to T Street. He recalls nothing unusual about the arrival.

While the President was inside, they took about a ten minute break in the elevator room to get out of the rain.

They returned to their position and he heard the call to 872 that they're coming out.

He heard the shots fired and had a good idea where they came from. His first thought was that it was a Uzi.

He grabbed his 872 (rifle), chambered a round, and ran to the and looked over. He recognized Tim McCarthy on the ground. He also saw the other two down and the struggle. His next thought was of snipers. He scanned the windows of buildings across the street. His partner moved to a new position near the edge with his rifle.

saw one motorcycle down and remembers the tail end of a car, either the limo or follow-up, turning on Connecticut Avenue.

He and his partner held their positions until instructed by radio to report to the Adams Room. This was 15 minutes or longer after the incident. The crowd across the street was about 40-50 people.
He heard "AOP" called several times over the radio. Also heard the calls of going to the White House and then to the hospital.

His instructions to the C-S Response Team had been to remain in the area of the VIP entrance.

He thought he recalled a TV remote camera set-up on the roof. He also recalled seeing a UD Canine Officer at the scene.

has written reports available on the 4th floor at 1310 L Street and will send them to Inspection.
April 4, 1981 - 1st Interview with Officer 66167c

Division at George Washington Hospital by Inspectors Roger Counts and Assistant Inspector Richard Foxx

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

Officer 66167c was notified of his assignment on Saturday (3-28-81) by Officer 66167c who was to be the team leader. 66167c tried to contact SA 66167c at this time but was unsuccessful and they began the preliminary report.

He was on an RDO on Sunday.

66167c was able to contact SA 66167c on Monday morning.

66167c reported for duty at 9:00 AM on Monday. He and 66167c departed 1310 L Street at 11:30 AM and attended the briefing at the hotel at 12:00 Noon.

There was no adverse intelligence and he does not recall anyone from MPD being present.

They talked to SA 66167c and the response team and gave them copies of their report.

They then went to the Security Office (hotel) to get an escort to the roof. They were escorted by a lieutenant and were in position by 12:50 PM.

They began observation of the surrounding buildings. 66167c took the buildings to the right and 66167c to the left. There was a small crowd of 7-8 across the street.

The motorcade arrived about 1:53 PM. He had seen the motorcade make the turn at Florida and "1st".

While the President was inside they stepped back under cover for about 20 minutes.

They then went back to their position. They were unable to see the motorcade
from where they were located. They did hear a radio call that the President was coming out.

Three or four minutes later he heard the shots. They appeared to come from the ground below them.

Grabbed his rifle, chambered a round, and took a prone position facing Connecticut Avenue.

came to a kneeling position to scan the area. He saw the MP officer down. He also remembered seeing the cars leaving while he was getting his rifle.

About 30 minutes later they got a call to return to the Adams Room. He had been monitoring frequency but does not remember hearing anything else.

At the Adams Room roll call was held and they were asked if they had heard or seen anything. He was later contacted by the FBI over the phone.

This was first movement at the Hilton.
April 4, 1981 - 1st Interview with SA Danny Spriggs at the Washington Field Office by Inspector Roger Counts and Assistant Inspector Richard Forces

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

Spriggs reported for duty around 9:00 AM to 9:30 AM on March 30, 1981.

He checked with SA 66167C and was told he was to work the Hilton as an ID team with SA D. V. McCarthy. McCarthy was to be the P.I. Coordinator.

SA 66167C advised him there was to be a second ID team composed of SA 66167C.

Spriggs was going to try to ride to the Hilton with 66167C. McCarthy had something else to do before going to the hotel.

Later advised him that someone had called in sick and an additional assignment had come up, so there would only be one team at the Hilton. 66167C said he had left a note for McCarthy, but he didn't get it, so he asked Spriggs to advise him.

Spriggs called the Intelligence Division and talked to SA R. A. Smith and advised him of the movement and asked for any intelligence. Smith said there was none.

Spriggs took 66 car and left WFO at about 11:30 AM, with SA's 66167C of Liaison Division.

He arrived at the hotel at about 11:50 AM and went to the Adams Room for the briefing.

He told McCarthy there was only going to be one team. He also gave SA 66107C the same information.

Spriggs advised McCarthy that there was no intelligence information, but McCarthy already had the information.

McCarthy advised everyone at the briefing that there was no intelligence.
Spriggs and McCarthy accompanied SA while he posted the agents. They went to almost all inside posts.

They next took a position at the main entrance to the ballroom and observed the guests as they entered.

He recalls McCarthy frisking one individual who had a bulge.

Spriggs and McCarthy went outside about 10-15 minutes before the arrival. They observed the crowd at the rope line and noticed CO-2 subject: McCarthy approached spoke to him, and looked him over. He was wearing only a shirt and slacks.

SA Russ Miller also mentioned the subject to them. was standing, by himself, to the rear of the crowd at the rope line.

Spriggs took a position at the rear of the crowd, near the Terrace entrance, to observe the crowd and for the arrival.

After the arrival, Spriggs and McCarthy went through the lobby to the public entrance of the ballroom and then took a position at stage right.

When the President left the ballroom, they walked behind him and then ran up the stairs to the VIP entrance.

They both stepped outside just ahead of the President.

Spriggs looked toward the rope line and saw McCarthy moved to the left toward the crowd.

Spriggs walked to the right and looked at the crowd across the street.

He heard the shots before he reached the curb.

He drew his weapon and looked to the rope line where he saw the suspect in a crouched position.

The suspect was still shooting. He could see the smoke.
Spriggs aimed his weapon at the suspect but couldn't get a shot.

He continued to move toward the suspect and saw Tim McCarthy fall. He
also caught a glimpse of SAIC Farr entering the car.

As he reached the rope line, the suspect still had the gun in his hand but
then it disappeared.

He grabbed the suspect's right wrist and began looking around for
or a second attack. He did not see

A civilian who had grabbed the suspect had become hysterical.

SA 67C came up and asked Spriggs to get the suspect's gun but Spriggs
couldn't see it.

They had some difficulty getting the suspect cuffed because of the number
of people who were holding him.

Spriggs helped move the suspect to a patrol car and he and McCarthy got
in the back seat with the suspect. SA 61b7C got in the front with MPD
Officer 61b7C

They told Officer 61b7C to go to the Central Cell Block and have some
officers meet them.

At the Central Cell Block, Spriggs searched the suspect and took his
personal belongings and put him in a cell.

SA McCarthy advised the suspect of his rights.

The only thing the suspect said on the way to the jail was that the cuffs
were too tight. They did not loosen them.

McCarthy stayed with the suspect while Spriggs discussed jurisdiction
with the MPD officers.
Spriggs called WFO and asked that a supervisor be sent over.

Director Knight called to advise that the FBI had jurisdiction.

When the Homicide Squad arrived, they all moved the suspect to the Homicide office. They wanted to interview the suspect alone but Spriggs refused.

Later, 3-10 FBI agents arrived and Spriggs inventoried the personal effects with them.

He went to the FBI-WFO and then to the hotel to get his car. After he returned to his office he was asked to draw up an affidavit for a 111 charge and then attended the first appearance before the Magistrate with KISAIC Densereau and SA Colo.

SA Spriggs has worked the Hilton as a post-stander or ID team on four or five occasions.

The arrangements have always been the same, including the rope line, which has never been a press area. He has seen it worked with one and two ID teams.

MPD sometimes sends intelligence teams on movements but Spriggs did not know how they decide to send a team or not send one. He thought the WFO-ID Squad advises MPD Intelligence. He did not observe any MPD Intelligence Team at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
April 3, 1981 - 2nd Interview of Special Agent 66167C, PPD, Lead
Advance for the visit of the President to the Hilton Hotel on March 31,
1981, at the Hilton Hotel by Inspector Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts.
(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA 66167C stated that on the Wednesday or Thursday prior to the incident, he
was told by AISAIC Shaddick that he would advance the Hilton stop for the
President and that he would have Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday to
conduct the advance.

On Thursday, SA 66167C pulled the general survey from the records of
the Presidential Protective Division and familiarized himself with the
contents of the survey. He said that another agent had an advance for the
President at the Hilton on that day and he monitored the preparations for
that stop. He was advised that there would be a walk-through of the Hilton
on Friday and that the staff advance person would be 66167C

On Friday, in the morning, he made general arrangements for the visit,
to include preparation of diagrams, etc.

At 10:30 AM on Friday, March 27, he proceeded to the Hilton Hotel to
have a walk-through with the various counterparts. He recalled that 66167C
was a little late but that he finally met 66167C who is the lead
advance agent from the White House, political type. He also met 66167C
who is the Hilton Convention Services Director and was advised that 4,000
people would be attending this event and the event was sponsored by the
Building Construction Trade Union. Also present was 66167C of the
host committee; however, he was also late. They met in the holding room
with TSD representative 66167C, WHCA representative 66167C, Agent
66167C who is the supervisor of security at the Hilton Hotel.
They went over the proposed itinerary and was advised that 15 VIP types would meet with President Reagan in the holding room for a photo opportunity prior to the President's speech. SA asked the host committee for the names of these people and was advised that these names would be available later in the day.

arrived at the holding room at that time. They explained the itinerary as they understood it.

During this meeting a question arose as to the location of the press inside the hall. produced a diagram showing the press area to the rear of the room. objected and stated that he wanted side shots and the standard press setup for the President. indicated that to do this a number of the people attending the function would not be able to see the podium or the President. continued their discussion of this point which ended with saying he would bring it back to the committee for a decision. to advise him what the final arrangements for the press would be inside the hall.

They did not discuss setting up a specific press pen area for the arrival or departure to the Hilton Hotel.

is a local representative of the Buildings Trade Union and can be reached at telephone No. 223-8700.

All of the above then proceeded through the hall, etc. for the standard walk-through. After the walk-through was completed, Agent waited for
a Xerox copy of the list of VIP's.

After receiving the Xerox copy of the VIP list, SA 66167C remained at the hotel reviewing posts and generally familiarizing himself with the building. He general oriented himself to the building and the posts including the kitchen, alternate arrival points, emergency exit points, etc. He had previously asked the hotel to update their employee list and recalls that on Friday he picked up a list of names at 66167B. Agent 67C recalls being at the hotel from prior to 10:30 AM to around 1:45 PM on Friday, March 27.

Also on Friday Agent 66167C made certain notifications regarding this visit.

At approximately 2:00 PM he called Gary Yauger in AD-FO and advised he needed 62; 67E he also provided the itinerary as known at that time to Gary Yauger.

He contacted 66167C, NFO, and made a notification to him of the visit. He advised that no assistance was provided to him at that time by Agent Lawton.

He was advised that 66167C would be the follow-up driver from FPD Transportation.

He spoke with 66167C of ID regarding the notification of this visit. From TSD was at the briefing; therefore, he made no telephonic contact with TSD regarding this visit. The same situation existed with 66167C, therefore, no telephonic communication notification was made. He telephonically notified Lieutenant Uniform Division, White House, Lieutenant Uniform Division, Foreign Missions, or the First Lady Detail and confirmed that the First Lady would not accompany the President to
the Hilton Hotel. He notified [redacted] of the White House Ushers' Office, and [redacted] of the White House Physicians' Office. He notified Captain [redacted] of the Washington, D. C. Fire Department and requested that the Fire Department provide inspectors from that department on site. He also requested an ambulance to report at approximately 1:15 PM on 3-30-81 to the Hilton Hotel. He also advised the Captain that there would be a briefing on 3-30-81 at the Adams Room at the Hilton Hotel. He notified Dispatcher [redacted], of the U. S. Park Police but made no request of Dispatcher Stratton. He notified Sergeant [redacted] of the counter-sniper team and requested counter-sniper assistance.

When he spoke to Agent [redacted], he recalled that [redacted] could not help SA [redacted] regarding the ID teams assigned; therefore, he gave SA [redacted] to SA [redacted], NFO, ID Squad.

[redacted] recalls asking SA [redacted] who would work the visit as far as ID was concerned. [redacted] did not know but told him he would send one team. [redacted] said words to the effect - Are you sure just one team? [redacted] advised that unless there was an intelligence type problem or unusual circumstances, they sent only one team.

Agent [redacted] stated that when he was in the ID Squad of NFO, they normally sent two teams to a visit of this type.

[redacted] stated he called [redacted] later in the evening and asked him to have [redacted] call [redacted] at home. [redacted] after this call to [redacted] and was advised of the final press arrangements for the inside of the hall. [redacted] also advised him that the press pool would not go with the President through the VIP entrance, the pool was to use the general press entrance which is the Terrrace Room entrance.
On Saturday he was at work at 6:10 AM at approximately 8:30-9:00 AM. Since the names had been provided from the hotel and the host committee, he filled out the ID request for a name check. Since he did not know the ID agents' names, he felt he should do it and get the names in the system.

Between 10:00 and 12:00 Noon he attended childbirth class with his wife which he had mentioned to ATLAIC Shaddick. He explained that Saturday was originally supposed to be his day off and that this class was scheduled. He informed us his wife is due within the next several weeks.

After the class he returned to the Hilton Hotel and did a complete walk-through of the site by himself. This included all the posts, the holding room, under the stage area, out to the emergency motorcade, etc. It was another general orientation of the hotel and its surroundings.

He attempted to contact 66167C security director, but he was not at the hotel. He did contact 66167C assistant, name unknown, and told him he would be in and around the hotel. SA 67C stated that he spent the majority of his time looking for alternate ways for the President to enter the hotel and attend his function at the International Ballroom. He recalls going to the employee entrance and walking around for a period of time and finally deciding that that was not an acceptable entrance for the President because he would have to walk too far through crowded corridors to reach the site. SA 66167C did a complete walk-through by himself one time. Then 66167C and the unknown assistant walked through the hotel together.

It was the second alternate arrival site that he looked at but decided was not acceptable. He went down to the hydraulic area under the stage with the assistant security man to 66167C and the security man showed him this area.
SA decided this was an agent post. He stated he felt that he knew where everything was located in the hotel and felt pretty good about his preparations for this visit.

He had a cup of coffee at the hotel, finished his name check list and left the hotel. He proceeded to the Intelligence Division via FOV and gave the name list. He told SA that he needed the results of the name checks by 9:00 AM on Monday or earlier, if possible.

He called the Washington Field Office sometime on Saturday and talked to SA who was assigned the physical advance with him. explained that there was a skeleton crew on duty at the WFO and he did not know how to research the situation and get back to him. did not return his call.

advised that he could not find the assignment sheet for the advance.

On Sunday, at approximately 10:00 AM, SA was on duty at the White House. He continued working on the survey, typing, etc. and recalled pulling blank sheets of the survey form. He filled in everything possible on that sheet with the exception of the ID advance agent's name and the Washington Field Office counterpart.

On Sunday he received a call from Mary Ann Gordon who is the transportation advance for this visit and advised her that the VIP door would be used which was satisfactory to Agent Gordon.

He called Washington Field Office again and spoke with Agent They still did not have the name of the advance person. He asked for SA Tom Dailey's
home telephone number. He called Dailey at home; however, his wife said that he was on duty at Andrews Air Force Base. He called WFO and they got Dailey on the air and Dailey passed through WFO the fact that SA 66 would be the assistant advance, Washington Field Office, counterpart to SA 6167C. Then asked SA 66 for SA 66's home phone number.

-- On Saturday he told 67C that he needed to contact MPD. Normally 66 would not do it inasmuch as Washington Field Office is the proper authority to contact the MPD. 67C told him that he would call the PD and make the necessary contacts. He stated he gave Hall the briefing time at the Adams Room and Green expected the police to be there. 66 stated that MPD used to be at all the briefings when Green was in WFO. --

On Sunday, 67C returned to his residence sometime late in the PM and continued working on his briefing format, copy of his notes attached. SA 66 and gave him a general rundown of the visit. 66 asked if he had done the Hilton stop before and 66 told him he had done three or four advances and been to several other functions at the Hilton.

He told 66 that 67C had contacted MPD, the names were run and that the ID agent's name was unknown for the visit.

He recalls leaving work sometime around 3:00 PM on Sunday.

He told 66 to meet him no later than 11:00 AM on Monday, 3-30-81, at the Hilton Hotel.
On Monday, 3-30-81, SA b7c was on duty at the White House between 7:30 and 3:00 AM in b2. He got the survey report finished and gave it to the shift. He recalls Agent b6167c attempting to get him on the air but when b7c attempted to return the radio transmission to b6167c, there was no contact.

b6167c called WFO again for the name of the ID agent. He asked for the ID Squad and spoke to b6167c.

b6167c gave b7c Dennis McCarthy's name as the lead ID agent for this visit. b6 put McCarthy on the phone and McCarthy advised b7c that there would be b8157c-156157c.

b6167c recalls being relieved upon hearing that there would be two ID teams because he was uncomfortable with doing the stop with one ID team.

He gave McCarthy a general briefing and advised him that there would be a briefing in the Adams Room at the Hilton Hotel.

On Monday he called Gary Yanger at AD-PO and advised him that Sergeant b7c of Counter-sniper team needed official notification from AD-PO to authorize their use. Yanger advised b7c that he would take care of this.

The names b6167c were given to SA b7c as the counter-sniper representatives.

b6167c in b2 Logistics, gave SA b6101c/02167c Green xeroxed the sheet and made post assignments, general assigning GS-13's to the "heavier" posts. He recalled that b6167c told him b2 would be assigned. SA b7c left b7c in a PPD station wagon which would be the follow-up car in the emergency motorcade.
SA 66167C field office car was to be the emergency limousine in the
emergency motorcade.

He met 66167C at the hotel and after some difficulty clearing the
emergency motorcade site left the 66167C's field office car and the follow-up
wagon from PPD at the appropriate location to use as the emergency motorcade.

Then he and SA 66167C walked through the entire site at approximately
11:00 AM.

66167C recalled picking up ID pins and the ID bee-from-R book from
82 prior to leaving the White House. He recalls seeing the teletype regarding
his name checks and checking that teletype for exclusions, there were none.

SA 66167C advised SA 66167C that he had combined four posts into two.
Since there was no food being served from the kitchen, he did not see the need
for the two additional posts.

Generally he oriented 66167C to the expected itinerary and movements of
the President and recalls that there were no problems. He recalls telling
66167C that post assignments would put the most senior guys in the most
responsible areas.

The briefing took place at approximately 12:00 Noon of the Adams Room
at the Hilton Hotel. He recalled giving ID pins to 66167C for the host
committee and the security people. He advised 66167C that these pins should
not be given to new employees because their names would not have been run
and that he specifically limited the number of pins to as few as possible.

At the briefing were the 62167C. No
police officers were present, and no representative from the fire department
attended the briefing. Prior to the briefing he saw SA Dennis McCarthy and
asked for the location of the second ID team. McCarthy advised him that they would not be coming. McCarthy asked him why and all McCarthy knew was that there was a change of plans.

Since the briefing was ready to start, there was no time to complain about the loss of one ID team; however, SA 67C recalls he did not like it. During the visit he recalled asking SA McCarthy to give an ID briefing. He recalled that the general intelligence information was negative for that visit.

When 67C was ready to start the briefing, everyone was there. He feels that he started the briefing at approximately 12:05 PM. He introduced the advance team to include the ID agents, TSD representative and EOD teams.

He gave a standard briefing from his notes, which are attached, asked if there were any questions and received none. He instructed the agents to have something to eat as they would be posted by 12:30 which is the time the EOD sweep began.

SA 67C personally posted several agents 66. Everyone else was posted by SA 66.

SA 66 took his group to the security room to leave coats, etc. and at that time gave Ramsey the CP package and a general briefing regarding the security room and its functions.

SA 66 then walked through the site dropping agents at posts as they arrived there. He explained to 66 the 15 VIP's to be in the holding room for a photo opportunity for the President. He advised him they would be escorted by pinned personnel from the host committee.
He briefed regarding the access through the door was posted at and gave him an access list. He insisted that the doors to the International Ballroom remain closed until the sweep was completed. He then decided that EOD would check briefcases and large purses prior to people gaining entrance to the room.

He then did a general walk-through re-evaluating the postings and made minor adjustments to the posts.

SA then went outside the hotel to the arrival area and met several uniformed firemen. He directed them to the security room and recalled that the lead fireman posted his own people at their normal positions.

He recalled giving SA the keys to the emergency motorcade which was also positioned near the ambulance which was to arrive at approximately 13:15 hours. He advised of the arrival and provided him the keys to the vehicles and a PT-400 for the ambulance.

While outside, he noticed Sergeant MPD. He asked if all his men were present and the sergeant told SA where he normally posts his people. impression was the sergeant was telling him where he posted his people and not asking for permission to post these officers. SA estimated that Sergeant. They arrived between 12:30 PM and 1:00 PM. SA agreed with the posting arrangement that Sergeant proposed.

SA then returned to the International Ballroom and walked through the posts again. The sweep had been concluded and was present when the sweep was concluded.
He recalled wanting to be sure that he was at the checkpoints when the doors were open to ensure that the EOD teams were checking the briefcases and large handbags, etc. At each checkpoint there was a Secret Service Agent, EOD team and a representative of the Sergeant-at-Arms of the host committee. He recalls no particular problems with the search of the items entering the ballroom. He recalls observing SA Dennis McCarthy watching the people coming in to the International Ballroom at the checkpoints.

SA 6017C recalled seeing several newspaper people outside of the press area inside the International Ballroom. He advised 6016C of this and 6016C told 6015C to straighten out the situation. 6010C handled this.

604C then went outside when he heard the departure on 60267C frequency.

When he arrived outside, he noticed several cameras were at a rope line; however, the general scene on the street was clear in his opinion. He noted that 605C or someone from his office had placed the stanchions for the general public area down the street from the VIP entrance. There were very few people at the arrival area, in his opinion, and he observed MPD performing their duties of watching the crowd, etc. He then heard sirens and a request on 601112 frequency for a situation report. His recollection of this situation report was approximately seven press, ten spectators, no problems, that the arrival was clear. The President arrived, went through the VIP entrance, down the elevator with 606C on the elevator. He stated that he was the last on and the first off the elevator as per procedures. He had previously advised SA Russ Miller that no press would follow the President down the VIP entrance. Miller was to redirect the press and/or pool through the Terrace entrance. SA 607C told SA 6015C to be in the holding room area so that he might take the shift to
their pre-designated posts.

The President had his picture taken with the 15 individuals in the holding room and while this was going on ATSAIC Shaddick went into the ballroom to observe the general security in place.

The VIP's were escorted from the holding room to the head table and after a short time the President then went from the holding room out into the hall.

SA 161 remained in the vicinity of the President, SAIC Parr, a ATSAIC Shaddick while the President was in the room. He recalled advising ATSAIC Shaddick how to reach the emergency motorcade. ATSAIC Shaddick was aware of the route to take.

SA 167 was also in this general vicinity.

SA 167 at the appropriate time notified ATSAIC 167 that the President may be coming out. The President exited the stage. SA 167 led the Presidential party to the elevator where he once again was the last on. 167 from the hotel operated the elevator.

SA 167 had previously gone upstairs and outside to check the departure area. He believes that this was four or five minutes prior to the Presidential departure. As 167 exited the VIP entrance, he immediately looked over the general area. He had an impression that the press pool was arriving at that time. 167 recalls peeling off to the left after leaving the VIP entrance in case the President decided to walk over to the press who were in the general public area.

He then heard the shots, saw bodies going down, noticed a hole in the glass
of the limousine and the door being closed. He also noticed a number of people on the assailant at the same time the cars were leaving the area. He recalled thinking that we needed an ambulance at that site and he called on the radio to SA 64167C with no contact. He then called the security room and advised that there were injured people down. He recalled an MPD officer asking 64167C for instructions and 64167C told him to keep all the people away from the scene. 64167C then ran up the hill towards the emergency motorcade where the ambulance was located and beckoned the ambulance to the VIP area.

His thoughts then turned to the FBI and the investigation which needed to be done. He collected himself at that time and advised the arriving police officers and the police officers on site to keep the crowd away from the site.

He went to Agent Tim McCarthy to see if he could help.

He recalls seeing SA 64167C with a small caliber handgun attached to his handcuffs. He then recalled the FBI arrived.

He called the security room and passed certain information to them regarding the scene. He advised several of the MPD officers that the FBI would be assuming jurisdiction for the site. At approximately the same time he noticed ropes going up around the crime scene. Evidence technicians, cameras, and investigators were arriving at that time. He checked with the security room for notifications made and Agent Ramsey in the security room advised him that the proper notifications had been made.

When he determined the crime scene was under control, he went to the security room to call MPD. When he returned to the scene, the area was totally secured and noticed that interviews were ongoing, of witnesses, etc.
He recalled SA arriving as the case agents from WFO. He assumed that when they arrived, they would take command of the crime scene and pointed out the FBI Agent on site to Agents Clatti and Sorrels.

He recalls the discussion with the FBI agent about the gun in Agent possession.

At this time, he decided to look himself over in case he had been injured.

He went to the Adams Room and was interviewed by the FBI at approximately 4:58 PM. He did a walk-through with the FBI at the site.

He returned to B2167 at 6:00 or 7:00 PM and then went to the Washington Field Office to see and was interviewed by AGIC Burger and someone else. He arrived home between 11:30 and 11:45 PM.
April 3, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA b6167c at the Washington Field Office by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

SA b6167c advised us that the Washington Field Office sent b6167c to the Hilton. There were three changes to the original list sent to SA 67c Dailey b6167c that SA 66167c was b6167c b2167c.

SA Dailey advised that the Protection Squad of WFO assigns all the b6167c except the ID personnel. He does not assign ID personnel without talking with the ID Squad leader.

He recalled that Gary Yaeger, AD-PO, asked for b2167c After reviewing the list of available personnel in the Washington Field Office, b6167c advised Yaeger he could provide only 16. SA Yaeger got the rest from Headquarters personnel.

He recalled that Mary Ann Gordon asked b6167c for a route car for this visit.
On 4-2-81 at 5:00 PM I spoke with Jim Huse, Liaison Division, and asked him for
1-the subpoenaed tapes in the possession of the FBI; 2-asked him if they had
subpoenaed the tapes of the arrival if so, obtain them also; 3-obtain any charts
that the FBI have in their possession of the crime scene; 4-determine if the
FBI had transcribed the notes of the agents’ interviews. The FBI had told our
agents they would have the notes of the interviews transcribed and typed and
our agents would be able to sign these statements.
FOR CHRON FILE ONLY  (Dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

On 4-2-81 at 5:10 PM I asked Dick Hartwig, Public Affairs, to contact any and all sources to get any still photographs from these sources which might aid in our investigation. I stated that we are not speaking about video tapes but still photographs.
April 2, 1991 - 1st Interview of CA Dennis Fabel at approximately 12:20 PM at the Office of Inspection, 1310 L St., N.W., Washington, by Inspectors Kevin F. Houlihan and Roger Coates

CA Fabel was the follow-up car driver for the movement of the President from the White House to the Hilton Hotel on 3-30-81.

At approximately 12:15 PM he arrived via POV at the Naval Observatory. He left the Observatory by official vehicle and proceeded to 1310 L Street, to pick up the normal follow-up for the movement that day. He drove this follow-up to the White House and recalls that it was raining; therefore, he left the top up.

The departure from the White House was approximately 1:45 PM which Fabel recalls as being the scheduled departure time. Upon arrival at the Hilton the limo pulled up to the VIP entrance and the follow-up stopped immediately after it. He recalls seeing upon arrival a marked APD cruiser at the top of the driveway blocking the driveway as per normal procedure.

After the President had left the motorcade and entered the Hilton Hotel via the VIP door, CA Fabel and others repositioned the follow-up and the motorcade. He believed that it took five to ten minutes to accomplish the repositioning of the motorcade.

CA 57C was the limousine driver that day and CA 57C returned to the follow-up car where he and Fabel remained while the President was inside the hotel.

CA recalls a hotel security lieutenant with a woman who he thought worked for the hotel. The woman wished to look at the Presidential limousine and the lieutenant asked CA Fabel for permission for her to do so. This was permitted
and he recalls several questions from the woman about general security, etc. The lieutenant asked where this woman could stand and SA Fabel directed her to the rope line set up to his right which, in his opinion, was a general public area which could be also used by the press.

He recalled that SA [redacted] pointed out a former QI which he described as a "screamer" to SA Fabel. SA Fabel kept the former QI under surveillance and recalls speaking with SA [redacted] regarding this former QI and pointing him out to him. The former QI was located near the rope line on the right of the follow-up car. Five or ten minutes prior to departure he started the follow-up car. He recalls that he began inching the follow-up car towards the rear bumper of the limousine. He had difficulty closing the cap inasmuch as the press pool had come out the general public entrance (Terrace Entrance) and were filtering between the limousine and the follow-up car. He recalls SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] in front of the follow-up car attempting to clear the area between the limousine and the follow-up car.

He heard the transmission from SA [redacted] an frequency that the President was leaving the Hilton Hotel. He

At this time Fabel was concentrating on the people in front of the follow-up car and inching towards the limousine. Then he heard shots, saw people scatter, and waited for [radio name] to return to the follow-up car. Fabel handed Chaddick the radio microphone and he recalls [radio name] immediately notifying [redacted] that shots had been fired.
The limousine took off and as soon as it was clear for SA Fabel to do so, he followed the limousine. He recalls the spare limousine swinging in behind the limousine as it was moving up T Street. He was on T Street moving towards his normal position prior to the Presidential limousine reaching Connecticut and taking his left hand turn.

SA Fabel stated that he did not "run the follow-up car" because there were people in the general area specifically between him and the limousine and for their safety he could not move the follow-up car more rapidly than he did.

He recalls as he proceeded up T Street SA 6167C jumped on the right side of the follow-up car. Someone else was on the follow-up car on the left side but he did not know who it was at that time.

He stated he overtook the spare within a block or so of Connecticut Avenue and that the spare dropped off the immediate rear position to the limo and allowed the follow-up car to take up its normal position. He then heard SAIC Parr make a transmission that they were proceeding to the White House. A short time later he heard SAIC Parr state that they could go to GM hospital instead of the White House. Upon this transmission he recalls the spare limousine taking the lead in front of the limousine. His recollection is that the spare limousine took the lead prior to the motorcade going into the tunnel on Connecticut Avenue near Dupont Circle.

He felt that there must have been some type of traffic control because the traffic on T Street and Connecticut was light or stopped. Fabel could also see a marked police cruiser ahead of the limousine and it was his impression
that it was leading the motorcade. When they reached Pennsylvania Avenue the
larger went straight and the limousine and follow-up went to the right towards
the hospital. He recalls that lights and sirens were used by the follow-up car
controlled by NSAIC Shaddick.

Then they arrived at the hospital SA Fabel noted that SA 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
was on site awaiting the arrival of the limousine when the motorcade arrived.

Upon arrival he called Horsepower and told 62, 63, 64 to send additional
people as soon as possible upon orders from NSAIC Shaddick. A very short
time later the portion of the 62, 63, 64, 65 arrived. He knows it was a very short time after his radio transmission
because he was still in the follow-up car which was still under the awning
of the emergency room. He directed the shift inside the hospital. The cars
were then driven onto Pennsylvania Avenue and placed on Pennsylvania near
22nd Street. This included the limousine the follow-up and the spare.

He stayed with these vehicles until they were repositioned on Pennsylvania.

Approximately 20-25 minutes after their arrival at the hospital, he recalled
that the Park Police brought barriers for the motorcade and the front of the
hospital.

He had a recollection concerning the ambulances and the persons taken
from the scene in these ambulances. He stated that ambulance No. 6 had Mr.
Bridy in the rear with SA 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 in this ambulance. Ambulance No. 5
had SA Jim McCarthy and someone else perhaps SA Williamson, 70. The ambulance
attendants for ambulance No. 5 were 66, 67, 68, 69, 70. A contact
number for these men is 745-2206.
Regarding traffic control for the motorcade after leaving the Hilton; Gala had no specific recollection regarding traffic control; however, it was his impression that the streets were pretty clean for the run to the hospital.

Prior to the President leaving the hotel he noticed SA #61576 on the sidewalk, SA Russ Miller at the VIP entrance, SA Williamson and SA Hobley outside of the VIP entrance.

He noticed nothing different regarding the arrival and/or departure from this site. He had advanced this site a couple of times and it was his impression that the hotel security people put up the ropes at the same location each time. When he did advance at this site there was no standard press pen set up for the arrival or the departure. His impression was that the ropes were for a general public area which could be used by the press. He made several movements to this hotel as a member of the shift and he recalls the same situation.

He noticed no canine. Uniform Division officer #61676 from the Uniformed Division Canine was there ten or fifteen minutes prior to departure; however, he did not recall if he had a canine with him.
April 2, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Nick Rolbin, NRO, at the Office of Inspection, 1310 L Street, N.W., Washington, by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Torer Counts. (This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

He stated that on Friday, March 27, he had received an assignment to cover the departure of the Vice President from Andrews Air Force Base at 7:55 AM on Monday, 3-30-81. Saturday and Sunday were his regular days off.

On 3-30-81 he completed his assignment with the Vice President at Andrews Air Force Base and returned to the Washington Field Office at approximately 10:15-10:30 AM. He was advised at that time that he had an assignment for the President at the Hilton Hotel. He was advised that PC PPD, was the advance agent and was conducting a briefing at the Adams Room at approximately 11:30 or 12:00 Noon at the Hilton Hotel. He recalls leaving NRO with SA PC PC PC and proceeding to the Hilton Hotel in time for the briefing by SA PC PC PC, which was at approximately 12:00 Noon in the Adams Room. No police officers from PPD were present. PC PC PC from hotel security was present (in and out).

He was assigned at the checkpoint of the east entrance Hall of Presidents which is located around the corner from the holding room used for that visit. SA PC PC gave him a list of VIP's who were to have access through his door for the holding room. It was his understanding that these persons were to be in the holding room prior to the President's arrival for a photo opportunity. As people designated on this list passed through his checkpoint, he circled their names. He provided a copy of this list to us during this interview.

He recollects that SA PC PC NRO, was the agent assigned to the holding room.
Upon the arrival of the President at the holding room he recalls having a conversation with SA b/16/00, FPD, at his post. Upon the departure of the President from the International Ballroom he closed the door to the east entrance Hall of Presidents thereby sealing the back of the Presidential entourage. After the President departed the area he and SA Lorenz had a short conversation maintaining their post as they spoke. They were on V2.10/2 frequency when they heard the transmission "NOP". 4/16/2 said something to the effect that we are not at Beltville and he and 4/16/2 decided to proceed to the departure area using the same exit as the President. They felt that the transmission "NOP" indicated some problem; therefore, they proceeded to the departure point. At the door of the VIP room they again heard the transmission "NOP".

SA Tobin placed his hand on his weapon, stepped through the door, looked to the left, and saw bodies lying on the street. He looked to his right and he saw a vehicle moving quickly up T Street; he looked straight ahead and saw a general confusion. He looked again to his left and saw a group of law enforcement personnel pushing what he assumed to be the assailant against the wall. He proceeded to the area where the assailant was being placed in custody and heard a request for a marked FPD cruiser. A Cruiser arrived, he opened the right front and right rear door, he entered the vehicle in the rear and attempted to open the left rear door inasmuch as the assailant was being brought to that side of the vehicle. He was unable to open this car and requested assistance from the FPD officer and they both attempted to open the car.
This was not possible; therefore, the group of law enforcement people with the assailant proceeded to another vehicle which Tobin was not able to get in.

He exited the cruiser he was in and noticed an ambulance proceeding in his direction on T Street from Connecticut. He assumed this was the ambulance that was under the control of SA 66 157C near the emergency motorcade. At that point he assisted other agents in crowd control and helped to get the ambulance to a location to move the wounded.

He recalls Agent 57C telling him that one of the people down was an agent and that he should get the agent into an ambulance. At this time Agent 57C gave him the Uzi that 57C was carrying because Wanko wanted to assist SA McCarthy who had been shot. Tobin attempted to open the ambulance door but was unable to do so, the attendant opened the door and SA McCarthy went into this particular ambulance.

He recalls that there was a period of time between the arrival of other ambulances and the arrival of this ambulance which came towards him from Connecticut Avenue. He told the ambulance attendant on seeing that we needed additional ambulances and the ambulance attendant told him that the Secret Service had already taken care of it. It is his recollection that there was a long time span between the arrival of the first and second ambulances. He stated that McCarthy went into the 1st, Brady in the 2nd and the policeman in the 3rd. He again went back to his task of crowd control at the scene. He removed an unauthorized young white male from the scene which he described as between 5'3"-5'9", very strong, medium to light brown hair, with casual clothes. He learned subsequently that this person was attempting to render first aid to Agent McCarthy and the other wounded individuals on the scene. Tobin stated that SA Williamson assisted him in removing this individual.
and Robin returned to this man and apologized to him for moving him from the scene but explained that no unauthorized personnel were permitted at this time.

Robin went back outside and he noticed the second ambulance taking Mr. Brady. It was his impression that McCarthy, the limousine and the follow-up were no longer on the scene. He noticed a Black plainclothes MPD officer with rope. He told the officer to cordon off the area and showed him generally that area should be cordoned off. The officer had assistants with him; therefore, Robin did not assist the officer in this task.

He then assisted other agents in and uniforms police personnel in preserving the scene as a crime scene. He then heard a transmission over $B_{12}$ frequency from the security room telling agents on duty to report to the Adams Room. He remained outside for several minutes and then proceeded to the Adams Room.

Regarding the briefing by Agent $B_{76}$, it was his recollection that it started sometime around 11:45-12:00 noon. He did not see uniformed police officers nor Hilton security at the briefing, although he did see $B_{62}$ chief of security at the hotel, in and out of the room during the briefing. He recalled the identification book was passed to all personnel.

He recalled that SA $B_{62,576,021,074}$ personally after the briefing.

He was placed on duty by SA $B_{62,576}$ but was not given the list of personnel to pass through his knot at that time. He advised him that he would return with the list of authorized personnel. Until he returned, SA $B_{62,576}$ advised Robin that no one would be allowed in or out of the door he was posted. $B_{62,576}$ returned in a very short time, gave the list to Robin and Robin then permitted
Page 6 - 1st Interview of SA Nick Robbin

Access for authorized personnel.

He recalled that after the transmission to return to the Adams room on 6/21/67, most agents left the area but he recalls SA bsbr remaining outside at the crime scene.

They were in the room for 45 minutes or so when they were dismissed. He does not recall who or when he was dismissed.

He, SA Miller and two others returned to the Washington Field Office. SA bsbr told them to remain in the Field Office pending FBI interview.
April 2, 1981 - 2nd Interview with SA b6, b6\textsuperscript{c} at the Washington Hilton Hotel by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts

(This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts)

b6

SA b6\textsuperscript{c} was the HFO Coordinator for the visit. HFO received a call about the visit at about 4:00 PM on 3-27-81. b6\textsuperscript{c} received written notification at about 4:30 PM on the same date. He talked with SA b6\textsuperscript{c} who said the advance was basically done and that he should coordinate with SA b6\textsuperscript{c}.

SA b6\textsuperscript{c} called b6\textsuperscript{c} on Sunday afternoon. He said everything was done and asked b6\textsuperscript{c} to meet him at the hotel at 11:00 AM on Monday. He asked to use b6\textsuperscript{c} car for the emergency motorcade and wanted b6\textsuperscript{c} to assist him in the b6\textsuperscript{c} events. They also discussed the event in some detail.

On Monday, b6\textsuperscript{c} came directly to the Hilton at about 9:15 AM. He positioned his car near the emergency exit. He then went to the ballroom and checked the location of certain posts. He next went to the security office and talked with b6\textsuperscript{c}.

b6\textsuperscript{c} at the emergency motorcade site, they adjusted the cars, and then went to the ballroom at about 11:30 AM. They took a walk-through by b6\textsuperscript{c} and discussed the b6\textsuperscript{c}. Both concurred. b6\textsuperscript{c} copied the b6\textsuperscript{c} list and they went to check the security room and then to the Mars Room where b6\textsuperscript{c} corrected the changes to the b6\textsuperscript{c}.

b6\textsuperscript{c} began his briefing shortly after 12:00 noon. He indicated there would be a limited issue of b6\textsuperscript{c}.

HFO advised that the sweep would begin at 12:30 PM. All agents had worked the site before but they asked if anyone did not know the location of their b6\textsuperscript{c} Those who did not were posted by b6\textsuperscript{c}

b6\textsuperscript{c} went back to the ballroom near the end of the sweep and determined that all b6\textsuperscript{c} were in place. He handled a few routine questions.
b016b advised that he had to go up for the arrival at about 1:40 PM or
1:45 PM. b016b ran around the ballroom until he heard the arrival.
He then went to the holding room to get the shift agents for b016b.

b016b

b016b then went out to the departure site and walked between the limo
and follow-up. He talked to the follow-up driver, SA b016b, who mentioned
the CO-2 subject, b016b. He continued to keep an eye on b016b.
b016b was standing near the left front fender of the follow-up looking
over the hood at the crowd when he heard the call, "We're moving." He saw
the press coming out of the public entrance. The follow-up was casing forward
and he tried to clear the people in front of it.

He heard the shots, ran in front of the follow-up and jumped on the
suspect. He grabbed the suspect's right wrist and assisted in cuffing him.
He was next aware that three men were down and the cars were gone. He
began to clear the area and held the press and public back until the wounded
were removed. He talked to Deputy Chief Cato and asked him to have his men
secure the area. He also talked with DAD Don Edwards about the suspect's gun.
Shortly thereafter the FBI arrived.

b016b stepped inside the VIP entrance and placed
the suspect's gun in a zip-lock bag which b016b had gotten from a police
officer.

SA's b016b arrived and sent everyone to the Adams Room.
b016b was interviewed by the FBI and they later had to re-enact the incident.
Two 3 - 3rd Interview of CA 66167c

66
67c He went next to the lounge room and then returned to 700 to brief
the people there. He also went to the Intelligence Division and briefed them.
67c He had to work a morning protective assignment at Arlington Cemetery
on Tuesday. His afternoon assignment was cancelled.

66167c He has been the lead advance agent at the Hilton once before. He
has also assisted once. The security arrangements have been basically the
same on all occasions. He has never seen an outside press area.

There was one ID team and he recalls only using one on previous visits.
He did not know that 66167c had asked for two teams.

He talked to CA 57c who he thinks said he sent over 62167c

63167c

He believes the police officer who was wounded was transported in a Rescue
Unit.

64167c also recalls seeing an Atlantic City Police car with dogs in it. He
was told they were on a training assignment.
PST b61b7c advised that on March 29, 1981 (Sunday), he learned that he was scheduled to drive the "spare car" in the Presidential motorcade from the White House to the Washington Hilton Hotel, 1919 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., on March 30, 1981 (Monday). Actually he was scheduled to work from b61b7c on March 30, 1981 (Monday); however, Special Agent s 661b7c 61b7c, drivers of the limousine and follow-up cars respectively, decided to relieve early on that date so he along with Agents 661b7c reported for work at approximately 12:00 Noon on March 30, 1981.

On Monday, PST b61b7c came to the U. S. S. S. garage at 1310 L Street, N.W., and drove a 1970 armored Lincoln automobile, USSS Number OK to the south grounds of the White House around 12:00 Noon. The limo (President's car) and the follow-up car (USSS) were driven over to the south grounds around the same time. The motorcade was formed under the supervision of Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon who was assigned as Transportation Section Advance Agent for the Presidential movement. PST b61b7c was provided with the advance survey conducted by SA Gordon dated 3-29-81 giving the routes (primary and alternate)
to the hotel as well as routes to George Washington Hospital which was designated as the hospital to be utilized in case of emergency. PST did not drive the routes prior to the movement because he had driven them on approximately twenty previous occasions.

Upon their departure from the south grounds, the White House Physician, was the only passenger with PST. PST stated the route to the Washington Hilton was the same as the primary route listed on advance survey route prepared by SA Gordon.

Although PST did not know the exact number of motorcycles. Also, there was full intersection control enroute to the hotel.

Upon entering E Street from Florida Avenue and arriving at the hotel almost directly in front of the VIP entrance to the hotel; however, between them and the VIP entrance was a traffic island and a driveway normally used for hotel taxi cab traffic. The Presidential limousine made a right turn behind the parked spare limo and then an immediate left turn into the taxi driveway stopping at the VIP entrance.

remained in the same position while the remaining drivers in the motorcade repositioned the cars for the departure from the hotel. The Presidential limo was backed up and turned at an angle so it could be driven directly into
Approximately 30 minutes later PST 6:04:7C monitored a radio transmission on 668 kHz advising the President would be departing shortly. PST 6:04:7C turned to the right and saw 6:04:7C coming out of the VIP entrance. PST 6:04:7C turned to the front preparing for the departure. He then heard gun shots and looked out the rear window but only 6:04:7C saw movement of 6:04:7C people. CA Mary Ann Corson opened the left rear door, got in the car, and said "Let's go." About the same time the limo was passing on the left and 6:04:7C was getting in the car from the right rear door. PST 6:04:7C accelerated the car, following the Presidential limousine because the follow-up car was not immediately behind the limo. By the time the limo was turning left onto Connecticut Avenue from 7th Street the spare limo was immediately behind the limo.

PST 6:04:7C did not know the location of the HUD lead car at this time. He could not recall if he passed it when pulling away from the curb or if it had already departed in front of the limo.

Somewhere around the intersection of 7th & 7th Street and Connecticut Avenue, prior to reaching the underpass at Dupont Circle, PST 6:04:7C noticed the follow-up car behind him. He emphasized the follow-up car could have been following him prior to that but did not notice it. He did not observe any other cars behind the follow-up car. PST 6:04:7C moved to the right, allowing the follow-up car behind the Presidential limousine.

In the meantime, a radio transmission was received on 668 kHz advising the President was not injured and he was returning to the White House. As they were proceeding on 17th Street around the intersection of K or L Streets,
There was a radio transmission from the limo saying they were going to George Washington Hospital. At this time, there was a marked LAPD car in front of the limo; however, PST 661670 could not recall how long it had been in front of the limo. CA Mary Ann Gordon asked PST 661670 to pass the follow-up car and the limo so as to act as the lead car to the hospital because they felt the LAPD lead car probably did not hear the transmission regarding the change to the hospital. After passing the two cars and getting in front of the limo, PST 661670 turned right on Pennsylvania Avenue. The LAPD lead car continued straight on 17th Street. Around Pennsylvania Avenue and 20th Street intersection, PST 661670 noticed the route car at the intersection stopping traffic. The route car continued in front of the spare limo assisting in traffic control until arriving at the emergency entrance to George Washington Hospital. The spare limo remained on the street at the hospital and did not enter the emergency entrance to the hospital. PST 661670 advised he remained with the spare limo for approximately the next 1½ or 2 hours.
Agent Carson stated the following. On Wednesday or Thursday (March 25 or 26) she was notified by Agent 661672 of her assignment as 661672 agent on March 30, 1981. This would be for the visit of the President to the Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981.

On March 29, 1981 she contacted 661672 of the Washington Field Office concerning the visit on March 30, 1981.

Sunday, March 30, 1981, she contacted Metropolitan Police Sergeant 672 and the Park Police Sergeant 672 to coordinate the upcoming visit of the President on March 30, 1981 and to set up an appointment with Sergeant 672 PD at 9:00 AM Monday morning, March 30, 1981, to run the routes.

She also stated that on Monday, March 30, she called Mr. 661672 of the DC Department of Highways; however, he was out and she talked to his assistant and she was checking to see if there was going to be any construction along the motorcade route.

At 1:00 PM on March 30, 1981, she took the cars, along with 661672, to the White House.

She was in the marked Metropolitan Police Department lead car when the motorcade left the White House Complex. The route from the White House to the
Page 2 - 1st Interview of Marylin Graton

approximately 6 minutes.

After the President entered the Hilton Hotel, she stated she repositioned the motorcade by placing 200-X at short of an angle off the VIP entrance. This was done for two reasons, easy access to T Street and it provided easy access to T Street in case of an emergency. She remembers that the limo was backed up towards the sidewalk at an angle.

b21678 While the President was inside and she remembers walking down to the b21678 and talking briefly with b21574

She stated that when Advance Agent b2674 advised her by radio that they were getting ready to come out with the President, she got into the lead car. As the President came out of the Hilton VIP entrance, she was in the lead car. She remembers seeing Agent Tim McCarthy open the limo door and she heard shots fired. She turned around and saw bodies all over the ground. She remembers getting out of the lead car and she ran back to the limousine to be sure that the President was inside the limousine. She then turned around and ran to the spare car since she did not think she had time to get the police lead car which was moving. She jumped in the left rear of the spare car, climbed over to the right front. Also in the car was the doctor White House doctor. The remembers as the limo pulled out onto T Street,

b21678... came on up behind them. Once they reached Connecticut Avenue they took a left on Connecticut and as we crossed Florida Avenue, the follow-up car was in position as we went under the overpass at Dupont Circle.

At that time it was the b21674 She stated that she does remember that after they got onto Connecticut Avenue the bikes passed them on the left. She does not remember who was in front of the limo except she recalled the bike car in front. She did not have to go on the street to turn
They were on Connecticut Avenue but she cannot remember if they saw police
officer intersection control. She assumes there was, as that was in the plan,
on the return trip to the White House.

As we were turning onto Connecticut Avenue, the follow-up came up behin"him and on Connecticut the follow-up got in position behind the limo
when the spare car pulled over to the side to let them by. At this point she
thought they were going to the White House. She remembers Agent 6666 came on
the car radio and said - We are going to George Washington. Then they got to
X Street, she remembered that she had a P-33 radio in the police lead car and
with the information from 6666 she said she simply radioed "sargeant 676,
we are going to George CV Hospital". She then said to 6666 we have to get
in front of the limo because the police may not have gotten my transmission
and they came around the follow-up and the limousine and got in front of the
limo to act as a lead. Then the motorcade got to the Pennsylvania Avenue,
the motorcade turned right and the lead police car and the bikes went straight
ahead. A few blocks up Pennsylvania Avenue she remembers seeing the Washington
Field Office route car and when they got to 20th Street on Pennsylvania, the
route car stopped traffic since they had a red light on top of the car. They
simply slowed the traffic down and the route petrole car continued to be their
lead through the Washington Circle. Once at the CV Hospital the route car
and spare car pulled off to the side and the limo and follow-up went directly
into the emergency drive. The CPO route car and the spare car remained on the
pavement.

She remembers getting out of the spare car at the hospital and running up
to the follow-up where she was told to stop people from coming up outside.
the emergency entrance. She also remembers at this time looking back and seeing if the police tail car was with them. She also remembers at this time of getting the police officers on the site and they worked out the matter of perimeter with the police officers. Hospital spokesman came out and told her that they had an ambulance coming up with a subject with a gunshot wound and requesting that they move the limousine and follow-up car which they did in order to allow the ambulance to get to the emergency entrance. She remembers telling the police officers that she did not want to let anyone within ten feet of the limousine and if they could to keep people away from the circle there at the emergency room entrance. She remembers asking the police for rope and barricades and they said they were on the way. Police officers assumed positions to secure the entrance to the emergency room.

She remembers shortly after that that some of the press got there and by this time security had been set up by the police.

She remembers that she stayed outside most of the time right after arriving at the hospital, at least the first 30-40 minutes after which she did go inside a few times to check on the situation. She said she wanted to stay there since she had been working with the police throughout the renovation.

Around 10:15 PM she went to the Washington Field Office where she was interviewed by FBI agents.

She also remembered that during the time she was at the hospital, she was on the phone with her supervisor, Bill Clark, and Agent Bob Carter about security at the hospital and concerning police escorts needed later that evening for family members.
She also remembers that at some time she was given the President's clothes by SA 167. The clothes contained shoes, socks, trousers, belt, undergarments but no upper body clothes at all. She remembers that 167 said she heard Darr said - put these in the limousine and don't lose them. Put them on the floor of 200-X, which she did and at a later time in the afternoon Bob Teter advised her that they were going to replace 200-X with 42260. Rich Dry brought 42260 at which time she put the President's clothes in 42260. Later Agent Teter advised her again that they were going to replace that car with 7957 and Agent Hartman and one other SA from the VP Detail came over to switch the cars and then she put the President's clothes in 7957. Later that day she turned his clothes over to FBI Agent Warren Anton. Before doing so she inventoried the clothes and had the Agent to sign a receipt. She also remembers that inside the pockets there were some small articles which were also listed on this inventory.

She still has the copy of the receipt.

She advised that within the last couple days she continues to get telephone calls from FBI Agents wanting to know where the upper body clothes of the President could be found, and she has told them that she never did have the upper body clothes of the President.
by taxi drivers coming down to the 15th Street entrance of the hotel.

Vivian Gordon also stated that her experience since being in the Secret Service while in the Washington Field Office that she worked many visits at the Hilton Hotel in the following capacities. She participated in advances, ID response tours, transportation advance, post standing, etc.

As far as she can recall, the rope barrier on the outside of the VIP entrance on this past Monday, March 30, was in approximately the same location that she had always seen this barrier.

Attached is a copy of her survey, dated March 29, 1981.
April 1, 1981 - 1st Interview of [redacted] - Senior Political Advance Man

for the White House, at George Washington Hospital, 3rd Floor Staff Office,

by Inspectors Kevin R. Houlihan and Roger Counts (This interview was dictated by Inspector Houlihan)

stated that there was a walk-through on Friday at approximately 10:30 AM at the Hilton for the visit of the President to the function in the International Ballroom. He stated that the following people were present during this walk-through:

U.S. Secret Service
Rocky Kounan, press advance, White House
John Bidir, WHCA
Vic Kamper (host committee)
Al Fury, chief of hotel security at the Hilton Hotel
Charlie, ENO, from the hotel sales office.

stated that was late so they did the arrival and departure without him.

He stated that and discussed the arrival and departure of the limo during this walk-through. He indicated that a rope line which is normally present at the arrival and departure would be in place for this visit. He stated that this rope line is normally placed somewhere in the vicinity of the follow-up car. His impression was that it would be approximately 25 feet from the limousine.

stated that he never asked Agent to make the roped area a designated press area. stated that a designated press area requires the presence of not only Secret Service agents and police but also a White House advance man who was familiar with the people who need access to that area;
Therefore, in his opinion, it was not a designated press area. He continued that to do so would in effect shut down the entrance to the hotel which is not feasible in most situations and was not feasible in this situation. He stated the rope line was for crowd restraint and pedestrian control in his opinion.

He indicated that it was his belief that it was coincidental that a number of cameramen and news personnel took positions at the rope line. Normally only one camera crew is there at that rope line.

On the arrival he did notice that some cameras were in this general roped area which were more than the normal amount.

He stated that the White House press pool was to be escorted by the press pool, upon departure, were to take their normal positions which places them on the left side of the limousine, across the limousine.

He stated that he went through this during the walk-through on Friday.

Regarding the inside arrangements for the event, he stated that the tables which were located near the stage were not for the White House Press Corps. The host committee had a number of what he called trade-writers who needed to have a location where they could sit and take notes of the President's speech. He indicated that the host group wanted this and he acceded to their request.

During the initial stages of the planning for this event, wanted the standard photo opportunity for the moving cameras and stills. This standard photo opportunity setup is normally to the right side of the podium as you face
the podium. The host committee wanted the press area back towards the rear of
the room so that the press would not interfere with the attendees observing
the events on the podium. [Redacted] was not particularly pleased with this
arrangement; however, he consented to this for political reasons. He stated
that the center aisle of the ballroom was more congested than he would have
wished; however, [Redacted] cleared this area during the event.

He stated that during the departure they planned that the President
would take the same route out as they had taken in.

[Redacted] stated that he has attended functions at the Hilton approximately
five times and that in his opinion the rope setup for the visit on 3-30-81 was
the standard setup for ropes at that site for arrival and departure.

He did notice three uniformed police personnel and one plainclothes police-
man right on the line upon the arrival of the motorcade. One of those uniformed
personnel perhaps was a Hilton police officer but he was not sure.

Upon departure he proceeded the President from the VIP entrance and as is
normal course he peruses the area prior to the President leaving the door. He
distinctly recalls seeing at least three uniformed personnel at the rope line
on departure.

He stated he saw nothing out of the ordinary upon the arrival or departure
of the President. He reiterated that the area near the rope was not a designated
press area inasmuch as he had no staff man at the rope to check people in and out
with a Secret Service Agent. He emphatically stated that he had made no request
of Agent [Redacted] to designate the area near the ropes as a press area alone. He
considered that a general public area with the press getting spots on their
con volition.

stated that this is his position and will make it known to
the members of the press if they ask him questions on this issue.
April 1, 1981 - 1st Telephone interview of (SA Billy Williamson) FO, at his residence by Assistant Inspector Force.

SA Williamson was informed around 10:30 AM on Monday, March 30, 1981, that he would be assigned as a 621572 at the Washington Hilton Hotel for the visit of President Reagan on that date. He was advised to report to the Adams Room of the hotel at 12:00 Noon for a site security briefing to be conducted by SA 66167C for PPD. The briefing was held and SA Williamson was assigned as a counter-sniper response team agent. He has served in this assignment on prior occasions and was aware of his duties. SA 66167C was assigned as the other response team agent. Attending the briefing were Secret Service agents, Uniformed Division counter-sniper personnel, and possible White House Communications Agency (WHCA) personnel. The briefing lasted approximately 20 minutes.

SA Williamson said he and SA 66167C got together with the 621572 counter-sniper personnel and went over their assignments. He and SA 66157C were furnished a preliminary survey report prepared by the UD personnel. The one UD personnel were to be 621572 of the Washington Hilton Hotel prior to and during the visit.
SA Williamson was not certain of the time but believed prior to the arrival
of the President SA Ross Miller, another 62,59, was told by someone
about an unusual person in the crowd. SA Williamson took notice of the person
who he described as a white, male, early 20's, 5' or 5'2", sandy hair, wearing
burgundy trousers. He evidently had been observed on prior occasions and was
referred to as a "cut".

The Protective Intelligence Team consisting of SA Dennis McCarthy and
SA Danny Spriggs informed the agents in the area the individual was known to
them and was not considered dangerous. The individual was standing by the
ropes and stanchions located on the sidewalk between the VIP entrance and
the public entrance on the T Street side.

Upon the arrival of the President at the hotel, SA Williamson was located
standing near the edge of the canopy overhang facing in a southerly direction
towards T Street observing the crowd. There were no unusual incidents during
the arrival. While the President was inside, SA Williamson remained outside the
hotel near the arrival/departure area with the exception of going inside to the
restroom for a short period of time.

SA Williamson mentioned that while outside the hotel after the President's
arrival, a woman (name unknown) approached him saying she wanted to shake the
President's hand. He described her as a white female, late 30's or early 30's,
5'9", 100-200 pounds and somehow he got the impression she worked for the
Social Security Administration across the street in the Universal Building.
SA Williamson said she displayed no unusual interest; however, he thought
she could mention it.
SA Williamson advised upon the President's departure from the VIP door, he was standing in the driveway area with the Presidential limousine located over his right shoulder. He was looking in the direction of the follow-up towards the public entrance. Off his left shoulder was the crowd behind the rope and stanchions. Off his right shoulder was T Street. SA Williamson was beginning to move forward to tell the people to get on the sidewalk when he heard gunfire. He could not recall the number of shots. SA Williamson looked in the direction of the shots but by this time all of them had been fired. He moved to the area of the shots and saw agents and officers struggling with someone. SA Williamson saw the FBI officer, James Brady, and Agent McCarthy on the sidewalk. He went to Agent McCarthy who said he felt something in his chest. His tie and shirt collar were loosened and SA McCarthy asked how bad the wound was. SA Williamson saw a small hole and placed his handkerchief on it. In the meantime SA Williamson was also trying to keep the crowd back. Also during this time a man came out of the crowd. He said he was an emergency medical technician and he assisted in rendering first aid. He also told everyone the order in which the three wounded men would be taken to the hospital.

SA Williamson advised that while working the movement the counter-sniper response team did not receive any calls. He also stated he has previously worked the outside area of the Washington Hilton Hotel on approximately ten occasions and he has never recalled a designated press area on the outside of the hotel.
April 1, 1981 - 1st Interview of Franz Schwarm at Special Investigations and Security Division, by Inspector Jonathan Poussies and Assistant Inspector Richard Force.

Schwarm advised while assigned to the Presidential Protective Division he was assigned to conduct several advances at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Schwarm advised that on he was advised he was assigned as a b21672 for the visit of President Reagan to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981. He went to the Washington Hilton Hotel on that date where he attended a briefing for Secret Service personnel at 12:00 noon at the Adams Suite on the Terrace level. The briefing was conducted by SA b61572. SA Schwarm did not recall anyone attending the briefing except Secret Service personnel. During the briefing SA Schwarm was informed his b21672.

At 1:00 PM on March 30, 1981 SA Schwarm went to the b21672. Later, the President arrived in the ballroom and departed after making a speech. No unusual incident occurred while he was in the ballroom.

After the President departed the ballroom, SA Schwarm discontinued his b21672 and walked to the departure area outside the hotel. As SA Schwarm exited the hotel from public entrance/exit on T Street, he observed a large group of people. To the right of the
entrance he saw several agents and policemen struggling with a man. He also observed two citizens also struggling with the same man. SA Schwarm said he separated one of the citizens and moved him away from the group. The citizen was a white male, wearing a yellow shirt, sweater, or jacket. He later learned the citizen was from Ohio. SA Schwarm remained in that area keeping the crowd away from the struggle until the suspect was placed in a police car and transported to the police station.

After a few minutes, the security room put out a radio transmission over one frequency for all agents to return to the briefing room. SA Schwarm went to the briefing room where names were taken to determine if there were any eyewitnesses to the shooting.
On the best of his knowledge it was Friday, March 27, 1981, when he checked the workschedule in the Transportation Section and saw where he was scheduled to be the Presidential Limousine driver, on March 30, 1981.

Agent 66C advised he did not run the route from the White House to the Hilton and return since he had driven the follow-up vehicle the last Thursday to the Hilton and since he had also done advances at that location. Agent 66C's recollection of the route from the White House to the Hilton and return was the same as that the route that appears on the survey which was prepared by SA Gordon.

Once at the Hilton Hotel he drove the Presidential Limousine up to the VIP entrance and the President got out and went inside the Hilton. After the President went inside the Hilton Hotel, 66C said he backed the Limousine down past the VIP entrance and positioned the car at an angle from the VIP entrance and that by doing this he gave him access to 1st Street. He said that if he had left the vehicle in front of the VIP entrance, he could not have had easy access away from there in case something happened because this time as in the past there was a marked police cruiser parked in the driveway leading up to the circle on Connecticut and that in all the advances and trips he had made to the Hilton that access was never used. It has a very small driveway.

66C also stated that after he repositioned the Limousine he called 66D out to stay with the Limousine and follow-up and 66C went inside the
Follow-up with 661676.

Agent 661676 also said that as he drove up to the Hilton on the date as he was approaching the VIP entrance and saw the crowd that he did see in the crowd a CO-2 subject that he has seen on numerous occasions at other movements.

Agent 661676 advised that he was sitting in the Limousine when he received radio transmission traffic from 661676 advising him that the President would be coming up momentarily. He advised that when he received this radio transmission, he already had the Limousine started. He remembers looking over his shoulder and saw Agent Tim McCarthy walking out of the VIP entrance. Tim walked over and opened the Limousine door for the President and at that time I looked straight ahead and was putting on the red flashers for the motorcade. I looked back over my shoulder and saw the President approaching the vehicle.

I looked straight ahead again. At that point I heard gunshots. I turned and saw Jerry Parr and the President coming into the car head first, Parr was pushing the President in. I heard the door slam and I accelerated the car as Parr told me - Let's get out of here. I took a right on T Street and in doing so I swerved to miss a police car as I turned on T Street, proceeded to Connecticut where I took a left. At this time I do not remember any police vehicles being in front of me. I remember when I pulled out from the VIP entrance I passed the bikes and the lead car. I'm sure there was intersection control going down Connecticut Avenue because we did not have to stop or slow down at all. I heard the President and Parr talking. I heard Parr ask him - Are you hit and he said no, I don't think so. Parr was checking the President's body all over for blood and any wounds. The President said I believe I cut my mouth. The President was dabbing his mouth with a handkerchief and complained that his ribs were hurting. Parr asked 661676 to give him the radio. At this point Parr advised on the radio that the President
was not hit and that they were proceeding to the White House. Immediately after this the President said - I’m having trouble breathing, and he again explained about his ribs. He recalls Jerry Parr saying to the President - Do you think it’s your heart. The President said - I don’t think so. At this point Parr advised the President he thought they better go to the hospital. The President did not object and said something to the effect - Okay.

At this point I noticed the follow-up vehicle had caught up and this was about at the overpass because I saw two agents on the side of the follow-up. Parr told me - Get us to George Washington as fast as you can. Also by now a few bikes had passed us and apparently a police lead car but I don’t recall seeing the lead car pass. I do remember a police car in front of us going straight when we reached Pennsylvania Avenue.

I took the mike back from Parr and advised over the radio that we were going to George Washington Hospital. I also radioed agent Gordon and told her to get us to the George Washington Emergency Room and somewhere around K Street Gordon and 63167C got around us in the spare car. Until this time I thought she was in the police lead car. We proceeded to Pennsylvania Avenue and took a right on Pennsylvania. Shortly after turning right on Pennsylvania Avenue we caught up with the Washington Field Office route car. They had a red Light on top and they led us to the Washington Circle where the all the cars in front of us peeled off and I drove the limousine up into the emergency entrance. Hospital personnel were standing outside waiting for us.

Parr and Chaddick were helping the President in to the emergency room. I stayed with the vehicles because I figured we would have to move the cars since others may be coming in to the emergency room. (63167C) stayed by the right rear door of the Presidential Limousine in order to cover the area where the
It didn't hit the windshield.

Later, it came to light that my agent Gordon brought some of the President's clothes down and put them in 200-X. Later 200-X was replaced with vehicle 3260 and the clothes were then placed in that vehicle and later on this car was replaced with vehicle 3257 and the clothes were placed in 3257.

Also later in the day, an FBI agent came up and asked me if I knew where the clothes were and I said yes I did and I went up to room 2500 in the hospital which was the command post and asked Bob DeProspero about turning over the clothes to the FBI agent. He said it was okay but to have Agent Gordon prepare an inventory of the clothes and get a receipt from the FBI agent.

Agent [Redacted] advised that the rest of his day was spent as part security and that between 9:00 and 10:00 PM on that evening, he was interviewed by agents of the FBI. These agents were [Redacted]. Also present during the interview was a Secret Service Agent, a police officer, and that the interview took place at the Washington Field Office.

He also advised that he believes he had done a transportation advance at the Hilton before and that the parking of the limousine and the rope barrier at the VIP entrance were just about what he had seen before on other trips there. The only difference maybe was the crowd on this occasion was quite large.
April 3, 1983 - 1st Interview of (DA 661674) at the Office of Investigation
by Inspectors Jonathan Fuchske and Richard Accola.

Agent 661674 advised that he was notified Friday, March 27, of his assignment
at the Hilton Hotel on Monday, March 30, and that he was to be a member of the
counter-sniper response team. His partner in this would-be turned out to be
DA Williamson.

He recalls leaving the White House Headquarters at 11:20 AM on March 30
to attend a briefing in the Adams Room of the Hilton Hotel. Agent 661674
conducted the briefing. He does not remember seeing any police at this
meeting, only agents and the counter-sniper sniper men.

He advised that the briefing started about 12:05 and concluded at about
12:25 PM.

After the briefing he talked with the counter-sniper men and 661674 and
his partner, DA Williamson, were to be out 69, 67, 2 and remain
in that area in case they were needed for a response. He remembers on arrival
of the President he was standing in the street on T Street and as you face the
Hotel VIP entrance, he was actually standing to the left of that entrance on
T Street observing the public.

While the President was inside he advised he stayed in the same general
area just observing the people coming and going.

He also advised that he was aware that there was a 00-2 subject in the
crowd, that the subject was pointed out to them. He remembers Agent Russ Miller
held 661674 about this and that he does know that Dennis McCarthy came
up and identified the subject and talked to the subject and both McCarthy and
McCarthy's partner, DA Sykins, were watching the subject on the arrival and
departure of the President.
66
666 advised that after the shooting had taken place he remembers
assisting Press Secretary James Brady.
666 advised that during his time with the Service he has been
worked visits to the Hilton Hotel many times and as far as he can ever remember
there was never a press area outside the hotel.
1128.44 - Female called in over 911 to report a shooting. This person was thought to be a hotel employee.

1130.04 - Ambulance #6 reported by radio that there had been a shooting and they were going to investigate.

1130.50 - Two additional calls were received over 911, reporting multiple shootings.

1131.00 - Ambulance #5, which had been dispatched by Communications, called in by radio to request more assistance.

1132.00 - Engine #9, Rescue Squad #2, and Ambulance #7 were dispatched.

50 get Units (Life Support Systems) were available to be sent. They were all on calls.

If the actual tapes are needed, we should call Battalion Fire Chief.

A written chronological log, that was made from the tapes, was sent to the fire chief.

Chief also believed that Ambulance #2 was dispatched at approximately 1130.
April 1, 1981 - 1st Interview of Walt C. Rodgers by Jonathan Lougher and Richard Force. Interview took place at the White House Complex. Mr. Rodgers is a White House Correspondent for Associated Press Radio.

Mr. Rodgers related that on March 30, 1981 he departed the White House Complex to attend the function at the Washington Hilton on Connecticut Avenue at which the President was going to speak and that he took a cab from the White House to the Washington Hilton. Upon arrival at the Hilton Hotel, he went immediately inside as he did not intend to cover the arrival of the President. Once inside he went to the press area that was set up and positioned himself next to the risers that were there for the press. He stationed his tape recorder in preparation for the President's speech. At the conclusion of the speech, he came out of the Hilton using the public entrance and he decided to cover the departure because he felt that the President may come over to the crowd and say a few words and he was in hopes that maybe they could get some comment concerning the Poland situation. When he came out through the public entrance he noticed the public had gathered around the VIP entrance through which the President would exit and he began working his way through the crowd up to the rope line and on the way through the crowd he turned his tape recorder on and began just politely telling the people - Excuse me - National Press - I have to get to the front - Excuse me. Just before reaching the rope line he heard a male voice saying - You ought to get here on time. They think they can do anything they want. Don't let them do that (Rodgers feels like the subject was talking about the press).
Dr. Rodgers told us there is no doubt that this was the voice of Hinckley.

Then Rodgers got to the rope line, there was a place to stand on the rope line up against the Hilton Hotel wall and that once he got in position there, he was actually standing next to the subject that he felt had been making the remarks and he was working his way up through the crowd. He did not make eye contact with the subject because the standing rule of the White House press is if they get into any kind of confrontation with anybody, on any of these movements, they are immediately fired and, of course, their press pass taken away from them.

He does recall just looking out of the corner of his eye trying to get a glimpse of this person. He remembers he had a very young face, light hair, and was wearing some type of a light jacket or light shirt.

As the President came out of the VIP door, Rodgers was watching the eyes of the President in hopes that he might get some indication that the President was actually coming over to the crowd to say a few words. He remembers the President raising his hand and then all of a sudden he heard the sounds of gunfire right next to him and the next thing he knew someone had grabbed the subject and was taking him to the ground and in doing so had also knocked Rodgers to the ground.

Rodgers said he did not see the subject firing the gun. He never did see the gun. The only thing that really stands out is the concussion he was getting from the gun as it went off next to him. He was keeping his eye on the President throughout the shooting.

Rodgers advised that in no way was the rope that he was standing behind that area considered a press area, that in fact upon departing the Hilton in order to cover the departure, he took off his press pass for fear that walking through the public there, it might get ripped off and lost. As he recalls, the same security that was in effect on March 30, 1981 as far as the cars and the rope, he had seen
this same setup many times before when he covered the events of the President there. He went on to say that it certainly was not a press area, nobody was checking credentials and certainly if it had been a press area, credentials would have been checked.

Rodgers also told us that an FBI agent had talked to him by telephone apparently on March 31st but that the agent did not go into great detail but simply asked him a few questions about what he saw. At this time Rodgers had told us that he had a tape that covered the male voice as he was approaching the rope line and also on the tape was the six shots that were fired, that he had timed these six shots and that all six shots were fired in two seconds.

Rodgers said he did not think that the FBI knew that he was in possession of this tape, at least he does not recall telling the agent that he had the tape during the telephone conversation. He also stated that if anybody from the Secret Service wished to listen to the tape, he was agreeable to that, but that his supervisor had told him that if we or the FBI wanted a copy of his tape, a court order would be necessary to get the copy.

Rodgers also stated that he was standing behind the rope line when the shooting took place and that the subject who allegedly did the shooting was also standing behind that rope.

After we finished the interview with Mr. Rodgers on April 1, 1961, Dick Force and I proceeded to Headquarters where we briefed Director Knight, Acting AD Lawson, AD Simpson and other Headquarters personnel.

On April 1, 1961, at 3:50PM I notified NISAIC Ed Benscorea, Washington Field Office, of this interview and of Rodgers' possession of this tape.
On 3-31-81 myself and Assistant Inspector Force interviewed Bob Goff, Legal Counsel. We had previously advised him of our intention to conduct this internal investigation and speak with people on the scene regarding their recollections.

He had advised that he would speak with the Justice Department to make sure it does not interfere with the criminal investigation being conducted by the FBI.

On this date Bob Goff advised me that we can proceed with our interviews regarding the overview of the protective reaction of the Secret Service during the shooting incident.

He stated that he had cleared this with the appropriate Justice Department officials.
March 31, 1961 - 1st Interview with CA正文 from 1314 L Street by Inspector
Jonathan Poshuee and Inspector Counts

This interview was dictated by Inspector Counts.

CA Good was assigned as the Press Liaison Agent in the motorcade. He rode in
one of the press vans.

There were two press vans containing thirteen members of the press "pool",
a UHCAN team, and Dave Prosperi from the White House press office.

Then they arrived, there was little time for arrival shots, so they
all entered through the public entrance on the Terrace level. They then
proceeded through the main checkpoint to the ballroom and went directly to
the center aisle.

The center aisle was very crowded with public and local press photographers.
They then returned to the pool area.

The pool exited the same way they had entered. Outside, they went around
the crowd, out in the street around the motorcade and to the area of the rope line.

Good was standing, one step into the street, at the end of the rope line.
He heard the shots, saw the gun, and dove on the suspect. He assisted others in
apprehending him.

Good recalls receiving no complaints about the press area or the way the
rope line was set up.
March 31, 1981 - 1st Interview of Director H. Stuart Knight in the Office of the Deputy Director by Inspector Kevin R. Houlihan. Present during the interview were Deputy Director Weinstein and Acting AD Lawson.

Director Knight told me he had received a call from Director Webster, FBI, wherein Mr. Webster indicated that the findings of the FBI to that point indicated that they had not made notification to the Secret Service of Mr. Hinckley's arrest. Mr. Knight indicated that there were certain areas still to be resolved by the FBI regarding notifications that were in fact made.

SA Huse stated that he had been in the FBI building at the time of the assault on the President. He immediately went to the crisis room at the FBI Headquarters and maintained a Secret Service presence at that location.

He stated that the FBI had internal rules and regulations regarding notification of the Secret Service of certain incidences. He stated his understanding of the internal regulations for the FBI in this particular instance is as follows:

SA Huse stated that this was normal operating procedure for the FBI.

He stated that he had received official notification from the Bureau that they had not in fact notified the Secret Service that Hinckley was arrested on the day of the Carter visit to Nashville. He stated that Section Chief, Personal and Property Crimes, FBI Headquarters, told him on 3-30-81 that at approximately 10:30 PM that the FBI had not notified the
Page 2 - 1st Interview of SA James Huse

Secret Service of Dr. Hinckley's arrest.

Huse stated it was his understanding that Director Webster had spoken with Director Knight on 3-31-81 and acknowledged that the FBI had not made a notification to the Secret Service of the arrest of Mr. Hinckley.
March 31, 1981 – 1st Interview of SACIC Walsh, Intelligence Division,

by Inspector Kevin R. Houlihan and Assistant Inspector Richard Force

SACIC Walsh also stated that he would send a teletype to all field Offices requesting that they conduct a records check through their indices and their administrative files for the suspect, Hinckley. Negative replies would not be required and the information would be in the hands of the Intelligence Division on April 1, 1981 by 12:00 Noon.

On April 1, 1981 SACIC Walsh advised me that there were no replies to the internal records check of all field offices.
March 31, 1961 - 1st Interview of SNIC Parr, SPD, at the Office of Inspection, by Inspector Buhl and Cameron

Parr was the supervisor with the President for the trip to the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1961.

They departed the White House in vehicle SS-200-X with SNIC Parr in the driver seat and SA McCarthy driving.

They arrived at the Hilton VIP entrance and Parr accompanied the President to a holding room.

SNIC Parr accompanied the President to the main ballroom where the President addressed a meeting of the Building and Construction Trades Union.

SNIC Parr proceeded, with the President, from the ballroom to the VIP entrance.

As Parr exited the VIP entrance, he looked across 16th Street and saw people standing, then glanced to his left and saw SA McCarthy leading the way to the Presidential vehicle.

Parr was walking to the President's right rear, as they got to the vehicle, SA McCarthy opened the right rear door and SNIC Parr shifted to the President's left rear and SNIC Shaddick (shift leader) took a position to the President's right rear.

SNIC Parr heard a shot, a delay and more shots.

On hearing the first shot, Parr went forward, grabbing the President and pushed him into the vehicle. Parr landed on top of the President. SNIC Shaddick pushed Parr's feet into the vehicle and slammed the door shut.

SNIC Parr told the driver to move out and he then noticed the bullet hole in the vehicle window.

The President told Parr that he thought that Parr had hurt his ribs.

Parr then put the President up and checked him by crossing his hands over
over the President's body and found nothing.

SAIC Parr then asked the driver, SA 67C, to pass him the radio mike and SAIC Parr broadcasted that "Tench is okay".

At this time Parr was intending to go to the White House.

About ten seconds later Parr saw bright red blood in the President's mouth and that he felt the President had a rib and lung injury.

SAIC Parr then told the driver to go to the hospital.

Upon arrival at the hospital, the President and Parr walked in and were met by a nurse and Parr told her "Let's go to the nearest emergency room".

At this time the President looked gray in color and said that he was having trouble breathing.

The President was laid down in the emergency room and his clothing was removed.

At this time Parr saw the wound.

Parr instructed MISAIC Shaddick to secure the area.

Parr stated he knew shots were coming from the left and that the President had to go into the car fast - Parr read survey report that morning - Parr was not wearing a vest. Parr estimated shots came from 15-20 feet away.
March 31, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Robert Wanko PPD, at the Office of Inspection, by Inspector Houlihan and Assistant Inspector Fores.

Agent Wanko advised on Monday, March 30, 1981, he was assigned to work the 62167-2. He reported for work at approximately 7:00 AM on that date at the White House. Sometime during the morning he was given his assignment by Shift Leader Shaddick as the 62167-2 for the movement of the President to the Washington Hilton Hotel. In this assignment he had the responsibility of the 62167-2.

Upon their departure from the White House, Agent Wanko rode in the follow-up car. He was positioned in the 62167-2 which is the 62167-2. Upon arriving at the Washington Hilton he followed the President into the VIP entrance to the Hotel and trailed the working shift to the ballroom. During the speech Agent Wanko maintained security of the hallway and the entry/exit ballroom door. After the speech Agent Wanko followed the working shift to the holding room.

While the President was still inside Agent Wanko walked outside and took up a position on the other side of the Presidential limousine facing the crowd on T Street. Agent Wanko stated he had been standing at this position for a few seconds when he heard shots from a gun. He took the Uzi from the briefcase and went to the area where police and agents were struggling with an individual. This area was located on the sidewalk between the VIP entrance and the public entrance. Agent Wanko took up a position with his back against the wall facing toward the crowd on T Street. He took up this position to provide covering fire for the departing motorcade if necessary and
to assist in the apprehension of the suspect.

After the motorcade departed Agent Nanko advised he assisted in rendering first aid to Agent McCarthy. He said a citizen from the crowd also assisted in rendering first aid.

Bobbitt stated for the visit of the President to the Hilton Hotel on March 30, he was the Washington Field Office advance agent coordinator. He stated he was notified of his assignment on March 27, 1981, by way of a standard form memo, copy of which is attached to this interview sheet.

At the bottom of the interview sheet assignment sheet was a note - 'Hook up with Monday AM, coordinate with Bob on the weekend. March 27, 1981, was a Friday and he did not get this notice until late on Friday. He contacted or tried to contact Special Agent Bob that afternoon; however, Bob had left work and had gone home. He advised that he talked with Bob on Sunday by phone and that Bob advised that everything was done for him, to hook up with him at 11:00 AM on Monday.

Bob advised that he went down to the Hilton Hotel early on Monday.

He met with the hotel security personnel, checked post assignments and at 11:00 AM hooked up with Bob at the Hilton and went through all of the security arrangements with Bob. He stated that upon the President's arrival, he was pretty close to the holding room for the President and that he moved to the elevator since he was waiting for the shift leader and shift agents to arrive there and he was going to Bob of the shift agents himself.

He stated that Bob, in charge of hotel security, was the person who actually set up the rope barricade at the entrance to the VIP room outside the VIP entrance. He made several post adjustments once the President was inside due to the large crowd and that upon the President finishing his speech, he advised that he was going back outside for the departure and check things out. He then went out through the VIP exit. Upon coming out he noticed the
A rope barricade was still in place, the crowd was held in the area that the President would be coming out was clean as far as security. He came out of the VIP door and went towards the rope barricade area to observe the crowd. He then walked over in the vicinity of where the follow-up was parked. He began seeing the press was starting to come out from the main public entrance to the hotel and shortly thereafter he heard shots and actually he was looking from the back side of the follow-up over the hood towards the crowd. He saw a puff of smoke from a gun. He ran to the area of where the subject with the gun was standing and assisted other agents and police in subduing the subject and handcuffing him.

He also advised that the rope barricade area outside was in no way considered a press area that was designated by him or a special press area.

He also remembers that above the VIP entrance police officers had been posted.
TO: SEE BELOW

FROM: ASAIC

SUBJECT: PROTECTIVE ADVANCE

Through coordination with your ATSAIC's, the following personnel have been selected for an Advance Survey in connection with the visit, to this district, by:

RUTUS TO WASHING TO HOTEL

on 3/30/81 THRU 3/31/81 (noon-2:30p).

Your assignment will run from _____ THRU _____.

Please contact ATSAIC, Physical Protection Section for briefing regarding this assignment.

(b2, b7e)

(b6, b7c)

(WILL BE WORKING ON WEEKEND.)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

SPEECH AT 2PM ON 3/30/81 TO BUILDINGS AND CONSTRUCTION TRADE UNIONS
SPEECH CONCLUDED AT 2:30 PM

Hook up with Monday AM

(10/2/weekends)
March 31, 1981 - 1st Interview of SA Dennis McCarthy, at the Office of Investigation, by Jonathan Touchee and Roger Counts.

SA Dennis McCarthy advised that on March 30, 1981 he was part of an ID Response Team that was to cover the President's appearance at the Washington Hilton Hotel on Connecticut Avenue. Upon arrival at the Hilton, he and his partner, SA Spriggs, went inside the hotel at the ballroom at the main checkpoint where he observed people coming in for the event, that this was a standard procedure for the ID Response Team, to observe the people as they came in for the function. He was in the ballroom when he received a radio call advising him to respond to SA Russ Miller who was outside the hotel at the VIP entrance. He and Spriggs proceeded to the VIP entrance where they met with Agent Miller and he advised them that one of the policemen had told him that there was a subject in the crowd acting very strange. McCarthy remembers telling Spriggs on the way up to the VIP entrance - I bet that's who, in the crowd again. McCarthy and Spriggs approached the crowd and they observed the subject known to them as 601676.

His real name is 601676, a former subject who for the past few months has been making all of the Presidential stops that he apparently has knowledge of. He was dressed in casual clothes. They could observe that he was not concealing anything on him and in the past 601676, when he does show up for these events, simply yells and talks loud and just carries on. McCarthy went over to the subject, talked to him for a few minutes.

McCarthy advised that he was at the VIP entrance up on the arrival of the President. That as you face the VIP entrance down to the right towards the main public entrance, there was a rope barricade in place with the crowd standing behind it. The area of the arrival was very clean and that upon the arrival, the Secret Service went to the ballroom where they remained until after the speech which Mr. Reagan made the speech that is threaded on the Presentation page.
Upon departing the VIP door, he veered off to his left towards the rope barricade and the public and Spriggs veered off to the right. McCarthy advised he was walking toward the rope barricade and actually walked to the area of the end of the rope barricade which was along the curb when he heard shots. He turned to his right and saw the subject standing behind the rope barricade with a gun in both hands. He jumped this guy and as he grabbed the gun, the subject was still clicking the gun. They both went to the ground. McCarthy and the subject were immediately covered by other people jumping in to assist. McCarthy finally freed himself of his handcuffs and began trying to get the guy handcuffed. After a short time with the subject, they proceeded to a LPD cruiser in order to put the subject into the cruiser; however, they could not get the door unlocked and they went to a second LPD vehicle where McCarthy got in first, subject was put in, Spriggs also got in, and they left the area.

On the road to the lockup, McCarthy said he remembers telling the police officer who was driving the vehicle - Pass the word to your people that when we get to the underground, I want it clear - the only people I want to see are uniformed people. McCarthy said when they got there they all went to the call block where McCarthey advised the subject of his constitutional rights, after which the subject was searched and then SA McCarthy advised the subject of his constitutional rights. They then went to homicide with the subject. He remembers an FBI agent coming in and said - we will take over. McCarthy told the agent that he wanted to be relieved by one of his supervisors and shortly after Al Damasceno came in and advised McCarthy that it was all right, that the Bureau would now take over custody of the subject. McCarthy also said that from the time the subject was handcuffed at the Hilton Hotel until arriving at the call block, he asked the subject no questions. The subject did move ask McCarthy if he could
chose on the handcuffs a little bit, that he thought his twist was broken. McCarthy did tell him that - you're lucky it's only your wrist if it is.

McCarty also advised that there was no press area designated as such on the outside of the hotel. There was simply a rope, couple of stanchions across the sidewalk and some of the press were in there as well as the general public.

McCarty had several scratches on his hands and apparently his legs which he advised he received during the scuffle with the subject when he leaped on him and that later that evening he went to the Fairfax Emergency Hospital Emergency Room to have it checked out since his neck was hurting and his shoulder and apparently there was something wrong. The doctor advised him that probably he had pulled some muscles.

McCarty also advised that from the point he was standing to where he jumped on the subject, he was about, he'd guess, about 6-8 feet away when he leaped through the air on top of the subject.
March 31, 1961 - 1st interview of Agent Wood at the Office of Inspectors
by Inspectors Counts and Foushee

Agent Wood stated that his duties on March 30, 1961 was press pool agent,
that in the motorcade were the press pool vans consisting of 13 press people,
the NBC team and White House press officer Dave Prosperi.

Upon arrival at the Hilton he took the pool press in the public entrance
of the Hilton. He also remembers at towards the VIP entrance there was a
roped off barrier.

Inside the ballroom there was a press area for the pool press which was
located 15-20 feet from the stage and center aisle.

On departure after the President's speech the press departed out the
same way they went in through the public entrance. The camera crews and
some stills went up to the rope line and as they got there, the shooting
started.

Wood said he was standing at curbside by the rope barrier and he saw
a blonde guy with a gun extended and he jumped for the guy. Wood also stated
that he stayed and helped cuff this individual and helped take him to a police
patrol car.

Concerning the pool press Wood advised that when they came out of the
public entrance, there was some crowd standing by to watch the departure
of the President and that the pool press had to come around the crowd and on
to the curb in order to get their pictures.

Throughout this trip Agent Wood advised no members of the press have any
complaints to him about the press area inside or outside.

Agent Wood was not wearing a protective vest.
Wood also advised that inside the ballroom there was a pre-possedional press consisting of risers, etc. located about 20-30 feet back from the stage. Down in the middle aisle in front of the stage and in fact in front of some seated guests was the pool press area and a number of the public did not into this pool press area and take pictures.
March 31, 1981 - 1st Interview of (SA 66/67) at the Office of Inspection by Inspectors Counts and Foushee

66/67 was the PD advance agent for the President’s trip to the Hilton on March 30, 1981.

Agent 66/67 advised that there was no press area designated outside of the Hilton Hotel.

The rope barrier was put up by the hotel in the area of the grate to separate the general public from the arrival and departure area. Police officers were the only permanent posts around this rope barrier area.

66/67 also stated that SA Russ Miller was the

66/67 did state that there was a designated press area inside the hotel and SA 66/67 was the press agent.

SA Holzer advised that on March 30, 1981 at approximately 12:00 noon he held a security briefing of all security in the Adams Room of the Hilton.

At this briefing he asked the ID agent if there was any intelligence and McCarthy said they had none.

66/67 said he did not see the suspect at all and that on departure as they came out of the hotel, everything just seemed to be in order and well contained.
also stated that he might as well bring this up as he was sure it would come up later. Then he was doing the advance for this trip, he asked for two ID teams from UPO and that on Monday morning he received a phone call from McCarthy advising him that there had been a change of plans, that he would only get one ID team. He remembers initially it was agreed for two teams,
March 31, 1961 - 1st Interview with Russ Miller at the Office of Inspection

by Roger D. Counts and Jonathan H. Poushee

Attached are typewritten notes made by Russ Miller concerning his activities on March 30, 1961. These notes were given to Poushee by him on March 31, 1961.

Miller also stated that the rope barrier outside stayed up and intact for both the arrival and departure of the President.

He also remembers that there were approximately 621672 outside the VIP entrance.

Rope barrier was to keep the general public from getting closer. Of course, some press were with the crowd behind the rope.
On March 30, 1981, I attended a briefing for the President's visit to the Washington Hilton Hotel on Connecticut Avenue, at approximately 12 Noon in the Adams Terrace Room. The briefing was conducted by SA 67c from PPD. At that briefing, I was advised that my 62167c to the Hotel, I was shown copies of the acceptable identification for the visit, given the itinerary, and received an intelligence briefing from SA McCarthy to the effect there was no adverse intelligence and no lookouts. At approximately 1:00 PM I assumed 62167c.

62167c I am aware of the responsibilities of this post from having been posted in the same location before and from having done an advance at the same location. I understand I was to 62167c.

62167c In addition, it was to include general visual surveillance of the area that could be observed by the post.

Upon assuming my post, I made contact with the police officers located in the general area and with Hotel Security Chief, 66 67c who was at my post assisting in 62167c.

62167c Approximately 30 yards to the left of my post and approximately 40 degrees to the rear was what I believe to be a rope barrier across the sidewalk to restrict pedestrian traffic from approaching the area where the President was to enter the VIP door. I recall seeing several uniformed police officers standing in the same area. It was my understanding that the officers were to keep any crowd, press included, behind the ropes.
Approximately 20 minutes before the arrival, I was approached by two Metropolitan Police officers who pointed to the general public area (previously described) and pointed to an individual whom they had observed at previous locations protectee's had visited in the city in recent weeks. They advised the individual had not been violent but merely vocal. I looked at the crowd area in question and observed approximately 15-20 people in the crowd area, and further that several reporters had positioned themselves in the area also. There was no formal press area as such. The roped area was opened on a first-come first-serve sort of basis. The individual the officers were referring to was standing approximately 2 deep in the crowd, was a white/male, approximately 6'0" - 6'2" in height, shaggy brown hair, wearing maroon or burgundy pants, and a brown/gray tone striped shirt. At this time, I requested the security room send an ID team to my location. Approximately 2 minutes later, SA's McCarthy and Spriggs responded to my location at which time the officer and I pointed out the subject in question. They then proceeded toward the crowd area and I remained on my 621072. Shortly thereafter, they returned to my location and advised that he was known to them and that he would be observed by them. Prior to the arrival of the ID team, I had discussed the location of the subject with SA's Williamson 621072 who were 621072.

At approximately 15 minutes before the arrival of the President, I observed a liquid fuel truck pull up and stop on "T" Street, directly across from my post. At this time I requested the police officers at my location to attempt to have the driver move until
after the movement, as it would present a potential danger to the President. At the same time, I requested the security room send SA WFO Liaison Advance) to my location to help assist the police officers and resolve any problem which might arise. I then continued to control access through the.

Upon the arrival of the President at the Hilton, I restricted access through the to those properly pinned personnel who had arrived in the motorcade. While the President was in the Hotel, I continued to observe the surrounding area and restrict access. During this time, I had occasion to observe the crowd area from a distance and observed that since the arrival, a large number of spectators had filled the general crowd area as well as some reporters. From the vantage point of my post, I observed no suspicious or unusual activity in my field of vision. Prior to the incident under investigation, nothing attracted my attention to the alleged assailant.

As the President exited the VIP door, I focused my attention on the area across the street and up the hill directly to my right (the President's rear as he proceeded to the cars). Seconds after he exited the door, I heard what sounded like 4 or 5 small caliber shots. I then turned my attention toward the President at which time I observed SAIC Parr and ATSAIC Shaddick placing the President into the armored limousine. I then drew my weapon and responded toward the President's location. Upon arriving at the limousine, SAIC Parr had secured the President inside. I then turned my attention toward the crowd area and observed numerous law enforce-
ment personnel struggling with an individual. I then observed the limousine and follow-up starting to leave the scene, and realizing the shift may be injured or involved insubduing the assailant, I then assumed the B1 B2 on the follow-up car.

Upon arriving at the emergency entrance, I proceeded inside and at the direction of SAIC Parr and ATSAIC Shaddick, SA b667c b61b7c and I established checkpoint security at the entrance to the emergency room with the assistance of medical staff. I then accompanied the President to the operating room where I continued to operate a checkpoint at the entrance to the operating area with the assistance of Hospital personnel. I acted in this capacity until being relieved at approximately 10:00 PM.

I then proceeded to the Washington Field Office where I was interviewed by SA's b61b7c of the FBI, SA b61b7c of the U. S. Secret Service, and Detective b6,57c Metropolitan Police Department Homicide.
March 31, 1961 - On interview with [redacted] conducted for ABC, between 1:30 PM and 2:24 PM at ABC Headquarters by Reporters assorted and name.
Also present during the interview was Harry Selden, his partner, and Don Donaldson.

On the day of the visit to the Hilton he went to the VIP entrance area and once there asked a uniformed police officer where they wanted the press. The police officer asked an agent and according to Brown the police officer then said that - That's where they want you. Brown stated he was standing in the area of the grate on the sidewalk and that the rope barrier had not been put up at that time. This was approximately 1:00 PM. He covered the arrival of the President after which he went inside the ballroom to cover the speech. At the conclusion of the President's speech he went back outside where Don Donaldson had reserved him a spot along the rope and was going to cover the departure of the President.

He remembers after covering the arrival and upon entering the ballroom, Brown asked him how things were going and he complained to him that he was not very happy with the press situation outside and Rockey said - Let's talk about it later.

Brown stated he did not talk with or complain to any Secret Service agent on March 30 about the press area outside or inside. He asked him about the comments made by him in the interview where he claimed that Secret Service security had been penetrated by the subject and he stated he felt it had been because the press should have been on the rope line, that the public had a right to see the President, but the press represents more people and should have the roe front.
Brown's partner, Harry Golden, shares the same views as Brown and stated it is dangerous for the public to be in the crowd with the press, especially children, because if you get hurt, especially during an incident like the one on March 30, 1961.

Ron Donaldson advised us that he has covered many trips by the President to the Hilton and that he has never been there where there was a designated press area outside and on many occasions the rope barrier as it was on March 30, 1961. He stated that on March 30, 1961 there was a rope barrier on the outside but that this could not be considered a press area. There was no checking of credentials and nobody should consider this a press area.

He also stated the Secret Service cannot fully protect the President in our type of society, we can only minimize the potential and he made very complimentary remarks about the Secret Service's reaction when the shooting took place. He stated naturally the press would like the best spots up front to cover the President for two reasons - 1-in case of an instance such as the one that happened on March 30 and 2-for coverage of any remarks the President might make, that maybe in the future the Secret Service could use two rope barriers to separate the press out in front of the general public and also that he did not like the idea of a press pen.
March 31, 1961 - The Supervision of NANCY P.R. Keefrock at the Office of Exposition
by Inspector General and Deputy.

Keefrock remembers on arrival at the Hilton, VIP entrance, the area of the arrival
was clear. He did notice a small crowd to the right; however, they were contained.

Upon departure as he left the VIP entrance with the President, he looked to
his left and saw the public and some press. They were contained and about three
feet from the Presidential Limousine he heard some shots. He grabbed the Presi-
dent and helped push him into the Limousine along with Jerry Parr. Their feet
were hanging out of the Limousine and he pushed their feet in the door and shut
the back door. He at first decided to get into the Limousine in the front seat
but then thought he should not open the door since they were secure inside
and he did not know what else might be around; therefore, he ran back to the
follow-up and jumped in the right front of the follow-up.
March 31, 1961 - 1st Interview with CA John Barry by Inspectors Zunche and Counts.

Upon arrival CA Barry noted that the crowd was controlled and the entry area was clear.

Inside, there was a large crowd, right up to the stage.

He held a 3:09:02 and followed the President out of the hall.

He took the stairs to the upper elevator landing with Shaddick, 3/16/61 and McCarthy.

As the landing was clear, he went outside to check the crowd.

He first looked across the street and then glanced to his left and thought about how close the crowd was to the follow-up. He took up a position at the right front fender.

There was a very large crowd that was right up to the bend in the wall.

He felt he was outside from 3: to 45 seconds ahead of the President.

He noticed that the street was wet.

He heard two shots followed by three or four more.

He saw Brady go down and also saw the policeman fall.

He saw the cars moving away and did not feel he could take the follow-up car considering the wet street.

He saw the suspect being subdued and noted no other hostile activity.

He did not see the gun when the shots were being fired.

He saw Brady had a head wound and shouted for someone to call an ambulance.

He talked to Brady and thought he got a response.

He applied bandages to Brady's wound until a police arrival and applied a pressure bandage.

He did not use the 3:00 ambulance united.
He was aware of the gun lying near Brady's head and also noted a second gun on the ground near the suspect.

He instructed SA to stay at the scene.
March 31, 1981 - First interview with Billy Joe at the Old 78 by Inspectors Mccullough and Counts.

Billy Joe did the press advance for the staff.

We met with SA Billy Joe and others at the Hilton Hotel on Friday (March 27) for a walk-thru.

To designated press area outside the hotel. Has been approximately four events at this hotel over the past six weeks and the arrangement was always the same.

Positions at the ropeline are handled first come-first served.

Inside, there was a designated press area in the back of the ballroom and tables for the writing press in front of the stage. This was not the preferred arrangement by the staff but they gave in to the host committee's wishes.

The center aisle was to be used by the press "pool" for cut-aways (photos).

People from the audience kept getting into the center aisle to take pictures, causing a very crowded situation.

Billy Joe helped remove the crowd from the center aisle. This included the traveling pool.

Pool was allowed to work in front of the stage but behind the tables. This was roped, but a second rope was needed to form a chute.

Pool left by the same route that they entered.

The ropeline outside very crowded. The crowd was much larger than on any previous stops.

The pool was forced to go into the street, around the rotunda, to get to the ropeline.
accompanied suspect to suicide interview room.

Saw an F. J. Attorney arrive and was told that the FBI was on their way.

said a nitrate test was run on the suspect by the FBI lab.

said that he knew President was in his car and he didn't think that he could catch the follow-up.

He thinks the suspect was about 15 feet from the President.

said that the roped area has never been a press area but has always been for the general public and news media.

was not wearing a vest.
March 31, 1981 - 1st interview of SA b6167c, at the office of Inspection, by Inspectors Echel and Cannon.

SA b6167c was working the 62,67c shift on March 31, 1981.

SA b6167c reviewed the survey report prior to leaving the White House.

b6167c arrived at the VIP entrance of the Washington Hilton Hotel in the follow-up vehicle, SS-5940, and accompanied the President into the hotel.

b6167c proceeded to the holding room via the stairwell, while the President went by elevator.

b6167c then accompanied the President from the holding room to the ballroom. We did not have a fixed post so he maintained a post with SA b6167c.

b6167c accompanied the President from the ballroom to the VIP entrance.

b6167c used the stairwell while the President used the elevator.

b6167c exited the VIP entrance ahead of the President and angled to the left toward the Presidential vehicle.

He looked across Florida Street and saw a crowd, he looked left and saw a crowd on the sidewalk next to the hotel. This crowd on the sidewalk was a mixture of press and public and appeared to be contained although he does not recall seeing any rope.

b6167c glanced back to his right and it was clear. He then looked over his shoulder to the area above the VIP entrance and saw people as usual.

b6167c walked around the front of the Presidential vehicle to the left front window.

b6167c then heard clapping and cheering.
then heard shots (bam, bam, pause, bam, bam, bam
OR bam, bam, bam, pause, bam, bam, bam).

armed toward the shots and drew his weapon. He saw the
President being shoved into the vehicle and he started to the rear of the
vehicle. He glanced back toward the front of the vehicle, saw no one
coming, and then cleared the rear of the vehicle.
saw two bodies on the ground or going down.
then saw assailant being put down but never saw him shooting.
approached, saw assailant without a weapon and then put his back in
his holster.
helped handcuff the suspect.
told SA Marco to stop on suspect’s weapon (which was laying
on the ground) and told police to get elderly citizens out of the area. Citizen
appeared to be trying to help subdue suspect.

is not sure when Presidential vehicle left but know that the
President was inside.

CA Spriggs and CA D. McCarthy took suspect to 1st HFD car
but could not open rear door. They took him to 2nd HFD car, put him in and
reported.
told driver to go to the Central Cell Block, asked HFD driver
to request additional officers and called on his radio (CS 8T-220) and asked
for a ID team and supervisor to respond to the Central Cell Block.
said that suspect was advised of his rights by CA D. McCarthy.
heard the shots and took a couple of steps toward the President then turned to help in crowd control.

The pool was lined up at an angle from the corner of the ropeline toward the motorcade.

He did not specifically notice the ropeline.

He recalled SA been being concerned with the crowd in the center aisle inside.

Nothing was ever said about the ropeline outside being a press area. It has always been done this way.

He described the arrangement inside as not being their best drill.

He talked with Hank Brown (NBC) while in the ballroom about the press set-up. Brown said it was too crowded. was sure he meant the arrangement in the hall.